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Abstract: 
This MA thesis deals with the European Community's response to the Central 
European challenge. The lack of explanatory and normative theories to explain the 
European integration process as a whole demonstrates that it has been driven by 
Member States' interests and could be heavily influenced by external aspects. Despite 
the different political models of organisation (i.e. federation, confederation or 
international organisation) at the disposition of several states to organise themselves 
to tackle international problems, West European member states did not completely 
subscribe to any of these and that makes the European Union the political invention of 
this century. The politico-administrative model of the European Union is the result of 
a original and unprecedented bargaining to preserve national interests and 
supranational efficiency both at the same time. This process is both the source of its 
originality and the reason of its relative inefficiency when compared to the United 
States of Germany. However the European Union survives and proves the relevance in 
the international scene when confronted to external effects. Our argument is that 
Central Europe could be considered as one of the external factors that might push the 
European Union to strengthen its decision making process and to render its action 
more efficient and responsive to Central European needs. This thesis deliberately 
limits itself to the economic and political sides of European external policy and 
shows the evolution of the methods, structures and concepts that the European Union 
used to build up a Common Commercial Policy and to set up the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. 
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IntimdMCtiom 
The 1989 revolution has suddenly accelerated the European historical process and 
reactivated a political reality which disappeared in 843: A unified Europe. Numerous 
attempts have been made during the past centuries to bring Europe under a single political 
structure. The most extreme and brutal Ffitlerian episode divided Europe into two halves 
during almost 40 years, instead of bringing European countries back together. Now that the 
Iron Curtain is down, Western Europe has the unique opportunity to reunify the whole 
continent on democratic and market economy principles. Although this political project is 
an old European dream, very few academics or politicians thought that its peaceful realisation 
could be possible by the end of the twentieth Century. As the European Community became 
the major potential European power by default, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it 
assumed the responsibility to bring this project to a successful conclusioa This programme, 
however, requires dramatic changes and presses the Community to reform itself in order to 
take on its new international responsibihties, before such a European dream might be 
possible. 
In this context, the most recent and most forceful challenge for the EC is the end 
of the Cold War and the consequent release of the Central and Eastern European countries 
form the former Eastern Block. This development has put the EC under pressure on 
numerous counts. The collapse of the bi-polar system of world politics presents an 
opportunity and a challenge to the EC to assert itself on the international scene as a third big 
international player. Central Europe presents many problems to the EC which cannot be 
answered i f there is no clear coherent strategy. Therefore a would-be coherent European 
Common Foreign Policy would have to be developped with a long term strategy and would 
have to include and integrate many aspects of international life such as economics, security 
and political aspects. The EC was clearly not ready to undertake such a diplomatic role as 
it never managed to acquire a far reaching common policy in political affairs since the failure 
of the European Defence Community in 1954. Even i f the Founding Fathers were conscious 
of the very important political role of the EEC -to preserve peace on the European continent-, 
they were unable to develop the adequat institutional structure framing the political 
cooperation. Although the political activity of the EC has been developed since the 1970s, 
the EU has major handicaps in dealing with Central Europe. 
Central Europe is particularly important to the Community, firstly, because it 
occupies an important place in European history and has a very symbolic meaning. It 
represents the object of contempt of the Twentieth Century European civil wars and it 
embodies and suffers from the division between East and West. To solve the Central 
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European problem without isolating Russia will signify the end of the East/West antagonism 
As a consequence it is worth for the EU to improve its international capacity to act. 
Secondly, Central European countries are facing many problems which influence the 
European Community directly. Moreover, as following the Copenhagen Summit in 1992 
Central European countries expect to join the EC, the latter has to undertake fundamental 
revision of its economic policies, its political structures and institution to prepare them for 
accession. Thirdly, because Central Europe is facing problems, such as borders disputes, 
non-respect of minority rights, political instability and security concerns, that are common 
to Eastern Europe and to the part of the continent which was under Soviet control, the EC 
and then the EU has to set up a structure and to initiate a policy that enables it to intervene 
diplomatically, efficiently and early enough to prevent conflicts. A long-term strategy is 
therefore needed. 
This Central European challenge has major consequences on the European integration 
process as it has, in particular, questioned the EC's international capacity. Does this mean 
that the EC's answers to Central European challenge can be considered as a Common 
European Foreign Policy? In order to answer this question this thesis will: 
analyse the impact of the reappearance of Central Europe in Europe; 
study the Community answer to Central European economic and political needs; 
examine the emergence of the international role of the Community. 
To fulf i l this task, Chapter 1 recalls some basic aspects of the European integration 
process and introduces us to the concept of Central Europe and the historical challenge that 
it represents for the EC. The liberation of Central Europe from the glacis pmtecteur of the 
Soviet Union has had major consequences for the geopolitical landscape of Europe but also 
for the integration process of the European Community. Central Europe is facing important 
economic and political hardship that cannot be solved by any other institution but the 
European Community. How is the EC going to undertake the role that it has been given 
unanimously by the international community? 
Chapter 2 goes into more details to analyse the setting up of the Common 
Commercial Policy. There are two reasons for such a demarche. First, because it helps us 
to understand how decisions are made in the early nineties to answer Central and Eastern 
European economic and financial needs. Secondly, because it provides a very useful basis 
on which to compare what has been done at the economic level and what has been achieved 
politically so far. The dichotomy existing in the European structure dealing with political 
and economic external affairs has been detrimental to the scope and efficiency of Community 
actions. It took the EC/EU four years to decide what would be its policy towards Central 
Europe. The political decision in favour of the accession has had a great influence on the 
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economic policy of the EC which progressively updated its major tools of economic and 
financial intervention: the Association agreements and the PHARE programme. 
Chapter 3 explains how the EC has developed its new concept of agreements which 
took the shape of Europe Agreements and their relevance to the economic and financial needs 
of Central Europe in the perspective of accession. Europe Agreements were first aimed at 
Central Europe but were then extended to Eastern Europe. The extension of the EC's 
activities shows that the Community cannot be concerned only with its closest neighbours 
but that it has to take a pan-European view. Of course the EC/EU cannot offer the same 
level of integration and cooperation to all European states because its resources are limited 
and because it has to deal with a still potent and unfavourable Russia. It therefore had to 
develop policies with different levels of commitment. The EC/EU has given the highest level 
of political and economic commitment to Associated countries in order to put into place the 
free trade area and because they have clearly expressed their will to join the EU. Europe 
Agreements and their political corollary are the best way to prepare the accession of these 
states, but what is the Community doing for other states? As far as international intervention 
is concerned, something else had to be found to answer needs of countries which have not 
yet signed the Europe Agreements or to provide political solutions to specific problems such 
as security, prevention and defence that are outside the scope of Europe Agreements. 
Member countries agreed to transform the EC into a European Union by bringing the 
external political dimension under a single institutional framework 
Chapter 4 analyses the new institutional structure set up by the Maastricht Treaty 
which is designed to answer the EUs neighbours' concerns in a more adequate manner. Does 
Maastricht give the EU the necessary means to achieve a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy? A comparison between the prerequisites which were the basis of the difficult but 
successful Common Commercial Policy and those set up by the Treaty on European Union 
will enable us to answer that question. What level of efficiency, democracy and transparency 
can be expected from the EU in its external political relations. An analysis of the results 
achieved by the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy will be the best criterion 
to determine which reforms are necessary to undertake before enlarging. Central Europe 
represents an institutional challenge for the European Union because its political goal is very 
clear: to join the EU. Consequently the EU has to think now about the reforms to undertake. 
There is no consensus at all about what should be done and about what the EU is going to 
be. Will it be a federation or will the Member States try to preserve the present balance 
between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism? Is there a choice? Chapter 4 considers 
the consequences of the enlargement on the European Union. 
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Chapter 1 
WhM h Cemhrd Eimpe? 
Ckqpter 1 
WkM is CevMmi Emtope? 
I) JMEmopeaiiiMegnMonpmcesSo TlmoreAcdrntdUstoncd 
It is common place to say that theories do not mould the course of events but are 
invented to explain them, 1 however it is no less true to say that the European integration 
process has challenged many scholars in their theorizing work, be it normative or 
explanatory. The European Community is a regional group of nations-states of a complex 
nature which does not respond to any usual theoretical framework As a matter of fact its 
decision-making process and its structure are cumbersome, and its political finality uncertain 
and not clearly defined. The attempt to provide the EC with a theoretical explanation is 
rendered even more complex by the fact that nation-states and international relations are 
undergoing massive changes, and that the question of adaptiveness of the states to manage 
complex economic interdependence is at stake in this theoretical battle. It is not the place 
here to explain in extenso the theories of International Relations or those of regional 
integration, but it is nevertheless necessary to have an overview of the different theories 
1 R.W. Cox 'Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory1 
Millennium 10:2 1981 pp. 126-55. 
backgro undo 
Tai toujours pense que l'Europe se ferait 
dans les crises, et qu'elle serait la somme 
des solutions qu'on apporterait a ces 
crises.' 
Jean Monnet. Memoires p. 622 
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Chapter 1 What is Central Europe? 
which tried to explain the European integration and what kind of challenge Central European 
countries represent for the European Community. 
It is difficult to find a satisfactory, comprehensive and systematic theoretical model to 
apply in rigorous analyses of the European Community and to explain the interaction 
between the apparently contradictory forces which are the engine of the integration process. 
As C. Webb put it 
Faced with conceptual and methodological anomie, uncertainty as to the 
long-term political significance of the EC, or even the most appropriate 
criteria by which this could be measured, the analyst is inclined to despair.2 
Theories are furthermore changing because they have to adjust their concept to the 
changing nature of international relations and to the changing reality of the European 
integration process. In a rapid overview of the different theories which have been used in 
the political interpretations of the EC, we could say that none of them is sufficient in itself 
but they all give a useful insight into the whole integration process. Amongst those which 
proved to be quickly dismissed by events are Federalism which foresaw a steady and 
homogeneous transfer of sovereignty to a central and unique decision center and 
Functionalism which assumed that integration was progressing thanks to automatic spill over. 
According to C. Webb3, only three theoretical frameworks are still more or less valid: Neo-
functionalism, Intergovemmentalism and interdependence. At the basis of these three 
theories are different conceptions of modern state which are themselves defined by three 
fundamental concepts: boundaries, sovereignty and national interests. For each of them, two 
opposed sets of interpretation are available: 
- states boundaries: billiard ball and cobweb theories 
- sovereignty: intrinsic or functional 
- national interest: domestic and international politics. 
Because European integration theories used different premises, their conclusions on the 
purpose and the evolution of the European Community are therefore divergent. What are 
they? 
Neo-functiowdism and the tenants of the cobweb model of international politics affirm that 
governments could be divided into sets and layers of diverse interests, some of which would 
2 C. Webb 'Theoretical Perspectives and Problems' in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and C. Webb 
Policy making in the European Community. London 1983. pp. 1-41 
3 C. Webb Policy making in the European Community.^. 1-41. 
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naturally have links with similar groups in others states.4 In the neo-functionalist's view, this 
natural cooperation is particularly necessary in the economic sphere and is bound to evolve, 
through the "concept of spillover', into deeper economic and political integration. The 
logical consequence of this process is the eventual emergence of a supranational political 
entity which would be more efficient than national states to manage economic 
interdependence. The assumption of automatic spillover has been dismissed by a growing 
influence of intergovernmental bargains and structure in the Community-building process. 
Intergovernmentalism is based on the concept that national governments, as subjects and 
actors of international relations, are large units which can legitimately and effectively claim 
to manage the external interests of their societies. 5 This political creed leads the 
governments to preserve a 'billiard ball' mentality in international negotiations. The EC 
would thus be the result of strategies pursued by rational governments acting on the basis of 
their preferences and power. The European integration process would be acceptable only 
insofar as it strengthens nation-states' control over domestic affairs, permitting them to attain 
goals otherwise unachievable. The major agenda-setting decisions in the history of the EC, 
in which common policies are created or reformed, are negotiated intergovernmentally (i.e. 
European Councils) 
Interdepetulence analysis has given up the 'billiard ball' theory but still believes in the 
resiliance of states to manage interdependence. 6 It draws attention to the diminishing 
importance of the formal boundaries of states as they become enmeshed in, and dependent 
on, extensive economic exchanges. The concept of interdependence explains the conditions 
under which governments have to contemplate some form of collaboration; but unlike the 
4 E. Haas The Uniting of Europe, Stanford, 1957, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration 
Theory, Research Studies 25, Institute of International Studies, Berkeley 1975. and "Turbulent fields 
and the theory of regional integration', Internationa! Organisation, Vol. 30 n°2, Spring 1976. pp. 172-
212. D. Puchala 'Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration' Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 10. 1972. pp. 267-85. L. N. Lindberg The Political Dynamics of European Economic 
Integration, SUP, Stanford, 1963. 
5 R Dahrendorf, A Third Europe, Jean Monnet Lecture, European University Institute, Florence, 
26 November 1979. 
Moravcsik 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the 
European Community' in International Organization, Vol.45, Winter 1991. pp. 19-56. 
6 R Keohane and J. Nye "International Interdependence and Integration' in F. Greenstein and N. 
Polsby Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 8, Massachusetts, 1975. pp. 363-414 and Power and 
interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, 1977. 
M. Camps, The Management of Interdependence, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1974. 
R N. Cooper "Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies' World Politics, Vol. 
24 January 1972. pp. 159-81 and "Interdependence and Co-ordination of Policies' in Economic Policy 
in an Interdependent World: Essays in World Economics, MIT Press, Cambridge 1986. 
12 
Chapter 1 What is Central Europe? 
integration theory, it does not necessarily define the outcome very precisely. 
Interdependence serves as a justification for maintaining the EC in spite of disagreements 
amongst its member states about its ultimate political purpose. This theory has the same 
starting point as neo-functionalism, but where the neo-functionalist sees here a reason to 
transform completely the structure of the nation-states, the interdependent argues for their 
adaption to a new international environment. 
Because the European integration process has no precedent, and because it does not 
respond to a precise pre-established and coherent model of elaboration,7 theorists came to 
treat the EC as a sui generis phenomenon which cannot be the object of theoretical 
generalization8. As a haut fonctionncdre of the EC would put it 'the.Union is not a natural 
unit but a voluntary construction. In a fundamental way, it is a contract through which 
common polices are conducted and rules are established to attain agreed purposes among 
member-states.'9 Moravcsik cautiously suggests considering the EC as an international 
regime for policy coordination where national preferences are determined by the constraints 
and opportunities imposed by economic inter-independence. The outcome of 
intergovernmental negotiations is determined by the relative bargaining power of 
governments and the functional incentives for institutionalization created by high transaction 
costs and the desire to control domestic agendas. 1 0 In fact, this theoretical confusion is a 
consequence of the extreme institutional elasticity and adaptability that the EC is capable of 
to accommodate national concerns and interests. As a matter of fact, European integration 
history shows that, when established mechanisms were judged to be unsuitable or 
unacceptable for a specific purpose, the EC has set up either an intergovernmental non-treaty 
approach, a non-treaty partial membership approach or non-community pillars. Of course, 
at the end of such a process the original idea of the Founding Fathers fades away, 
transforming the European Union into an impalpable reality feeding scepticism As J.A. 
Caporaso argues 
7 The European integration is said to be supranational in intention and intergovernmental in 
practice. C.Webb Policy making in the European Community, p. 23. 
8 A. Moravcsik 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach' in Journal oj Common Market Studies, Vol. 31 n°4. Etecember 1993. 
pp. 473-524. p. 477. 
9 Speech on prospects for the European Union given by the head of the Commission of the EC 
to the United Nations. Unpublished, New York, 19 May 1994. 
1 0 A. Moravcsik 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach' in JCMS, Vol. 31 n° 4. December 1993. p. 517 
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'the important achievements of Western Europe, particularly in NATO, EC and 
CSCE were the products of self regarding and rather hard-headed bargains among 
states rather than concessions to 'community spirit' transnational economic forces, 
or supranational Eurocrats. 1 1 
The European integration process has evolved following three axes that A. Lloyd had 
detailed as follows: 1 2 - The Communitarian method 
- Use of extra Community mechanisms 
- Enlargement 
The Communautarian method is based on institutional balance, a constant objective (the 
Union) and a strategic functional growth. One of the major characteristics of the European 
integration process is the mixing of the innovatory federalist approach and the more classical 
intergovernmental approach. The adoption of practical solutions has given birth to an hybrid 
system wherein supranational and intergovernmental bodies are interacting toward a common 
objective: a European Union. This concept of political union has always been present in the 
history of the European integration process, but was never defined. The Maastricht Treaty 
(signed on 7 February 1992) implements a European Union which was adopted on 1 
November 1993, but its nature is still not clearly defined juridically speaking and seems 
bound to evolve at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. European Union institutions are 
complex, its powers ill-defined and its constitutional nature is still hesitating between an 
intergovernmental structure and a more federalist orientatioa In the absence of a 
substantive consensus on the long-term political objectives of the EC, the Community, given 
its structure, has to look to its policy performance to win support and stature. The 
communautarian method consists of emphasizing the economic efficiency and necessity and 
of keeping a low profile on political and institutional issues where stronger opposition would 
have been met. This pragmatic link which exists between economics and institutional, 
embodied in the Jean Manner's method, gives to each major step towards more integration 
a precise task: ECSC was aimed at preserving peace on the continent, the EEC to ensure the 
economic prosperity of the European continent and the European Union the reunification of 
the European continent after the 1989 revolution The political aspect was never absent from 
European Community concerns but was hidden in technical or economic achievements. This 
1 1 J. A Caporaso 'Has Europe changed? Neorealism, Institutions and Domestic politics in the new 
Europe' in R- J. Jackson Europe in transition the management of security after the cold war. Praeger, 
London 1992. 
1 2 Alexis Lloyd "Les etapes et la methode' in A. Lloyd & A Winckler L'Europe en chantier, 
Hachette, Coll. Pluriel, Paris 1993. pp. 11 - 32. 
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method has had a long lasting dramatic effect because it has cut off the populations from the 
European process. It is not without irony that Moravcsik affirms that the EC's 'democratic 
deficit' may be a fundamental source of its success. 1 3 The lack of public support to the 
European integration process is now a major weakness of the present European Union. The 
rediscovery of the European Community has created a feeling of fear and deep scepticism 
which could be seen during the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. 
The paralysis of the European Community which followed the Luxembourg compromise 
in 1966 has obliged the European Community to adopt pragmatic solutions which escaped 
the Community legislatioa Several initiatives developed on an intergovernmental non-treaty 
basis. Amongst them we can find the Franco-German treaty of cooperation in 1963, the 
creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970, the creation of the European 
Councils in 1974. Some other initiatives are following a non-treaty partial membership 
approach such as the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, and the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM). More recently, the EC has created two non-Community pillars 
(Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice Home affairs). 
European integration also progresses in the enlargement process, as it often goes with 
more integration if there is strong political will of the political actors at the Community level 
and at the same time a well defined strategy. As a matter of fact, during the first 
enlargement, the 1969 Hague conference spelt out the typical community model of 
integration: completion, widening and deepening. The acceptance of the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Ireland into the EEC enabled it to launch the Economic and Monetary Union 
project (EMU Werner Plan 22 March 1971). It also enabled the Community to develop its 
own budgetary resources and set up an embryo of political cooperation (see infra Davignon 
report). The second enlargement brought Greece in the EC into 1981 and beforehand, the 
EMS and the election of the European Parliament in 1979. With Spain and Portugal in 1986, 
the Single European Act was signed on 17 February 1987. 
1 3 A Moravcsik 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach' in JCMS, Vol. 31 n° 4. December 1993. p. 477. 
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K ) Centird Emrope: a new isnpeim for Esmpem imtegnsMom 
Central Europe may be the necessary impetus that the EC needs to compensate for its 
weaknesses as an EC fonctionnaire saw them: Economic recession, political rift in the 
public opinion support and perception that fundamental divergence about the future of the 
EU has been mostly papered over. Central European economic and political crises are also 
very important for the European integration process, because, as Jean Monnet put it in his 
Memoires: 'only emergencies make actions necessary'. 1 4 Through its action in Central 
Europe, the EU will have the chance to show its political maturity and to organise a real 
debate on its relevance as an international political actor and the urgency to achieve a 
political union to take its world wide economic and diplomatic responsibilities. Of course, 
Central Europe is not the only challenge that the EU is going to face, but Central European 
countries represent many problems which are common to the rest of Europe and for which 
it would be good to find a solution now in order to put into place a comprehensive and 
efficient external policy. In my view, because of the Central European challenge, the EU is 
most likely to pass from a reactive external policy to an active policy, and to affirm itself as 
a major international partner to the United States, Russia and Japan. As far as the economic 
recession is concerned, the pressure that Central Europe put on the EC and then the EU to 
destroy its trade barriers has opened new possibilities and new markets for European 
companies. Concerning the widespread perception that fundamental questions about the EC 
have been avoided, Central Europe will provoke the Member States to make up their mind 
because the prospect of enlargement to a European Union of 20 Member States, would for 
sure put an end to the continuous ambiguity between half-hearted federalism and disguised 
intergovernmentalism All the ingredients for a revival of the European integration process 
are present in the Central European challenge. Central Europe represents first a clear 
historical challenge which could lead to the reunification of the European continent if the EU 
takes it successfully 
With the end of the cold war and its simplistic division, between East and West, a 
number of countries, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, have re-adopted the name of 
Central Europe. This concept of Central Europe, whose history is the clearest illustration of 
1 4 Jean Monnet Memoires. Livre de Poche, Fayard, Paris 1978. p. 356. 
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the East/West antagonism,15 and the field of the major European Civil war, has resurrected 
from the Soviet grave. What is Central Europe? Does its re-emergence mean a new phase 
in the East West struggle? Or does it mean the definitive peaceful settlement based on 
freedom and liberty? 
Central Europe has never been easy to define because it depends on the whole concept 
of Europe first and on the moving concept of Western and Eastern Europe. What does it 
mean today? Having for its basis an ill-defined geographical reality, the notion of Europe 
takes a variable geometry according to which aspects one looks at. These aspects could be 
civilisational, such as history, religion or culture, or more politically oriented such as 
diplomatic construction, security-based prospective or economic integration. Hugh Seton-
Watson presents Europe as physical reality 'definefd by] the north-west peninsula of the 
Asian land mass'. 1 6 However, if its western boundaries are naturally clearly defined, its 
eastern limits are less static. The Russian writer Elgiz Pozdnyakov affirms that Russia is 
'part of another type of civilisation, another religious and cultural type', and that it never, and 
will never belong to Europe. 1 7 Vaclav Havel, former dissident and now Czech President, 
argues, in the Tragedy of Central Europe,18 that Europe, from the Atlantic to Ural mountains, 
has always been divided, religiously and historically into two halves which have evolved 
separately'. Central Europe is the child of the East/West stormy relationship and as V. Havel 
put it 'Central Europe's borders are imaginary and must be drawn and re-drawn with each 
new historical situation'. 1 9 
Central Europe had been constantly between these two influences. Considered as 'the 
window on Europe' by Russia, Central Europe was seen by the West as 'the eastern post of 
Western civilisation',20 defending the cultural heritage of West as the OstReich did in 1685 
by stopping the Turkish invasioa The fundamental difference of culture and civilisation was 
1 5 for LEberle 'Central Europe is a political question for policy makers', in V. Havel Spring in 
Winter, the 1989 revolutions Gwyn Prins (ed) Manchester University Press, Manchester} 1990. p. 197. 
1 6 Hugh Seton-Watson "Thoughts on the concept of West and East in Europe' in Government and 
Opposition, vol. 20 no.4. 1985. pp. 157-165. 
1 7 Elgiz Pozdnyakov 'The Soviet Union: the problem of coming back to European civilisation' 
in Paradigms, vol. n° 5, n° 1/2, pp. 45-57. 
1 8 Vaclav Havel in M. Kundera "The tragedy of Central Europe' in New York Reviews of Books, 
26 April 1984. p.36. 
1 9 M. Kundera,'The tragedy of Central Europe' in New York Reviews of Books, 1984. p.36. 
2 0 Kumar, "The 1989 Revolutions and the idea of Europe' in Political Studies, vol. n° XL, 1992. 
p.449. 
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the pretext for numerous hegemonic interventions in the centre of Europe, making Central 
Europe this huge "playground'. 
After the first World War, the Versailles Treaty and the subsequent treaties confirmed 
the importance of Central Europe in the settlement of the Franco-German antagonism The 
French were convinced that the only way to control and balance the authoritarian German 
power was to encircle it thanks to Central Europe, by organising it diplomatically and 
politically, according to French needs. Great Britain developed another view of Central 
Europe, which was to be a cordon sanitcdre between the Soviet Russia and the West. 
This definition of Central Europe as a buffer zone between the two major powers slightly 
changed after the implementation of the Yalta manipulations which gave the Soviet Union 
her beloved glacis protecteur. The ideological war which followed merged Central Europe 
into an Eastern European geopolitical role and proved that the whole concept of Central 
Europe could die with a reinforcement of the East/West opposition Eastern countries 
became an important concern for Stalin who wanted to protect Ukrainian plains from Western 
invasions and Soviet Union from Capitalist influences, and German hegemony. Stalin 
committed himself to destroying the anti-Russian and anti-Cornmunist seeds in Croatia, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia which had links with the Nazi 
power, and to put Central Europe under military control. The Soviet Union removed all 
latent conflicts between states, nationalities, ethnic groups and religions by imposing 
Communism and by carrying out massive deportations of minorities. The de-nazification of 
Central Europe conducted by Russians went in parallel with a de-Gerrnanisation of these 
areas. 2 1 As a result of both the Nazi and the Soviet occupation, Central Europe was 
unrecognisable and transformed into a 'disinfected' and unproductive area, as its two basic 
influences, Jewish and German, were destroyed. 
Despite the achievements of the Central European countries in the revolutionary process 
of 1989, it would not have been possible without the reforms implemented by Gorbachev in 
the Soviet Union between 1985 and 1990. In his speech on the 70th anniversary of the 
October revolution, Gorbachev reaffirmed the existence of different roads to Socialism stating 
that all parties are fully and irreversibly independent'.22 The self limited interference of 
Soviet Union in national affairs, and Gorbachev's call urging Polish communists to join the 
2 1 J. Rupnik, Le probleme Allemand vu de l'Europe du Centre-Est', in Revue Francaise de 
Sciences Politiques, Vol. 37 no.3. Juin 1987. 
2 2 K. Dawisha Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and reform, the great challenge, Cambridge, C.U.P. 
1990. p.76. 
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non-communist majority government led by Mazowiecki, in August 1989, signalled the end 
of Soviet support to most of the founding fathers. Honecker retired on 18 October 1989 and 
Husak was forced to leave in November, and other hard-line communists, who were no 
longer backed by popular sympathy, had to leave. The Russian reforms helped the reform 
process in Hungary and Poland, where debates accelerated in 1989 on even more 
thoroughgoing political, economic and military reforms, including neutrality (the issue on 
which USSR intervened in Hungary in 1956). The first popular demonstration hardly 
received any state opposition Central Europe was then given the opportunity to redefine its 
role within Europe, and therefore its relations with the unified Germany, which reappeared 
to be at the centre of the European Chess set. 
The traumatic forty year experience of Communism that Eastern Europe has undergone 
pressed countries like Poland, Hungary and former Czechoslovakia to emphasise their 
historic, cultural and religious allegiance to Western Europe. But are they that similar? Even 
if they affirm to belong to the same European family, they are still different in many aspects 
from Western Europe. The 1989 revolutions gave them the opportunity to reaffirm their 
peculiarity first as a distinct nation, and second as a group of nations with common traditions 
and regional ties.23 
ML) Visegmd, Poland, Czech Republic Slovakia and Hungary 
Each country is now looking to their past to find some guidelines of what would be an 
ancillary experience and would reflect the true nature of their nation. However, this process 
is dangerous, as is revealing atavistic oppositions. National egoisms have to be taken into 
account. As Charles Gati put it 
'History signifies a search for the usable past. To be usable, the past 
must fill the post-communist ideological vacuum, help to discover long-
suppressed indigenous values and rekindle national self-assurance and 
self-respect. Alas, the past may also assist those who seek to escape 
from complex and often painful present realities into an ostensibly 
golden age of glory and grandeur'.24 
2 3 T.Garton Ash. 'East Europe's opposition' in The New York Review of books Vol XXXV no 
15 October 13, 1988. p.3 
2 4 Ch. Gati 'East Central Europe: the morning after1 Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, 5. Winter 1990-
91. p.131. 
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Although Central European intellectuals emphasise that they truly belong to Europe, and 
not to Russia, they remain extremely critical of the political concept of Central Europe. 
Havel claimed that 'Central Europe is not a state: it is a culture or a fate.25 KKumar 
emphasises that the heavy Soviet occupation has created a superficial Eastern identity, from 
which the search for a Central European distinctiveness would be as superficial if not 
meaningless.26 Feher adds that 'Yalta created a geographical entity 'Eastern Europe which 
as a polity or a community of destiny had never before existed.'27 Kumar carries on by 
affirming that if Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary may count themselves as Central 
European, there is no need for them to pursue a common path, and that they are not 
condemned to the same destiny. This point is indeed important, but if we do not subscribe 
entirely to his negation of a different Central European entity therefore, we should always 
bring to the attention of the reader the particularities of each of the components comprising 
Central Europe. 
This political definition has nevertheless found a diplomatic reality in the Visegrad 
(Hungary) Agreement signed in December 1991, and for an unlimited period of time (taking 
effect on March 199228). The Visegrad agreement is aimed at the complete integration of its 
members into the political, economic, and legislative European order and into the European 
security system.29 On 21 December 1992, the Visegrad 4, signed an agreement in Krakow 
on the establishment of a free trade area from 1 March 1993 and decided to coordinate their 
views on several important questions such as their relations with the Council of Europe, 
EFTA, EC or NATO. The agreement' s timetable is almost identical to European 
Agreements' one, as the free trade area should be implemented by 2001.30 This initiative 
promoted by The European Community reveals in fact difficult to put into practice. Central 
European economies are not very complementary, the intra-trade existing between them has 
been completely disorganised (different customs duties) and none of them want to bear the 
consequences of its neighbour's economic failure. The process of trade liberalisation is also 
uncertain as restructuring is evolving quickly, which therefore makes commercial agreement 
2 5 Vaclav Havel in M. Kundera 'The tragedy of Central Europe' in New York Reviews of Books, 
26 April 1984. p. 36. 
2 6 KKumar 'The 1989 Revolutions and the Idea of Europe.' Politicd Studies Vol. XL. 3. 
September 1992. pp. 439-461. p. 454. 
2 7 F. Feher, 'Eastern Europe's long revolution against Yalta', in Eastern European politics and 
Societies, 2:1 (1988) p. 20. 
2 8 This date is symbolic as it corresponds to the entry into force of Association Agreements. 
2 9 Jean Yves Potel 'L'Europe Centrale a la recherche d'une nouvelle cohesion' in Le Monde 
Diplomatique, 4 October 1992, n° 463. p. 4. 
3 0 'Free Trade Zone in Central Europe', in East West, 28/01/93, n° .541. p. 2. 
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extremely unstable. 3 1 Moreover this idea itself does not meet the approval of every 
contracting party. Thus, the despite an original political will, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia which split on 17 November 1992 (decision put into force on 1 January 19993), did 
not find any incentive to make work the monetary union and customs union ruling economic 
relations between the two countries (Monetary Union broke down on 8 February 1993 and 
the Customs union disappeared at the end of May 1993). As far as the free trade area 
between the Visegrad 4 is concerned, the Czech Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus, who is 
asserting his leadership on International relations at the expense of the President Vaclav 
Havel, is re-orienting the Czech foreign policy away from sub-regional integration in Central 
Europe. He emphasised the practical character of the free trade area among Central European 
members, as such actions could facilitate the integration of his country into the European 
Community, however, in the meantime he affirmed that: 
"This is not a creation of a trade block, nor a signal that the Four Central 
European countries are ready for somewhat closer political cooperation.'32 
Furthermore, in a world completely out of tune, bilateral negotiations seem easier to 
achieve, and to satisfy public opinions rather than multilateral negotiations which demand a 
strong and stable forum, and moreover a common political project. On top of political 
difficulties, the economic integration of Central Europe seems to be a very long process 
(more than 10 years will be necessary to achieve a free trade area), and no country seems 
to be strong enough or to have the necessary resources to achieve such a goal. The split up 
of Czechoslovakia added to this pessimism, and these tensions made Visegrad 4 more 
unstable than ever. The political definition adopted by the Community means that, 
geographically speaking, Central Europe is 455,007 square kilometres in area (Poland 
312,677, Hungary 93,030, former Czechoslovakia 49,370 sq.km.) and its population is 64.0 
million strong ( Poland estimated in 1991 37.8 m, Hungary 10.5 m and former 
Czechoslovakia 15.7 m). 
In conclusion we would say that Central Europe is politically a superficial concept which 
changed with time and with international relations. The 1989 revolution and the 
renationalisation of Central European societies seem to be the prerequisite for the 
reunification of the European continent. This resurgence of nationalism does not ease the 
cooperation between the four Central European countries but they are unified by one political 
3 1 M.Percynski "la collaboration subregionale dans le cadre du groupe de Visegrad' in Revue du 
Marche Commun et de I'union Europeenne, n° 369. Juin 1993. pp. 541-546. 
3 2 "Free Trade Zone in Central Europe', in East West 28/01/93, n° 541. p. 2 
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project: their reintegration into Western Europe. Economic and political reintegration is 
possible and under way, but it is important to bear in mind that the problem of Central 
Europe will not be solved unless Western and Eastern Europe come to terms with each other. 
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Post-war relations between the EEC and Central Europe were dominated by intra-bloc 
relations leaving little room for any autonomous commercial policy or political debate about 
the relevance of such policy. However, the West started to make its presence felt through 
commercial links, even if most of the time, this meant competition between the United States 
and EEC Member States for a bigger share of the Eastern bloc market and even though they 
were drastically limited by the COCOM to non-strategic products. In order to achieve a 
more consistent approach and to get a more powerful leverage in trade negotiations, Member 
States began to give life to the European Common Commercial Policy as established in the 
Treaty of Rome. The CCP was, at first, aimed at completing the single market programme, 
but Central European countries economic situation forced the Member States to change their 
attitude and to flesh out the CCP in order to transform it into a real external trade policy. 
The mastering of the CCP by the Community as a means to conduct a common external 
economic policy is a long process which could be divided into three simplistic stages. The 
first stage is an institutional and administrative struggle over the interpretation of the treaty 
which establishes the Common Commercial Policy and subsequently over the competencies 
of the Member States and those of the Community. The second stage comes in parallel and 
is illustrated by a continuous fight between the Community and its Member States to impose 
consistent external trade policies and to harmonize commercial practices. In this stage the 
Community finds its limits but also a natural ally in the GATT. The third and last step is 
for the Community to ensure that its competencies in trade related matters are integrally 
recognised by Member States (i.e. transfer of sovereignty) and by its international partners. 
To achieve such a task, it is absolutely necessary that both national and international partners 
understand that the CCP is the product of a genuine and legitimate political will. 
Chapter 2: Common Commercial Policy 
The whole process cannot, however, be put into gear i f there is no perception of a 
common interest or a common view over the solution to be brought to a particularly urgent 
problematic situation International pressure or threat is often the source for governments to 
find the courage to act together. 
I) Centrd Emvpemt economies mid exiernd Made stmatwe* 
After the military invasion of Central Europe, the Soviet Union imposed a specific model 
of social compact based on consumerism in order to consolidate its political control.1 
Consumer satisfaction became the basis of political stability but was dependent on the 
subjective perception of consumers. This situation proved to be unstable as the fear of 
popular discontent obliged political elites to sustain practices damaging the whole economy, 
such as food subsidies. In 1970, Hungary and Poland used one third and one fourth of their 
respective budget to keep the prices low.2 Moreover, despite its isolation from the world 
economy, Central and Eastern European economies were affected by Western inflationary 
pressures. They increased Western import's prices and Russian raw materials' prices. As a 
result they put national budgets under harsh pressure, usually resulting in the discontent of 
public opinion which sharpened the economic contradictions of the Central European 
societies. These tensions paralysed the political elite who did not take the necessary reforms 
which could have saved their economies. Indeed these reforms needed a certain political 
courage because they were, in a number of issues, opposed to the Ctommunist economic 
management and the nature of socialist economies. Such reforms would have had 
unpredictable consequences for the Communist political leadership of these governments and 
dramatic effects on the ideological justification of democratic centralism 
An import-led growth plus an international rationalisation of Central European economies 
(conducted by Soviet Union) appeared to be the solution to the destructive effect of 
inefficient economic policies. Central European countries expanded their trade with Western 
countries by importing expensive technology and know-how, but this decision did not solve 
Central European economic difficulties in the long term. The failure of Eastern and Central 
European industries to compete with Western technology, or to increase the quality of their 
1 Z. Gitelman "The world economy and elite political strategies in Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Hungary1 in MBomstein East West Relations and the future of Eastern Europe London, 1981. p. 129. 
2 Alex Pravda "East West interdependence and the social compact in Eastern Europe' in M. 
Bomstein East West Relations and the future of Eastern Europe. Allen and Unwin, London, 1981. 
p. 175 
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product, prevented them from entering Western markets and from earning the necessary hard 
currency to repay the Western credits necessary to finance these imports. Moreover, because 
their products could only be sold in CMEA markets, Central European countries became 
more and more dependent on Soviet Union. The Soviet Union largely used this as leverage 
to secure political domination The expansion of trade with Western countries increased the 
dependence on Western technologies, worsening the balance of payments and intensifyied 
many of the pressures already existing on the Central European economies, narrowing 
therefore their margin to govern an unsatisfied population. In Poland, the rise in food prices 
in 1970, due to the reduction of subsidies granted by the government, triggered massive 
popular demonstrations which ended with the re-establishment of subsidised food prices. 
From 1970 to 1976, Gierek increased its imports six fold. 3 This habit to express any 
discontent through demonstration and social upheavals created a precedent in Central 
European politics. The volatility of popular expectations is crucial when dealing with Central 
European economies and reforms after the 1989 revolution 
With the creation of the CMEA, Soviet political elites tried to control the economic life 
of Central European satellites by completely submitting their economy to Soviet needs and 
by reducing to nothing the economic cooperation between Central European members.4 In 
1962, the basic principles of international Socialist division of labour were laid down, but 
did not succeed in reinstating trust between Central European partners and Soviet Union 
Brezhnev tried to rationalise the relations between CMEA member-states, first in 1965 by 
developing a trade policy with the Third world on a commercial approach and secondly, by 
introducing monetary measures to facilitate inter-enterprise trading in 1967. These 
experiences ended with the 1968 Prague Spring and Brezhnev imposed a Socialist economic 
integration to replace the doctrine of international socialist division of labour. In 1971, the 
proposals to specialise production through bilateral and multilateral agreements and the 
introduction of certain economic lessons experienced by Hungary (introduction of market 
relations between countries and full scale integration) were embodied in the 1971 Complex 
Program. This reform was essentially political as the drive to more integration was in fact 
aimed at tightening the economic framework to avoid further rebellion.5 
The CMEA, whose integrating process was based neither on political nor economic 
common interests, emptied Central and Eastern Europe of their economic substance and 
3 Alex Pravda 'East West interdependence and the social compact in Eastern Europe' in M. 
Bornstein East West Relations and the future of Eastern Europe. 1981. p.165. 
4 W.Wallace, R Clarke, COMECON, trade and the West. Frances Pinter, London 1986. p.4. 
5 W.Wallace, R Clarke, COMECON, trade and the West. 1986. p. 9. 
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transformed them into expensive and greedy parasites of the Soviet Unioa The insufficiency 
of the CMEA and the increasing needs of Western technological goods and credits made 
Central and Eastern Europe heavily dependent on Western European credits to survive 
economically. Western Europe responded quite favourably to these demands, but the crises 
of the 1970s made money and credit less available and forced Member States to adopt more 
common norms to conduct their economic bilateral policy with Central and Eastern European 
countries. 
The favourable international environment between 1960 and 1968 gave a boost to East 
/ West economic relations. The improvement of American and Soviet relations, the 
loosening of Soviet control on Central Eastern Europe (i.e. Moscow declaration of 1957 and 
Socialist Commonwealth) and the economic crisis that occurred in these countries, increased 
the demand for Western goods and inclined Western European countries to adopt independent 
commercial policies towards the Eastern Bloc. Britain was the first country to accord a 15-
year-credit to the Soviet Union in 1964. The Eastern policy of de Gaulle was supported by 
scientific and technological exchanges and by the removal of quotas in 1965. Thus between 
1958 and 1970 the EEC exports to the CMEA increased by 385 per cent and the EEC 
imports by 300 per cent.6 In 1969, France signed a new agreement with the Soviet Union 
aimed at doubling Soviet-French trade within 5 years. The independence of the Member 
States in the conduct of their economic policy was furthermore accentuated by the political 
resistance of some members, such as France and Britain, to delegate the necessary power to 
the Community to achieve a common stance toward Central Europe. This voluntary 
exclusion of France and Britain from the integrating commercial process allowed Germany 
to set the basis of the Community's Common policy. 7 AGyorgy argues that 
'Ostpolitik in the early 1960s may well be considered an essential and thinly 
camouflaged bridge between an involuntary Eastern-oriented commercial 
alliance system and a wholly voluntary and prosperous Western set of 
Economic treaty arrangements.8 
The different East/West economic and technological cooperation systems put into place 
in the 1970s did not enable Central European countries to improve their economic efficiency 
6 G. Yannopoulos 'Economic Relations between the EEC and Eastern Europe' in The EEC and 
Eastern Europe, Cambridge University, 1978. p. 2. 
7 J.Pinder The European Community and Eastern Europe, London RHA, 1991. p. 5. 
8 A. Gyorgy 'Ostpolitk and Eastern Europe' in Ch.Gati, The International Politics of Eastern 
Europe, 1976. p. 166. 
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but made heavier their financial difficulties and their national debts. This situation forced 
Central and Eastern Countries to tighten their belts, to import less and to accept less credit. 
This policy meant the loss of important export markets for the Member States who accepted 
a lowering in their interests rate and proposed extremely favourable terms of contracts. This 
competition led to damaging excesses and the Member States decided to adopt common 
minimal norms to conduct their credit policy. The 1970s feverish credit policy conducted 
to preserve western export market shares, was accentuated by the world crisis and the new 
competition for world markets. The Commission tried desperately to coordinate credit 
policies among Member States, but did not succeed in producing a clear policy statement 
before late 1970. The Council of Ministers adopted common, but loose, standards on 
insurance for medium and long term credits. Eventually, a gentlemen's agreement came into 
existence in 1974, within the OECD framework, but not the EC. However the Community 
adopted this agreement which stated that 'consensus rates' reflecting the evolution of market 
interest rates be granted to Eastern European countries.9 They limited the minimum interest 
rate on government export credit to 7.5 per cent per annum and forbade subsidies on such 
credits. Common credit policies were extremely difficult to implement at the European level, 
as Member States carried out their own policy in this sensitive area. Despite the fact that 
the European Court recognised the right of the Commission to rule in this field in 1975, it 
was not until 1976, at the Puerto Rico economic summit, that the four leading EEC states 
decided to adhere to a set of loose guidelines on export credits set by the Community. 
French opposition on the question of government-supported export credits, impeded the 
Council of Ministers from approving the guidelines before 1977. This common credit policy 
has been difficult to achieve but it was a step forward in the integrating process and a 
precedent which could be followed by a more ambitious programme, the Common 
Commercial Policy. 
9 M. Maresceau, The Political and legal framework of Trade Relations between the European 
Community and Eastern Europe. Dordrecht, Martinus, Nijtoff, 1989. p. 247. 
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ML ) The Cowwmm ComwnemM Policy* 
MA.) Strmtwre and Content 
Once it became obvious that common action was needed to deal with the Central and 
Eastern situation, Member States reactivated and fleshed out the Common Commercial Policy 
in order to use it in external economic relations. It took almost 17 years to provide the 
European Community with external competencies. 
The Treaty of Rome aimed to create a common market and a Customs Union with a 
Common External Tariff (GET) and including a Common Commercial Policy (CCP). This 
CCP was originally set up to complete the common market programme and was far from 
being a common external commercial policy vis-a-vis third countries. This CCP is embodied 
in the Treaty of Rome (1957, Art. 110 to 116) and gave the EC an exclusive authority in 
trade-related matters. 1 0 Article 113 states 
"the CCP shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes 
in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of 
uniformity in measures towards the liberalisation, export policy and measures to 
protect trade such as those to be taken in the case of dumping or subsidies.' 1 1 
Four different trade instruments were at the EC's disposal. The Community has the right 
to establish a Common External Tariff towards third countries, as it did on 1 July 1968. The 
Treaty of Rome also states that only the EC is allowed to conclude regional trade and 
cooperation agreements with third countries, as it did with EFTA, ASEAN, ACP. However, 
this should not be confused with political cooperation agreements which stay one of the 
Member States' prerogatives. The Commission has exclusive powers and became the sole 
trade unit acting on behalf of its Member States. The treaty also affirms that the Community 
may grant Third countries special tariff preferences. Finally, the Community has, according 
to art 115, to fight illegal trade practices. The EEC treaty contains the procedural framework 
1 0 N.A. Neuwahl 'Joint participation in international treaties and the exercise of power by the EEC 
and its member-states mixed agreements' in Common Market Law Review, vol 28, n° 4, winter 1991. 
p. 724. 
1 1 EEC Treaty of Rome Article 113. 
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for the design of Common polices, but does not give any rule for the implementation of the 
different procedures, let alone when it is related to individual trade policy areas. 
The process for the formulation of the Common Commercial policy is identical to the 
"normal' Community decision making process, but as Al Agraa puts it: "Common 
Commercial Policy is inherently complex. It is multi-faceted and multi-dimensional, the 
outcome of numerous compromises at EC Council and Commission level.'12 The Council 
role is political because it gives the general orientations of the CCP, it decides the opening 
of negotiations with third countries, it gives directives to the Commission for the conduct of 
these negotiations and finally concludes agreements. The Commission is in charge of the 
negotiations, submits proposals to put the CCP into practice and has exclusive responsibility 
for the conduct of the negotiations. However, the Commission has to have the assent of the 
Council before starting any negotiations and when negotiating, it is assisted by a committee 
nominated by the Council as foreseen in EEC art. 113: the so-called 113 committee. The 
Council eventually decides upon the ratification of the agreements negotiated by the 
Commission. The rules often provide the Council with powers to review, then confirm, 
reject or modify a Commission decisioa Community decisions respond to a very low 
common denominator and are the result of several internal processes for reconciling divergent 
views.13 The negotiations with Hungary about cooperation agreements in 1987, are a clear 
illustration of the lack of independence of the Commission on the interpretation of its 
Council's mandate, the difficulties encountered by Hungary to deal with a lengthy decision 
making process and the small gains that she could receive from the Community as a whole. 
This state of affairs was progressively improved through closer cooperation between Member 
States and the Commission in the major trade agreements. In the case of no general 
Community trade agreement, the Member States retained their existing arrangements, which 
then had to be consistent with the European legislation, the general commercial aims 
embodied in the CCP and the GATT provisions. The result has been an incoherent division 
of responsibilities and rights between the Commission and the Council which did not enable 
the CCP to be comprehensive. "European commercial policy* has been made up of bits and 
pieces from different authorities (European level and Member States level) in which it is 
extremely difficult to determine responsibilities. This state of affairs led to for institutional 
and administrative struggles. 
1 2 Al Agraa, Economics of the EC, 3rd Ed. London 1990. p. 420. 
1 3 "the European Community as a world trade partner' in Europecm Economy n° 52. Directorate 
General for economic and financial affairs, p. 190. 
30 
Chapter 2: Common Commercial Policy 
If the Community's role has not been really challenged by the Member States as far as 
the CCP is concerned, a long institutional dispute between the Commission and the Member 
States has been going on about the external powers which should be given to the former. 
The Member States affirm that only the powers to conduct the CCP should be given to the 
Commission, while the Commission affirms that it should be given enough powers to, not 
only implement the CCP, but also conduct a parallel external policy on matters on which she 
has internal exclusive competence. This definition, the so-called parallel approach has been 
confirmed by the European Court of Justice on several occasions and allows the' Community 
to control thoroughly external trade by autonomous or contractual means'.14 This view 
clearly opposes the narrow definition that the Member States want to implement in order to 
safeguard their power and their leeway to protect their national interests in international trade. 
This institutional battle has had administrative consequences. The opposition of interests has 
been reflected in the difficulties encountered by the Commission in setting up the CCP. The 
time-table for the implementation of the CCP was postponed several times between 1964 and 
1974,15 as the Commission was dependent on the Council's agreement before setting up the 
procedure necessary to the harmonisation of the Member States' commercial policies. 
Despite the fact that Member States agreed, on 16 December 1969, to give the Community 
exclusive jurisdiction in matters concerning commercial relations with states trading 
economies, it was not until 1974 that a true common policy emerged. On 7 May 1974, after 
the enlargement of EEC to Britain and because most of the Member States agreements with 
State-trading economies would finish in December 1974; the Council stated that any 
commercial negotiations should be conducted by the Community after 1 January 1975. On 
22 July 1974,16 a decision was taken to institutionalise the exchange of information between 
Member States and the Commission in order to make new negotiations on Cooperation 
agreements with third countries consistent with the Common Commercial Policy. 
Member States were not the only ones to prevent the Commission from asserting its 
authority in trade related matters, the Eastern bloc firmly refused to deal with the EEC as an 
economic partner. CMEA, which was supposed to represent the Eastern bloc in its external 
commercial relations, did not recognise the EEC as a competent body and both EC Member 
1 4 Case AETR of 31 March 1971, Case 8/73, Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey Ferguson 
GmbH (1973), E.C.R. 1135 and avis 1/76 of 26 April 1977. Case quoted by J. Steenbergen "The 
Common Commercial Policy in Common Market Law Review, May 1980. pp. 229-250. 
1 5 P.Marsh "The development of Relations between the EEC and CMEA' in A. Shlaim and G.N. 
Yannopoulos The European Economic Community and Eastern Europe. CUP, Cambridge, London, 
1978. p. 38. 
1 6 General Secretariat of the Council of the EC Twenty-second review of the Council's work, 
1974. OFPEC, 1975. p.83. 
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States and CMEA members found ways to bypass the Commission A number of EC 
Member States were intrinsically reluctant to transfer their powers and generally refused to 
harmonise their practices along a European norm EC Member States often used cooperation 
agreements as a substitute for former Trade agreements.17 Some countries adopted 
completely illegal measures, such as Italy, which granted, illegally, the Most Favoured Nation 
clause to a third country in signing a Cooperation agreement.18 This preference was shared 
by Central European Countries who found it easier to obtain more tariffs and quotas 
reductions by signing bilateral agreements. The EC took a unilateral trade policy towards 
Central Europe which, in fact, turned out to be an amalgam of national norms gathered 
together according to the lowest common denominator acceptable to all members. As far as 
the Common Commercial Policy is concerned, Farrands argues that "the enormous difficulty 
of reconciling the different national and community interests, explained to a great extent why 
EC External policy was made up of day-to-day understandings and sheer improvisation'. 1 9 
Thus the different national restrictions to trade; special safeguards for steel and textiles, anti-
dumping policies and discriminatory measures (sub-national quotas) which were implemented 
against state-trading economies, were still effective even inside the Common Market.20 
Many similarities exist between the GATT and the EEC21 as they have the same sphere 
of activity and as EEC competencies are delimited by those of the GATT. Considering this 
special relationship, EEC's efforts to complete a CCP are parallel and conditional on GATTs 
achievements in reducing non-tariff barriers and in promoting fair competition. In the early 
1970s, the Commission had no choice but to leave national Member States to do their 
business under the European label of 'autonomous policy. With the GATT asserting itself, 
the EEC was disposing more clout to impose an integrated commercial policy, allowing less 
and less leeway for Member States to act independently. However, numerous opportunities 
1 7 S. Senior Nello, The New Europe, changing economic relations between East and West. 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991. p. 44. 
1 8 S. Senior Nello in The new Europe, changing economic relations between East and West, 1991. 
p. 32. 
1 9 EI-Agraa, Economics of the EC, 1990. p.420. 
2 0 M. Maresceau "The European Community Eastern Europe and USSR' in J. Redmond The 
external relations of the European Community. The international response to 1992. New York, 1992. 
p.93. 
2 1 EEC Art. 229 provides that 'it shall be for the Commission to ensure the maintenance of all 
appropriate relations with the organs ... of the GATT' Also under EEC art l l l , the Commission 
submits recommendations to the Council concerning tariff negotiations with third countries in respect 
of the Common External Taritf. 
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enabled EC Member States to violate the GATT spirit and at the same time slowing down 
the integration process. 
The GATT (to be replaced at the time of writing by the World Trade Organisation) 
aimed at promoting free trade in the world by ensuring equal conditions of competition -Art 
I - (through MFN provision) and by implementing the rule of non discrimination -Art XIII-
(equal treatment). Former Czechoslovakia was one of its founding members but following 
a Soviet order, she was not allowed to participate in trade rounds and therefore could not 
oblige its trading partner to fulfil their obligations. Poland and Hungary became members 
of the GATT on 9 September 1973, but only after signing a protocol of accession limiting 
their rights and their prerogatives. The problem of accepting' non -market economies' within 
a club of free trading economies posed a big problem to Central European countries who had 
to accept through these protocols a different status and Discriminatory measures (Quantitative 
Restrictions. QRs). 2 2 Despite the fact that the EC's Founding Fathers were clearly 
committed towards a liberal trading order, number of measures embodied in GATT 
regulations to fight illegal competition have been used by the EEC and its member-states (Art 
115 EEC) to set discriminatory measures especially towards Central European countries. In 
1982, the Council issued the regulation 288/82 in which are enumerated specific exceptions 
to the 'unrestricted market access' guaranteed by the Community. These exceptions are listed 
in an annex and the Commission is the competent body for initiating at the request of 
member-states, investigation on safeguard measures, when considered justified This 
investigation may lead to the introduction of surveillance measures, which are based on the 
issuance of an import document. In emergency and specific cases, member-states may 
implement surveillance measures at the national level after having informed the Commissioa23 
For Central European countries this safeguard clause was included in their protocol of 
accession, which introduced a 'super' safeguard clause in the Hungarian case. Regulations 
288/82, 2 4 1766/82, 2 5 and 3420/83 2 6 provide the legal basis for introducing safeguard 
measures. I f foreign products are being imported into the Community in such quantities as 
to create major injuries to an Community industry, safeguard measures, such as additional 
duties, tariffs or quotas, may be imposed on these imports. 
2 2 Janos Martonyi 'East European countries and the GATT in M. Maresceau The Political and 
legal framework of trade relations between the EC and Eastern Europe. 1989. p.269. 
2 3 i.e.. EEC Article 115 and comments on this article in European Economy, n° 52. p.191. 
2 4 288/82 OJL35. 9/02/1982 
2 5 1765/82 O J L 195. 5/07/1982. 
2 6 3420/83 OJL377. 2/12/1983. 
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Anti-dumping measures are adopted in accordance to Art. VIGATT and the 1979 anti-
dumping code. This EC legislation is directly inspired by the Art XLX of the GATT, which 
states that a GATT member can take action to prevent market disruptions due to illegal 
competition from another countries (dumping or subsidies). The EC basic legislation is the 
Council regulation no 2423/88 (2424/88 for ECSC products.) Market disruptions are defined 
by the selling of a product under 'normal price' creating subsequently injury to national 
industry (generally assessed in term of unemployment). Protections are however, limited in 
time (6 months to 1 year) and extent to prevent or remedy the injury. This "normal price' 
is defined by different norms which take different elements into account, such as the 
materials, energy, production mode and so forth. Because Central European countries were 
defining almost all their prices administratively, it became extremely difficult to assess fairly 
their comparatives advantages. In fact, it was extremely rare that Central European countries 
were recognised to be more competitive than Western Europe, leaving complete open door 
to discrimination and unequal treatment. As a matter of fact, the Council (regulation No 
3420/83 2 7 ) established a list of quotas for Eastern European imports and known as the 
Annex or the liberalisation list. This list was defined and renewed every year for one year, 
but it could easily be amended, anytime during the year by the Commission, leaving no 
chance to Central European economies.28 
As a result of anti-dumping several actions may be taken. If the injury caused is less 
than the dumping margin,29 the amount of measures will be limited to what is necessary to 
remove the injury. Usually the exporter accepts the raising of export prices -price 
undertaking- or to see his exports being levied -countervailing duties-, so that the injury 
suffered by the national industry is eliminated (50 per cent of the cases during the period 
1985 1990). However, after a review, the council can decide if these provisional duties have 
to be transformed into definitive duties. The implementation of QRs may also be done by 
member-states. These QRs are either embodied in cooperation agreements, or are the legacy 
of some old agreements signed before 1970. These residual restrictions are being 
progressively eliminated by the European Community because they are clisrupting the 
completion of the single market.30 Thus the SEA eliminated national quotas and stated that 
national VERs were unenforceable, but thanks to the very same Article 115 EEC, Member 
2 7 Reg: 3420/83 in OJ L 377 2/12/1983 
2 8 M. Maresceau, The Political aid legal framework of Trade Relations between the European 
Community and Eastern Europe. 1989. p. 14. 
2 9 Dumping margin = Normal price - "export price'. 
3 0 M. Cremona, "The completion of the internal market and the incomplete commercial policy of 
the European Community' in European Law Review. August 1990. pp. 283-297. 
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States, once authorised by the Commission, are allowed to take specific measures in the 
absence of Common Commercial Policy. This was the very position of Central European 
states. In most cases, as far as Central and Eastern Europe are concerned, the EC gives the 
exporter the opportunity to offer an appropriate restraint arrangement which generally last 
for 3 years. This solution is preferred by most Central European exporters who fear harsher 
anti-dumping measures which may lead to a complete loss of market share. Thus, during 
the 1970-1982 period, 122 out of 315 EC anti dumping actions were taken against Central 
and Eastern Europe.31 
Moreover, the fact that states economies did not have any tariffs whatsoever created 
another problem as they could not offer anything in return for reductions in duties. To match 
tariff concessions, they had to increase their import commitments, making their trade balance 
worse off. At the end of the day, weaknesses in GATTs rules and discipline (that we cannot 
detail here) gave its members and therefore EC Member State, freedom to use and abuse the 
safeguard clause and to infringe the very spirit of GATT ideals by signing sectoral 
agreements. Often the fear that the EEC could proceed to anti-dumping measures whenever 
it wanted, strongly influenced Central European states into signing special agreements, which 
were not on the most favourable terms for them 
Under Council regulation 2641/84, the Community is empowered to adopt measures to 
combat illicit commercial practices. This allows individuals within the Community to 
complain to the Community authorities, who decide after investigation, if retaliatory measures 
may be adopted against the infringent country. 
Most trade controls which are relevant for our study are present in sectoral agreements 
which in broad terms escape the GATT multilateral negotiations and which also escape EC 
legislation because they are embodied in bilateral cooperation agreements.32 There are 
different techniques to restrict free trade such as the Voluntary export restraint' (VER) or 
government to government arrangements (Export Restraint Arrangements, ERAs) and which 
are negotiated every year. It is then crucial to study them because they have been increasing 
in the past few years in order to assess to what extent they are impeding the liberalisation 
of trade between the EEC and Central Europe. 
3 1 S. Senior Nello, The new Europe, charging economic mictions between East and West, 1991. 
p. 49. 
3 2 M. Cremona, European Law Review. 1990. p. 289. 
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The Common Agricultural Policy (1967-8) entailed a limitation of imports of food and 
agricultural products, as the Community became self-sufficient and later a net exporter. EEC 
introduced a high protection for import of dairy products (butter, cheese and skimmed milk 
powder), olive oil, beef and sheepmeat, an intermediate restriction for wheat and coarse 
grains and defending to a lesser extent pigmeat, rice oil seeds and poultry imports. As far 
as Central Europe was concerned a huge quantity of Hungarian exports (agriculture 
represented the highest share in all Hungarian exports to EC) saw European doors closed. 
Indeed, Hungary could no longer export beef and cattle to its traditional German and Italian 
markets, this represented a heavy loss as their export counted for 52 per cent of CMEA 
agricultural export to the Community. Hungary estimated that the CAP caused a 30 per cent 
fall in its exports to the Community between 1973 and 1976. On top of that, Hungary had 
to suffer new quantitative restrictions, new imbalances with the EC and finally completely 
disagreed with the 1974 Community's schema daccord 3 3 which did not change this 
discriminatory policy against Hungary. From 1974 onwards, Hungary signed nonetheless a 
government to government agreement (Orderly Market Arrangements OMAs are in fact 
another version of ERAs) specifying rules with regard to goat and sheep meat export supplies 
and monitoring trade flows.3 4 The Greek enlargement shrank even further the Hungarian 
market share, but the EC was not able to compensate new Hungarian losses (failure of 1983-
4 bilateral trade agreement), until the European Parliament urged the Commission to start 
trade and cooperation agreement with Hungary on 13 June 1986.35 
Concerning imports of textiles products, the Community applied the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement to Central European countries. The MFA was created by the GATT to respond 
to 'market disruptions' therefore allowing its members to sign bilateral agreements in order 
to restrain disruptive imports. However, this MFA had been abused and became a clever 
way to avoid multilateral agreement and to impose QRs and discriminatory measures through 
3 3 P. Balazs, Trade Relations between Hungary and the E C in M. Maresceau, The Political and 
legal framework of Trade Relations between the European Community and Eastern Europe. 1989. 
p. 58. 
3 4 Sheepmeat and goatmeet agreements with Czechoslovakia in OJ L 204/82 amended by OJ L 
95/90 
Hungary in OJ L 150/81 and OJ 154/84 amended by OJ L 95/90 
Poland in OJ L 137/81 amended by OJ L 95/90 
3 5 P. Balazs, Trade Relations between Hungary and the E C in M. Maresceau, The Political and 
legal framework of Trade Relations between the European Community and Eastern Europe. 1989. 
p. 68. 
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bilateral agreements. 3 6 In 1977, Hungary and Poland were ready to negotiate separately, 
within the framework of MFA, textile agreements with the Commission 3 7 Despite the fact 
that in 1986, at the beginning of the Uruguay round, (Punta del Este declaration) the GATT 
decided to abolish the MFA, more products and more bilateral agreements have been put 
under MFA's aegis.38 Until that moment, under MFA TV (1986), 19 bilateral agreements 
with restraints on the imports of textile products have been signed Under the same 
regulation 3420/83, Member States are able to apply QRs on certain textiles and clothing 
imports from state-trading countries. Further quotas have later been introduced into their 
bilateral agreements.39 
Steel production is an extremely sensitive sector affected by a world crisis since the late 
sixties. Harsh competition between United States, Europe, Eastern Europe and New 
developed countries resulted in a protectionist spiral and a trade war. After the presentation 
of the Davignon plan on 22 November 1977, the Community tried to regulate world steel 
production and signed sectoral agreements with Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1978, which 
agreed to limit their steel exports. In fact their exports into the Community had to be 
reduced to the 1980 level and then to be stabilised to a zero increase. 
To conclude with these barriers to trade, we might recall and UNCTAD study of 1986 
which affirmed that 33 per cent of all imports were covered by some form of Non Tariffs 
Barriers (NTBs) with the percentage rising to 58 per cent for clothing and 74 per cent for 
textile yarns and fabric.40 In 1982, 97,8 per cent of Hungary's trade faced some kind of 
barrier (33 per cent were quotas and restrictions). Between 1981 and 1990, Eastern Europe 
and Russia were subject to more anti-dumping enquiries than other parts of the world with 
39.3 per cent of the total enquiries launched by the EEC. 
3 6 S. Senior Nello, The new Europe, changing economic relations between East and West, 1991. 
p. 37. 
3 7 Textile agreements: Czechoslovakia: OJ1287/87 modified OJ L 13/91, OJ L 53/91 OJ L 90/92 
Hungary: OJ L 331/87 amended by OJ L 53/91 
Poland : OJ L 156/87 amended by OJ L 53/91 
3 8 M. Marescau, The Political end Legal Framework of Trade Relations between the European 
Community and Eastern Europe. 1989. p. 285. 
3 9 DG for economic and financial affairs. European Economy, The European community as a 
world trade partner. n° 52. 1993. 
4 0 S. Senior Nello, The new Europe, changing economic relations between East and West, 1991. 
p. 89. 
37 
Chapter 2: Common Commercial Policy 
Table 1. Anti-dumping Esuqtines of the EEC from 1981 to 1990. 
Regions. Number % of the Toted 
Eastern Europe and USSR 158 39.3 
Far East i l l 27.6 
Western Europe 35 8.7 
Latin America 34 8.5 
Middle East 27 6.7 
North America 26 6.5 
Rest of the World 11 2.7 
Toted 402 100.0 
iiource: tifcXJ in bjyeux tes bchos. Avnl Vfil. 
As a result of these discriminations, Central European economies were at the bottom of the 
Community's preferences. They did not have any preference apart from MFN and they have 
seen their market shares in the EEC reduced significantly, especially for animal and vegetable 
oils, textiles, clothing and footwear, because of obvious discriminatory measures. 
Numerous infringements and loopholes in the CCP impeded the Community from 
establishing the external dimension of a Single Market and a coherent policy. In spite of all 
technical improvements brought to the CCP since 1957, it became obvious that a real 
political will was missing. To achieve these goals, Member States adopted the Single 
European Act in 1987, which amongst others, went further in the elaboration of a Common 
Foreign Policy by associating the Communitarian CCP to the intergovernmental EPC. I f this 
step was necessary, it nevertheless proved to be inefficient as it was rather difficult to 
organise the expression of a common political will and as it was hardly possible to reconcile 
two completely different approaches. 
KB.) Common Commercial Policy, Single European Act and European 
Political Cooperation, 
At the beginning of the European integration process, Community commercial 
agreements were exclusively based on economics. However, with the globalisation of world 
economics and the domesticisation of international relations it has been extremely difficult 
38 
Chapter 2: Common Commercial Policy 
to disassociate economics from politics. Furthermore with the enlargement of the 
Community, the EEC has gained an enormous weight in the world and could not therefore 
ignore its political responsibilities. No decision could be any longer purely economic or 
purely political. 
Originally, both aspects of international decision making process were separated: the EC 
has exclusive responsibility for economics and trade affairs, while the Presidency and the 
Council were in charge of all political aspects of the Community business, even if the EPC 
was outside the Community process as such. Foreign policy is extremely difficult to 
integrate as it represents the ultimate prerogatives of the state and different historic 
diplomatic interests are at stake. Economic interests and protection of national industries are 
jealously kept by Member States as the refusal of the draft Treaty of the EP in 1984, which 
aimed at merging EC and EPC into a unique Single Union, showed The seventies and 
eighties brought the necessity to coordinate both aspects of European foreign policy, 
economics and politics and to try and coordinate them into a Common Foreign Policy. It 
is not the place here to detail the ins and outs of the European political cooperation, however 
it would be unthinkable to approach the CCP without paying attention to the political side 
of all the Community's decisions in foreign trade. The EPC was not included in the original 
Treaty of Rome, but came into existence in 1970. Its role was to make sure that a structure 
was in place to facilitate political cooperation enabling Member States to coordinate their 
position and to implement joint actions.41 The Single European Act (SEA), adopted in 1986 
and ratified by all Member States in 1987, attempted to bring the EPC and the EC to closer 
cooperation. The SEA institutionalises the EPC, grants it a small permanent secretariat 
headed by the Presidency and states in Art 30.5, that 
'policies adopted in EPC and external EC policies must be consistent and 
assigns to Presidency and Commission the special responsibility, each within 
its own sphere of competence, to ensure and maintain that consistency*.42 
The Community acts on behalf of the Member States in external commercial policy (the 
EC still has exclusive power in this matter) and cooperates with Member States in other 
foreign policy fields which were foreseen in the Community Treaties but not under its 
4 1 R. M. Alonso Terme "From the draft Treaty of 1984 to the intergovernmental conferences of 
1991' in Reinhardt Rummel Towad Political Union, Planning a CFSP in the European Community. 
Oxford, Westview Press 1992. p. 269. 
4 2 Maarten WJ.Lak, "The constitutional foundation' in Reinhardt Rummel, Toward Political 
Union, Planning a CFSP in the European Community. 1992. p. 48. 
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exclusive competencies.43 In practice the direction of that common action is determined by 
the Council of Ministers.44 Trade agreements and more particularly post-1987 agreements 
with Central Europe, respond to the definition of "mixed Agreements' which means that they 
embody both economic and political aspects in the same document and that they are the 
result of this cooperation between the Commission and Member States. Thus if the 
Community shares more power in the political field, it has as well, to accommodate Member 
States and allow them the possibility to enact norms in fields which were withdrawn from 
their jurisdiction45 As MCremona puts it: 
'Where the negotiation of trade agreements is involved the situation is made more 
complex by the Community negotiating procedures: The Commission negotiates, 
but under a mandate from the Council of Ministers and the watchful eye of a 
committee of national representatives; the agreement is then concluded by the 
Council and any implementing regulation (including the possible division of the 
Community quota into national sub-quotas) is enacted by the Council. There is 
therefore plenty of scope for national governments to ensure that their interests are 
well represented'46 
The European network regulates Member States 'activities, but the actual division of 
power remains, however, unbalanced as the Community possesses only two interventionist 
instruments: trade measures and financial aid which depend moreover on a very limited 
budget. Conversely, the Member States have freedom to offer financial assistance, credits 
or grants, to offer government guarantees for private exports credits and finally to send 
business, cultural and scientific missions.47 
Thus in the definition of a common foreign policy, both EPC and EC are cooperating, 
but both economic and political dialogues are maintained in parallel, responding to their own 
institutional structure and have completely different rationale. The CCP is conducted by the 
Commission which is the supranational guardian of the Community's interests, while the 
Council of Ministers is in charge of the EPC and represents and protects national interests. 
The final decision is implemented through Community instruments. The EC is making great 
efforts to be able to speak with one voice, but we have to admit that there is no easy way 
to achieve it and that for the time being, the EC is more a decision taker, than a decision 
4 3 R. M. Alonso Terme, "From the draft Treaty of 1984 to the intergovernmental conferences of 
1991' in R. Rummel Toward Political Union, Planning a CFSP in the European Community. 1992. 
p. 278. 
4 4 M. Cremona "The completion of the internal market and the incomplete Commercial Policy of 
the European Community1 in European Law Review, August 1990. p.286. 
4 5 N.A Neuwahl "Joint participation in international treaties and the exercise of power by the EEC 
and its member-states mixed agreements' in Common Market Law Review, vol 28, n° 4, winter 1991. 
p. 726. 
4 6 M. Cremona European Law Review. 1990. p. 297. 
4 7 R Rummel, Toward Political Union, Planning a CFSP in the European Community. 1992. 
p.35. 
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maker. As a matter of fact the implementation of the single market in 1993 planned for 
the elimination of some 6,500 national quantitative restrictions (1, 700 concerning GATT 
members, 4, 700 concerning state-trading countries.) replacing them by a new Community-
wide import regime, consisting of few quotas. The management of these new Euro-quotas 
belonged of course to the Commission. The subsequent increase of Commission power was 
however feared by the Netherlands, the UK and Germany who are very sensitive about the 
protectionist stance that the Community could take, not only towards Third countries (matter 
for the UK), but also towards Central and Eastern Europe (German concern). Therefore, 
these three states decided to re-conduct their national trade policies, by opening import 
possibilities for non-liberalised imports from 'state economies countries' without the 
Commission's approval. The Commission decided, in February 1993, to start an infringement 
procedure against these countries who took individual actions. This was not so much to 
protect other Member States economies, or to keep high the protectionist barriers, but to 
harmonise all Member States commercial policies and make the European liberalising policy 
coherent and comprehensive.48 As LBrittan stated 
I t is not acceptable for Member States to take the law into their own hands 
on the Community's external trade policy1.49 
However, it has to be said that this action taken by the Commission seems to be ineffective, 
as the aforementioned countries kept their own policies. 5 0 As a matter of fact, the 
Commission was considering taking legal action, in June 93, against Germany which broke 
up the Common European attitude by opening up its telecommunications markets to the 
United States.51 
The Maastricht treaty on the European Union has slightly amended the EEC treaty 
concerning the CCP. Art. I l l , 114 and 116 have been abrogated, with the consequence that 
the Commission is likely to represent more often Member States in economic-related 
international negotiations on the basis of art 113 and art 228.52 Furthermore the Maastricht 
treaty enables the Commission to decide whether it wants or not to apply protectionist 
4 8 L. Barber 'EC goes to court over trade policy in Financial Times 6/07/93. p. 2. 
4 9 Commission opens infringement proceedings because of 1993 quotas' in East West 542, p. 3. 
15/02/93. 
5 0 'Commission opens infringement proceedings because of 1993 quotas' in East West 542, p. 3. 
15/02/93. 
5 1 'EC shaken after Bonn breaks ranks on trade' in The Times June 15, 1993. p. 22 
5 2 'L'extension des competences de la Communaute' in Regards sur I'actudite, Special Maastricht, 
n° 180 avril 1992 p. 26. 
41 
Chapter 2: Common Commercial Policy 
measures requested by Member States. The Commission may do so and this is a step 
towards a more uniform Commercial policy. This was the case in the harmonisation of trade 
practices (tariffs and NTBs) with third countries which had been completed at a slow pace 
by the Community. However, because the European Community is a high contracting 
member of the GATT, there is a certain state of affairs which cannot be solved at a European 
level. 
MS) IntemaUo. mm recognition, 
In the third stage on the road to completing the CCP, international recognition plays an 
important role. The Community has a limited legal personality recognised by its Member 
States, 5 3 but declarations are not sufficient to create a new international subject. The 
Community's international capacity depends very much on the establishment of a common 
policy and on the subsequent degree of authority that the EC inherits in this field. Today, 
the EC has diplomatic relations with 117 countries. The Community has observer status at 
the United Nations and also in some of its specialised organisations. The Community 
participates as a negotiator at numerous international conferences on trade (GATT), 
development (UNCTAD, UN1DO, North-South dialogue). This process was however quite 
long and the eastern bloc was the last major international actor to recognise the EC. 
In October 1973, the Commission proposed cooperation agreements. However, because 
the Soviet Union forbade relationships between the Common market and East European 
countries, no agreement could be signed by the Commission before 1988. As we saw earlier, 
European policy toward Central and East European countries was a mix of autonomous 
policy and of national trade legislation which did not help the Commission to establish clear 
economic objectives and powers to implement them. The Commission did not succeed until 
late in the eighties in implementing a 'European model of cooperation' between the EC and 
third countries. The first European socialist country to benefit from this improvement was 
Hungary, but it came only after the recognition of EC by the CMEA group. 
The feebleness of the CMEA as an mtegrating body did not allow it to face the 
disastrous consequences of the international economic crisis, even if, for the first time, 
Central Europe and Soviet Union did not seem to be affected. However, in the long term, 
ECSC art 6, EEC art 210, EURATOM art 184. 
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the increase of Russian raw material prices put Central European economies and societies 
under pressure. At the very beginning, Soviet Union saw the creation of the EEC as 
detrimental because of its clearly 'capitalist' origin and condemned it as "lust of imperialist 
contradictions'.54 The Soviet Union therefore did not want to recognise a 'group [which 
was] serving the monopolistic class interests of exploiters'.55 
With the elaboration of the Common Commercial Policy, it became clear that the Soviet 
Union had to recognise the EEC before concluding any global economic agreements with 
Western Europe. An era of detente started in 1972 with the preparation of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. However both the Soviet Union and the Community 
were totally opposed to giving any official recognition to each other . Firstly because the 
Community would have been a means for the Soviet Union to strengthen its political 
authority on its satellites and secondly because the USSR did not recognise EC's 
competencies in trade-related matters. Moreover, the EC considered that the CMEA could 
not negotiate because it was not a supranational organisation. Because the Soviet Union was 
almost self-sufficient and autarkic, not many important economic interests pressed the USSR 
to overcome its political and ideological aversion of the EEC. However, the small countries 
of Central Europe, which were much more dependent on Western trade were looking for an 
agreement with the EEC and further increased the dissensions existing within the CMEA 
Talks started under the Danish Presidency in 1973 but they were limited to intergovernmental 
level and progressed very slowly until they were definitively stopped with the invasion of 
Afghanistan (1979) and the introduction of Martial law in Poland (1981). 
The unofficial talks between the CMEA and the EEC took a long time to restart. The 
arrival of Gorbachev in power had a major impact on relations between Western and Eastern 
Europe. Gorbachev stated, on 29 May 1985, that 'It was time not only to organise mutually 
advantageous relations' in economic matters but also to' seek a common language on political 
matters to the extent that EC Member States act as a political entity156 Talks started again 
in September 1986 and mutual recognition was finally granted on 25 June 1988. This 
declaration, however, lacked substance since the domains for cooperation were not indicated 
from the outset but had to be determined at a later stage. Moreover, due to the virtual 
5 4 A. Shlaim and G.N. Yannopoulos The European Economic Community and Eastern Europe. 
1978. p.26. 
5 5 J.Pinder, The European Community and Eastern Europe. 1991. p. 6. 
5 6 Speech on receiving Prime Minister Craxi in J.Pinder, The European Community and Eastern 
Europe. 1991. p.23. 
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collapse of the Comecon as an international organisation, further cooperation between the two 
blocs was never fixed and therefore was replaced by bilateral cooperation agreements.57 
From 1985 began a new era in relations between the Cornmunity and the CMEA. This 
period was rather short lived but it created a precedent which would be used in the post-1989 
discussions. Indeed, on 26 September 1988, the Community signed the first EC-wide 
Agreement with a member of Central Europe -Hungary- on trade, commercial and economic 
cooperation (October 1990 for Czechoslovakia and Poland). In the trade chapter of the EC 
proposed the elimination of specific QRs by 1994 for Poland and Czechoslovakia and 1995 
for Hungary. The agreements also granted the MFN clause (i.e. GATT), but as Pinder points 
out, this was not very significant as the Central European countries were already committed 
to this clause because of their accession to the GATT. 5 8 These agreements were for ten 
years (Poland 5 years) and concerned all products except those already covered by bilateral 
agreements. As far as economic cooperation was concerned, the agreement aimed at 
stimulating trade and business contracts and at reinforcing and diversifying economic links 
between the contracting parties. For Czechoslovakia it entailed technical assistance to 
structural adjustment, education and vocational training and environment (pollution and 
nuclear plants). Because the European Community is committed to reciprocity, Hungary had 
to agree not to apply discriminatory measures and procedures in areas such as business 
facilities, import and licensing. This agreement also contained a detailed safeguard measure 
consisting of a consultation procedure as well as a procedure to introduce import restrictions 
(Voluntary Restraint Agreements VRAs)5 9 
At an European Community level, these agreements did not represent a victory as far as 
the exclusive powers of the Commission were concerned. These cooperation programmes 
were not financed by the Community and were under Member States legislation Member 
States therefore could run their own cooperation agreement in parallel with the Community's 
cooperation agreements and maintained the right to conclude where appropriate new 
economic agreements. These first cooperation agreements rapidly became outdated as the 
political situation in Central Europe was under revolutionary pressures. 
5 7 J. Reszler, Rejoindre I'Europe, destin & avenirde VEumpe Centrale, Geneve, 1991. p.96. 
5 8 J.Pinder, The European Community and Eastern Europe, 1991, p.26. 
5 9 M Maresceau The Political and legalframework of trade relations between the EC and Eastern 
Europe. 1989. p. 6. 
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European integration movement and establishment of common policies are complex and 
uncertain processes which challenge theorisatioa They are determined by historical 
environments and by pragmatic steps which offer a huge range of possibilities and different 
options. The Common Commercial Policy is certainly a product of pragmatism but the initial 
European commitment provided Europeans with a sound platform on which they could base 
their arguments and develop a Common External Commercial Policy. This opportunity was 
present in the Treaty of Rome, but its setting took a very long time and had to pass through 
three stages before asserting itself. The first stage was indeed to prove that the Treaty has 
the necessary and sufficient juridical basis on which could set up the EC's external capacity. 
This Holy Grail search was riddled with dramatic institutional and administrative duels. With 
the problem of interpretation sorted, the second stage was to impose it in practice by 
overcoming national resistance. The third and last stage was a day-to-day battle for the 
Community to make sure that its competences were respected both by its Member States and 
recognized by international subjects. This is not, however, the end of the integration process 
as far as the emergence of a true European external policy is concerned. To be efficient and 
comprehensive, a fourth step is necessary as a genuine common foreign policy must integrate 
both economic and political approaches. This process has slowly been taking place since the 
Single European Act, but 1989's extraordinary events showed that they were insufficient. 
A major revision of Community external intervention tools has been undertaken and realised 
in the Europe Agreements but is it enough to meet the Central European political and 
economic challenge and to help Central European countries to return to Europe? Chapter 3 
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'Western Europe is an economic magnet, 
drawing Eastern Europe closer toward the 
Commonwealth of free nations.' 
President Bush. May 1989. 
1989. 9 Centrt m Europe sat er 
With the 1989 revolution, an economic crisis, mainly due to distortions and 
misallocation of resources, that we detailed in the previous section, broke out in Central 
Europe. This crisis was particularly intensified by the international situation. The collapse 
of CMEA in January 1990 completely disorganised the Central European export market and 
put an end to the advantageous terms of trade they were enjoying with the Soviet Union. 
That meant that a country, such as Czechoslovakia, lost 80% per cent of its trade with the 
former CMEA members in 1991 and that the European Community became the largest 
economic partner of Central Europe as a whole. The Gulf War further disturbed the supply 
in energy and raw materials and worsened the economic crisis in the EC Member States, who 
had to reduce their imports from Central Europe. The wealth created by exports to the EC 
vanished and put Central Europe under tense economic and political pressures, as the 
evolution of the basic figures between 1990 and 1992 shows. Central Europe had to speed 
up the reform process. 
Several common features characterise the transformation process of the Central 
European countries. If one had to structure what Central European countries need to do to 
transform their economies into market economies, one would say, that there are two major 
steps: the first step is to change the macroeconomic situation by regulating the major 
economic policy instruments such as monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy, inflation, 
external debts and currency convertibility. At the same time it is necessary to reform the 
major economic actors such as an independent central bank, an exchange market and an 
efficient fiscal administration. The second phase of the transformation process is at 
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microeconomic level and concerns the privatisation of economic agents, the liberalisation of 
prices and trade, the industrial restructuring, the elimination of subsidies and trade 
restrictions. 
However, there is no monolithic picture of transition. All three countries are at a different 
stage of the process, they have adopted a different strategy according to their initial 
conditions, their traditions, even if, in the long term, they have the same objective: to be 
economically integrated into the world economy. 
TcMe 2. Central Ewope: bmic ecovmmc figures 
Countries Hungary Czechoslovakia Poland 
1990 1991 1992 1990 1991 1992 1990 1991 1992 
GDP Change -5% -10.2% 0% -16% -15% -11.6% -7.6% 
Inflation rate 28.9% 35.0% 22.2% 10.0% 58.0% 11.0% 249.3% 60.4% 45.4% 
Unemployment rate 1.7 8.5 11.6 1 7 5 6.3 11.8 13.5 
External Debt ($ bin) 21.3 22.7 21.6 8.1 9.3 9.1 46.6 46.9 
2-15. 
Hungary was the first country to introduce gradual reforms, therefore the passage to a market 
economy was foreseen to be less difficult. In 1992 Hungary had almost set up the necessary 
institutional and juridical framework in which economic activity should take place. However 
the debt burden and the worsening of its position after the collapse of the CMEA, slowed 
down the whole process and making it more difficult. Poland was facing a huge debt of 
$48.5 billion in February 1991, with an hyper-inflation of more than 740% in 1989.1 That 
is why Poland decided to adopt a 'big bang policy* (Balcerowicz-IMF plan July 1991) 
implementing at the same time, a price liberalisation, a macroeconomic stabilisation (firmly 
demanded by the IMF) and a microeconomic restmrturing (privatisation law ratified in July 
1990). First successes appeared in 1991 with the development of the private sector (+50% 
in 1990)2, a better financial situation and commercial surplus (see table ). However, Poland 
1 S. Senior Nello, The New Europe, changing economic relctions between East and West. 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991. p. 125. 
2 S. Senior Nello, The New Europe, changing economic relations between East and West. 1991. 
p. 162. 
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had to suffer a rapid increase of unemployment, serious inflation, a strong industrial recession 
and slow privatisation of the big companies.3 The quick emergence of 'savage capitalism' 
with the increasing disparities between classes, under the restmcturing regime, had 
considerably undermined the social cohesion and therefore the conduct of the reform 
programme. During the elections following the dismissal of the Parliament, Lech Walesa 
even called Balcerowicz 'a pure and simple thief. 4 The situation was alarming in May 
1991. Czechoslovakia remained a carefully managed economy until the very end of the 
Communist era with only a 2-3 per cent inflation rate per year.5 As a result Czechoslovakia 
did not have to proceed with a drastic macroeconomic stabilisation and concentrated on 
microeconomic restructuring. However, because it was heavily industrialised, it had to get 
through a very difficult conversion of its manufacturing sectors, especially once Slovakia 
became independent. 
Although these countries had different reform programmes and were at different stages of the 
process, they were facing the same problems: the establishment of new economic relations. 
LA,) Cesttrd European tmde structure after 1989 
Within the context of economic reforms, Central European countries have to recreate 
institutions which respond adequately to people's needs such as a social protection. 
Moreover, they have to reorganise the interaction of the different economic actors according 
to a corpus of laws, which most of the time have to be invented, or if it is adopted, (i.e. EEC 
competition law), will demand time before being completely digested and operating. This 
process is long, extremely expensive and the pressure that the restructuring of an outdated 
economy puts on social cohesion does not allow room for manoeuvre and therefore makes 
more difficult the search for a political compromise. This is why a stable and encouraging 
international Community is important in Central European politics and this is why 
3 E. Lhomel and T. Schreiber ' L'Europe Centrale et Orientale, conflits, incertitudes et 
restructurations' in Notes et Etudes Documentcdres, Documentation Francaise, special issue. Paris 
1992. p. 150. 
4 E. Lhomel and T. Schreiber "L'Europe Centrale et Orientale, conflits, incertitudes et 
restructurations' Notes et Etudes Documentdres, Documentation Francaise, special issue. Paris 1992. 
p. 153. 
5 J. Williamson The economic opening of Eastern Europe published by the Institute for 
international Economics, Policy Analysis in International Economics, May 1991, n° 31 Washington 
DC. p.66. 
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international trade can help at the implementation of economic reforms. Indeed opening 
one's economy to world economies enables the country not only to survive economically, but 
also to resist internal protectionist pressures, to comfort the reform programme by exposing 
it to competition and to avoid counter-revolutionary backlashes.6 The OECD concluded in 
autumn 1991 that 
'Open access to their markets [OECD] is the single most important contribution that 
OECD countries can make to improving prospects for transition in the regioa'7 
The EC proposed to Central European countries association agreements that it signed twenty 
years ago with Turkey and Greece. Within the framework of the first generation of Europe 
Agreements that Hungary signed on 26 September 1988, Poland on 19th September 1989 and 
former Czechoslovakia on 24 September 1990, the EC accorded limited8 economic benefit 
to Hungary and Poland 9 by applying the Generalised System of preferences (GSP). The 
GSP covered 320 products and involved tariff reductions of 20-50% 10, but it represented 
only 35% of all dutiable imports from Poland and Hungary.11 This policy however did not 
concern steel and coal products which are covered by annual arrangements, as are 87% of 
sectoral Cbmmunity imports from Central and Eastern Europe. 1 2 The GSP gave tariff-free 
access to some agricultural and manufactured products but not to certain sensitive products 
which were subject to quotas. As far as the quotas are concerned, the Community decided 
to either eliminate them, increase their ceiling or suspend them for a limited period of time. 
Thus, for 1990-91, Poland and Hungary saw some of their quotas ceiling increased 
respectively by 23 and 13%. Some other quotas concerning glass, shoes, toys, leather, some 
machinery, some non-MFA products and some non-ECSC steel products were suspended 
until the end of 1991.13 The GSP regime was extended to Czechoslovakia in January 1991. 
6 CEPR annual report,'Monitoring European integration, the impact of Eastern Europe. London. 
October 1990. pp. 20-21. 
7 Conclusion of OECD autumn discussion on transition issues in Central and Eastern Europe, 3/4 
October 1991. p.4. 
8 S. Senior Nello notes that 'the concessions proposed by the Commission met with opposition 
from the Council of Ministers and the EC farm lobby1. Senior Nello, The New Europe, changing 
economic relations between East and West. 1991. p. 115. 
9 H. Kramer, "The European Community's Response to the "New Eastern Europe' in Journal of 
Common Market Studies. Vol.. 31..2. June 1993. pp. 213-244. p.227. 
1 0 S. Senior Nello, The New Europe, changing economic relations between East and West. 1991. 
p. 114. 
11 European Economy, n° 52. 1993. p. 38. 
12 European Economy, n° 52. 1993. p .34. 
13 European Economy, n° 52. 1993. p. 35. 
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At the end of the day, this first generation agreement had a rather limited impact on the 
liberalisation of trade between the European Community and Central Europe, as most of the 
quotas and the Voluntary Restraint Agreements (VRA) were maintained 
The closing down of traditional markets for Central European exports have made the EC the 
first commercial partner of Central and Eastern European countries after 1989. As we can 
see from the table, the proportion of trade between COMECON countries and EC has been 
inverted. As an example, ex-Comecon countries absorbed in 1989 42.2 per cent of Central 
European exports and EC only 24.5 %. 1 4 In 1992, the EC represented 48.2% of Central 
European imports and the ex-Comecon countries only 18.8%. Central and Eastern European 
countries account for a tiny 3 per cent of total Community imports while the EC accounts 
for more than 50 per cent of Central and Eastern European exports. 
Table 3. Share of the different partners in the external trade relations of the 
CEBCs 1989-1992 (in %) 
i n % Exports Exports Imports Imports 
Former 42.2 18.8 46.5 23.3 
EC 24.5 48.2 20.8 44.7 
EFTA 7.3 9.9 8.3 12.8 
United States 2.6 2.4 1.5 3.6 
Japan 1.0 0.9 0.7 1.9 
Rest of the 
world 
20.5 19.2 20.0 12.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Sources: Services de la Commission DGII. IMF, Direction des Statistiques Commerciales 
The crucial importance of international trade for the Central European reform process 
and the importance of the EC within Central European international trade made the EC the 
first international body to be able to help Central European in its reform process. 
1 4 We must use the 1989 dates with care because of the disparity of sources and the different 
method used 
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Table 4. EC trade with Central Europe 
LB.) Centml Europe smd EC msistrnwe. 
After the rapid decay of their economies, once faced with world competition, Central 
European countries needed the financial intervention of Western countries to stabilise the 
macroeconomic situation as the completely disorganised national capital markets could not 
regulate capital flux. They were anyway disproportionately insufficient in comparison with 
the needs of reform . This international financial help, decided at the G24 meeting15 in July 
1989, was aimed at creating foreign exchange reserves to maintain the convertibility of 
national currencies and to stabilise their exchange rates. International finance is also needed 
to set up a social safety net as the necessity to restructure drastically the whole economic 
process made a lot of people redundant. Finally, the international Community decided to 
lighten the debt burden contracted by the Old regimes, which was very damaging to the 
reforms. 1 6 
At the G7 World Fxonomic Summit in Paris on 15-18 July 1989, the seven richest 
countries decided to provide extensive aid to the new democracies and gave the Commission 
the responsibility to coordinate it on behalf of the OECD countries. The Commission, 
though it was willing to accept the challenge, was not able to take this initiative. It was only 
after President Bush's intervention that the Commission could affirm its leading role in 
1 5 G24 is constituted of EC 12 and Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA 
1 6 "Eastern Europe's economics' in The Economist. 13/01/90. p. 28. 
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Europe (mostly because the US did not want to pay the bill 1 7 ) as the Member States were 
still reluctant to give it the necessary powers. The American attitude was supported by 
Germany who worried about the reaction of its Eastern neighbours vis-a-vis a too strong 
German presence in the restructuring process of Central Europe. Although the Commission 
was not particularly adequate to undertake this mandate; Jacques Delors its President and 
Frans Andriessen, (the then Foreign Affairs Commissioner) took no chance and, with 20 of 
the best staff of the Commission, elaborated the PHARE programme (Pologne et Hongrie 
Assistance a la Reconstruction Economique, regulation 3906/89) that they presented on 26 
September 1989. 1 8 
The aid brought by this programme was conditional upon 
i) the organisation of free elections 
ii) the establishment of a multi-party system 
iii) the respect of Human rights 
iv) the introduction of a market economy. 
Another important condition is that would-be recipient countries have to make an agreement 
with the IMF, before the Community could work and provide the necessary funds. One year 
later, on 17 September 1990, the Council agreed (reg. 2698/90) on extending this programme 
to other Central European countries which fulfilled the above conditions (i.e. Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic along with Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia). The scope of the 
aid programme is to assist in the process of transition from a command to a market-driven 
economy with a focus therefore on core issues such as: 
The privatisation and the restructuring of enterprises. 
The restructuring and modernisation of banking and financial services. 
The promotion of small and medium enterprises and of the private sector 
generally. 
The establishment of laws, regulations and services for market economy, 
taxation. 
PHARE is also instrumental in assisting policy reform in other sectors, such as the 
environment, science and technology and social welfare. There are PHARE-funded 
programmes in support of energy policy development, incorporating strong linkages with 
environmental policies. 
"The headless superpower" in The Economist. 16/12/89. p.17. 
"European Community Survey1 in The Economist. 16/07/1993. p. 19. 
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Despite the priority areas set by the Community, RGibb and V.Michalak: affirmed that 
a significant proportion of funds have been used to purchase EC agricultural products at 
market prices. 1 9 Denmark, whose contribution is about Ecu 271 million, expressed 
dissatisfaction with the management of the aid by the Commissioa Soren Rishoj, a Danish 
MP, expert on Eastern and Central European affairs, argues that 'a high proportion of the aid 
money is filtered into the hands of independent West European consultants instead of 
reaching people in need in the East for whom it is intended'.20 The amount of money made 
available from the annual EC budget to carry on these project were: Ecu 500 million in 1990, 
Ecu 850 million in 1991 and Ecu 1 billion in 1992.21 Originally planned for five years, the 
Community decided, in November 1992, to extend it for five more years until 1997. 
Table 5. PHARE Programme, financial commitments from 1990 to 1993. 
(situation at 31.12.1993) 
(mlnEcu) 
Hungary Poland Cz-kia Cz rep Slovakia regional 
prgs 
Total 
Private sector, restructuring, 
privatisation, SMEs 
113.5 139.0 90.0 27.0 19.0 23.0 411.5 
Financial sector 19.0 42.7 0 0 0 0 61.7 
Agriculture restructuring 68.5 165.0 0 0 3.0 0 236.5 
Environment, nuclear safety 47.0 75.0 35.0 0 0 89.5 246.5 
Social dvpts and employment 28.5 117.2 19.0 8.0 3.0 13.0 188.7 
Education training and research 88.5 104.3 38.0 8.0 5.0 94.3 338.1 
Infrastructure (Energy transports...) 11.3 117.4 21.0 9.0 5.0 69.0 232.7 
Administration and institutions 13.0 8.5 0 0 0 9.5 31.0 
integrated regional measures 10.0 0 0 0 0 10.8 20.8 
Other (multidisciplinary..) 6.5 33.6 30.0 8.0 5.0 51.0 134.1 
Total 405.8 802.7 233.0 60 40 360.1 1901.6 
% 21.34 4122 1125 3.15 110 18.94 100.0 
1 9 R. Gibb and W. Michalak The European Community's response to the liberalisation of East 
Central Europe: illusions and Reality, unpublished paper presented at Royal Holloway, University of 
London in 1993. p. 7 
2 0 "Eastern grants to be reassessed' in The European 8-11/07/1993. p. 13. 
21 PHA RE Assistance for economic restructuring in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe: 
An operational guide. Commission of the EC, Luxembourg 1992. p. 7 
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Albania 195.0 6% 
Bulgaria 308.5 9 % 
Estonia 22.0 1 % 
Hungary 405.8 12% 
Poland 8028 24% 
Romania 441.7 13% 
ex-Cezecftoslovakia 233.0 7% 
Czech Republic 60.0 2% 
Slovakia 40.0 1 % 
Slovenia 20.0 1 % 
ex-GDR 35.0 1 % 
Latvia 33.0 1 % 
Lithuania 45.0 1 % 
Regional prgs 389.1 12% 
Other prgs 138.3 4 % 
Total 3.293.2 100% 
Sources: PHARE: execution budg&aire, established by DGI. Unpublished March 1994. 
The Commission had some difficulties not only because it had to coordinate about 170 
different initiatives22 (public and private) aimed at helping Central and Eastern Europe, but 
also because the Commission did not have adequate financial, diplomatic or administrative 
resources to carry out this business. Moreover, the Commission had to deal with reluctant 
Member States - about 80 per cent of the money provided by the EC and the Member States 
were still granted by individual Member States. H - who refused to come under the 
Commission umbrella. Britain developed and funded her own 'Know How fund' and 
2 2 J. Rollo, "Western policy: the room for manoeuvre' The New Eastern Europe, Western 
responses, London 1990. p. 110. 
2 3 R Rummel Toward Political Union, Plating a CFSP in the European Community .Oxford 
Westview Press 1992. p. 36. 
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organised seminars on British Parliamentary concepts, creating disruptances in the 
Commission's job and in the elaboration of joint projects.24 Furthermore, if there is some 
form of coordination in Western Countries, there is no such effort in Central Europe, where 
priorities are not clearly established25 So far, the Commission has managed to set up some 
joint projects in Poland as the cleaning up of the Mazuriani Lakes (EC, World Bank and the 
US) and the establishment of a Polish Privatisation Agency (with the International Finance 
corporation)26 
Table 7. Financial assitance to Central Ewope 
Total assistance of which grants 
EC and Members states 23.0 7.0 
(EC only) (5.0) (2.4) 
EFTA 4.2 1.6 
United States 5.5 3.5 
Japan 2.5 0.5 
Canada 1.7 1.2 
Total G24 without 37.8 14.1 
international financial 
institutions 
Total G24 + International 
f ia Institutions 
52.8 14.1 
Sources: 'Scoreboard ot the U24. 
Despite the fact that the PHARE is the major answer of the Community, Western aid 
invites many criticisms. Indeed as The Economist put it: of the various types of aid pledged 
so far by the G24, only Ecu 5.7 bin out of Ecu 27.7 bin (out which 73 per cent from the EC 
and its Member States) was in the form of grants, the most generous type of aid,27 the rest 
consists of loans and credit guarantees. These credits and guarantees are generally aimed at 
paying for Western exports, contributing to a further collapse of the intra-Central European 
trade as they capture the trade in favour of donor countries. Moreover, this policy is bound 
to put more pressure on the western markets as the Central European production is oriented 
2 4 "European Community Survey1 in The Economist 16/07/1993. p.20. 
2 5 OCDE Reussirles reformes des economies dEurope Centrde et Orientate Paris 1992. p.64.p.81. 
2 6 "European Community Survey1 in The Economist 16/07/1993. p.20. 
2 7 "Aid to Eastern Europe' The Economist 29/06/91. p. 11 
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towards them. Poland has proposed that the EC should give them some credits to export 
their productions to the former Soviet Union instead 2 8 
Other have complained about the scarcity of capital flows. According to a study carried 
out by International Economics in Washington D.C., $1.5 trillion are needed to raise the 
amount of productive capital per worker in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to that of 
the West within 10 years. So far only $55 billion have been attributed.29 Other criticisms 
reveal that Community actions lack coherence. As Kennedy and Webb put it more severely: 
The PHARE programme is a grab bag of initiatives ranging from emergency 
food aid to Poland to the establishment of the BERD [...] initiatives contain 
few surprises and repeat many aspects of prior development programmemes, 
including lengthy bureaucratic procedures for each Ecu spent and a bias 
toward purchases of EC agricultural surpluses.'30 
Thus, despite the PHARE programme, the Commission is still dependent on Member 
States' goodwill. PHARE in fact does not go further than the existing Community initiatives 
towards third world countries,31 and its provisions can be withdrawn at any moment if the 
conditions mentioned above are not satisfied Alongside the PHARE programme a European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development was set up. 
Although the European Investment Bank (EIB), which is a European institution, can 
intervene outside the Community on authorization of the Council of Governors (Art 18. of 
its constitution) and did so to support Cooperation Agreements,32 and despite the fact that 
2 8 OCDE Reussir les reformes des economies d'Ewvpe Centrde et Orientate Paris 1992. p.64.i.e. 
The E C has accorded a $2.5 bin to USSR to buy Community's surplus, instead of promoting the 
selling of Central European agricultural products and lightening the Central European pressure on 
Community markets. 
2 9 "Eastern Europe and the World', in The Economist 6/07/91. p. 73. 
3 0 Kennedy and Webb "mtegration:Eastern Europe and the European Community'. Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 28(3), p.650. 
3 1 H. Kramer, "The European Community's Response to the New Eastern Europe' in Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol.31, no 2. June 1993, p. 234. 
3 2 About 6% of the ETB total investment went to third Countries, (i.e. ACP countries and 
mediterranean countries). Out of Ecu 892.8m lend outside the Community, Ecu 320.0m (35.8%) went 
to Eastern and Central Europe, which is more than what has been lent to ACP countries (Ecu 252.0m 
28.3%) and about the same amount given to mediterranean countries. The money lend by the EIB is 
on a long term basis and concerns high priority budgets i.e. Trans-European network, 
telecommunications, industrial restructuring. From 1989 to November 1992, the ED3 lend Ecu 85m 
to the Federal Republic of Czecho-Slovakia. Ecu 285m to Hungary and Ecu 240 m to Poland. In top 
of these activities, the EIB plays an important role in expertise and advising, in EIB information, no 
72-75, no 77, EIB annual Report I992,(March 1993), EIB 1958-1993, 35years, Belgium, April 1993. 
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a special unit within the Bank was created in November 1989 to deal with Eastern Europe, 
the Community decided to create another institution: the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (BERD). Based on a French initiative to be a part of the PHARE 
programmeme at the Strasbourg Summit in December 1989, the BERD (operational in March 
April 1991) is especially dedicated to Central European countries to promote market 
economy. The BERD is not strictly a European institution since it is composed of 41 
members including Japan, the USA and recently Russia However, the EC and its members 
states hold 51% of the capital stock The bank purposes are explained in art. 1 of the BERD's 
Articles of Agreement. The bank has 
'to foster the transition towards open market oriented economies and to promote 
private and entrepreneurial initiative in the Central and Eastern European countries 
committed to and applying the principles of multi party democracy, pluralism and 
market economies.' (BERD 1990 art.1). 
However, its potential is considerably reduced because of restrictive operating conditions 
such as commercial criteria for investment and soft loans that the US has categorically 
refused to relax.33 Moreover, the Bank has to make at least 60 per cent of its total loans and 
investments to private borrowers. These restrictions limit enormously the bank activities, 
since the bank cannot find enough viable private projects. With Ecu 10 billion as capital the 
bank does not lack money only sustainable projects. By the end of May 1993, the BERD 
had financed 34 projects for a total of Ecu 230 million and approved 95 other projects worth 
only Ecu 2.3 billion,34 whereas the BERD President affirms that Eastern Europe needs Ecu 
4,000 billion A long on-going conflict between its president, J. Attali, and the Americans 
over his extravagant spending and bank management almost paralysed the bank's activities -
the American Congress refusing to approve this year's $70 million American contribution 
to the Bank - 3 5 until J. Attali eventually resigned in the summer 1993. 
I f J. Attali declared that the BERD had achieved 'an admirable performance',36 Vaclaus 
Klaus, (Czech finance minister) is more sceptical and argues that 'So far the role of BERD 
in our part of the world has been no more than marginal'. 3 7 A confidential report 
commissioned by J. Attali, even went further by accusing the BERD 
3 3 N. Denton 'US set to block EBRD expansion in East Europe' in Financial Times, 13/04/92. 
p. 8. 
3 4 'Europe angry at US stance on BERD1, The Times, June 5, 1993. p. 22. 
3 5 'Attali reshuffle will leave him in full charge' in The Times, 7 June 1993. p. 40. . 
3 6 'Attali claims history will vindicate BERD's record' in The Guardian 8 June 1993. p. 14. 
37 Financial Times 15/4/92 p.2. 
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"of failing to make a coherent [...] contribution to the [East European] 
economic transition process and that investments in the public sector have 
been confined to limited sectors (communications, construction and energy.)'38 
Despite its limits and insufficiencies and notwithstanding the difficult period of the early 
1990s, the PHARE programme and its management by the Commission to an extending 
number of 'Liberalised countries' represents an impressive achievement as far as short-term 
response is concerned. However, i f these circumstantial actions were helpful in facing 
immediate macroeconomic and stabilisation problems, the longer process of restructuring 
needed a long-term structure to develop steadily. The PHARE programme is widening its 
scope of activities along the lines defined at the European Council of Copenhagen in 
December 1992. The Growth initiative has been launched at the Edinburgh European 
Council to accelerate the financing of infrastructure investment (i.e. transeuropean networks) 
by providing a total of 5 bin Ecu in the form of a new temporary European Investment Bank 
facility. In order to facilitate the access to funds for infrastructure investment, the 
Copenhagen Council created the possibility for an incrasing utilisation of PHARE funds for 
the following areas (PHARE guidelines 93-97): environmental improvements, energy savings, 
regional reconversion, job creation, SME developments, research, education, local 
infrastructure, health, housing. 
Since 1989, old barriers to foreign investment have been dismantled and replaced with 
new liberal regulations. As a result, with a few exceptions, foreign investors have the same 
legal protection in Central Europe as in the EC. Western investments could play a major role 
in privatising state-owned enterprises as well as attracting western technology and business 
expertise. Foreign Direct Investments has four major roles 
a) Import substitutioa Creating national manufactures producing products 
which were mainly imported, reducing therefore the trade deficit and the 
foreign debt. 
b) Promoting exports by raising quality standards, competitiveness. 
c) Reducing the technological gap between the EC and Central Europe 
d) Privatisation through joint ventures increasing therefore opportunities for 
foreign investments. 
The needs of Central Europe in investment have been estimated at $2,000 bin for the next 
10 years. (UNECE 1991). Compared to the $9.6 bin provided in 1991, the present level of 
FDI is extremely small. Furthermore, it has been estimated that up to 50 % of this FDI is 
3 8 R. Peston" BERD under criticism over impact on Eastern Europe' in Financial Times. 18/06/93. 
p. 16. 
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essentially inactive. Indeed some companies invest only the minimum amount of capital 
required for a legal registration just to establish a market presence before taking the final 
decisioa 
Table 8. Cumulated Foreign Direct investments received by Central and Eastern 
European countries until 1.07.1993 (win US$) 
Receiving Countries FDI in mln US$ % 
Hungary 3875.5 42.9 
Czech republic 1850.0 20.5 
Poland 1800.0 19.9 
Rumania 678.8 7.6 
Slovakia 320.4 3.5 
Baltic states 418.5 4.6 
Bulgaria 57.0 0.6 
Albania 37.0 0.4 
Toted 9037.2 100.0 
• survey, Nov. 1993 










Hungary is the country which received the most financial direct investments with 62% of 
the investments made in Central Europe. As far as the origins of these investments are 
concerned, they are from different sources, Hungary received some from 50 countries 
whereas for the Polish they are about 90 for 1993. The share of the Member States 
represents 53,6% for Hungary and 52% for Poland. In terms of projects, Germany is the first 
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investor in Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria 3 9 
Table 10. Geogmphicllsa! origin of FBI 
EU EFTA USA Others Total 
Czech Rep. 52% 5.5% 29% 13.5% 100% 
Slovakia 36.6% 30.7% 14.5% 18.2% 100% 
Hungary 53.6% 23.6% 5.1% 17.7% 100% 
Poland 50.6% 7.9% 38.9% 2.6 100% 
710/1993 
M) Ewvpe Agreements. 
Financial help and investment are important in the reform process of Central Europe, but 
they are rather limited in comparison with the benefits that Central Europe could take from 
a structure where fair trade could take place and develop. Central Europe, in order to 
balance its exchange, urged the Community to open its borders in the sectors where they had 
a comparative advantage such as raw materials, machinery, transportation equipment, 
agricultural products, textiles and food Even if the European Community is attached to free 
trade, this represented a double challenge at the time. Firstly, because both parts had to 
reverse a 40-year legacy of discrirnination and asymmetry. Secondly, because the European 
Community had to adopt a common policy on tariff and quotas and create new commercial 
agreements, while the political debate was focused on the German reunification problem. 
The British, champion of the wait and see approach and the French, paralysed by their vision 
of a future big Germany, were for a while, united in their common political apathy. But 
when France realised that Germany was ready to go her way and help Central European 
countries (mainly to avoid massive immigration) and these centrifugal forces could be fatal 
to European integration process, they decided to speed up the European integration process. 
In a joint address of November 1989, they declared 
United nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Statistic Survey, November 1993. 
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that EC political integration and democracy in the East must go together and 
that the best way to respond to events was to strengthen the EC bounds so 
that the EC could maintain its magnetic attraction to the East'.40 
The perspective of the German reunification emphasised the need of deepening the 
Community before any other consideration This introspection, very much criticised by 
Central Europe, impeded the European Community from implementing an original, consistent 
and generous policy towards Central Europe. In August 1990, the European Council 
approved the British proposition to associate the Central European countries with the 
Cornmunity and gave the Commission the right to start negotiations for a second generation 
of agreements. It was only after this intergovernmental decision and under pressure of 
Central European countries that the Commission was able to propose a more coherent and 
long-term approach to deal with Central Europe and a new kind of agreement which could 
respond to the new needs of the EC in the realm of foreign affairs and security as M de 
Largentaye argues.41 Negotiations on the "Second generation' Europe Agreements started 
officially on 20 December 1990. 
It is only after 11 months of long and difficult negotiations, that the EC could solve the 
problems due to the formulation of the safeguard clause but also due to the fact that Member 
States of the EC pressed the Commission to withdraw the abolition of Quantitative 
Restrictions on imports of steel planned for March 1992. Countries like France, Italy and 
especially Spain demanded that Central European countries promise to reduce their excess 
capacities and threatened them with reintroducing self-restraint arrangements in case of non-
fulfilment of provisions concerning state aid and other restraints.42 Other problems arose 
with the fear that European presence in Central European countries could damage irreversibly 
the Central European national economies such as the banking and service sectors. Textiles 
was also revealed to be extremely difficult to negotiate, as the GATT did not foresee any 
definitive solution for the MFA before a transitional period of at least 12 years. As a 
4 0 R. Rummel, Toward Political Union Planning a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 
European Community. 1989. p. 125. 
4 1 M. de Largentaye 'La Communaute et les Pays de l'Esf in Alexis Lloyd and Antoine Winckler 
L'Europe en chantier. Collection Pluriel Hachette, Paris 1993. p. 242. 
4 2 'Europe Agreements between EC and Central Europe to be initiated'. East West, 19/11/91, n° 
514. p.2. 
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consequence, Member States' bilateral agreements were still valid 4 3 The European 
Community eventually signed the second generation agreement with the Central European 
countries on 16 December 1991. 
Europe Agreements are conditional upon political and economic criterions: democracy 
and market economy. ( preamble of the Europe Agreements) There are as many Europe 
Agreements as there are Central European countries involved in these agreements, but they 
have a common fiamework: 
a) to favour a climate of stability in Europe. 
'Association Agreements should help create a climate of confidence and stability 
favouring political and economic reform and allowing the development of close 
political relations which reflect shared values [...] consolidation of democratic 
political systems and market-based economies.'44 
b) to be a basis to strengthen the foundations of the new European architecture. 
"This will give tangible form to aspirations to return to the mainstream of 
European political and economic life and bring concrete reciprocal benefits'.45 
c) to enhance a better climate for trade and investment 
a long-term relationship between the Community and the Associated members 
would guarantee smaller firms from uncertainties from the new market 
conditions.46 
d) to facilitate the transition to a market economy 
By improving trade between them [Associate members] and supporting them 
through technical assistance, training and contacts.47 
e) to assure transparency and rational financial support through consultation 
mechanisms and financial cooperation.48 
f) to enhance cultural cooperatioa 4 9 
Two major innovations of the Europe Agreements are the institutionalisation of the political 
dialogue between the contracting parties (creation of an ad hoc institutional framework) and 
the establishment of a free trade area between the EC and the Associated members in less 
than ten years. Two periods of 5 years each enable assessment of the progress made by the 
4 3 "Europe Agreements between EC and Central Europe to be initiated'. East West, 19/11/91, n° 
514. p.3. 
4 4 Commission of the EC, COM(90) 398 final, Brussels, 27 August 1990. p. 3. 
4 3 Commission of the EC, COM(90) 398 final, Brussels, 27 August 1990. p.3. 
4 6 Commission of the EC, COM(90) 398 final, Brussels, 27 August 1990. p. 3. 
4 7 Commission of the EC, COM(90) 398 final, Brussels, 27 August 1990. p. 3. 
4 8 Commission of the EC, COM(90) 398 final, Brussels, 27 August 1990. p. 3. 
4 9 Commission of the EC, COM(90) 398 final, Brussels, 27 August 1990. p. 3. 
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contracting parties to achieve the free trade area. 
Hie legal basis of the Association Agreements, (Europe Agreements) is EEC art 113 (for 
commercial dispositions) and EEC art.238 which states that the: 
Agreements establishing an association involve reciprocal rights and 
obligations, common actions and procedures. Such agreements 'create 
special privileged links with a non-member country which must at least 
to a certain extent, take part in the Community system' 
That implies that the Commission should have the power to achieve and guarantee such 
commitment vis-a-vis Associated countries in all fields covered by the EEC Treaty. 5 0 
Moreover, any agreement signed on EEC art 238, requires the assent of the European 
Parliament, which has reminded the Commission of the inadequacy of its role in the decision 
process of the Community - the Parliament has however ratified the Europe Agreements in 
September 1992- 5 1 The signature of a Association Agreement can be motivated by two 
different purposes: enabling former colonial powers, member of the EC, to keep close links 
with their former colonies, or preparing the associate state for its accession to the Community 
by establishing a customs Union (i.e. Greece 1962, Turkey 1964).52 The Europe Agreements 
are obviously from the second category, however, despite the fact that the preamble states 
that full membership is the ultimate objective of the Association, it is not legally binding and 
they prepare neither for accession nor for a customs Union 5 3 and do not give a timetable. 
The European Parliament has criticised this lack of commitment arguing that 
The association agreements should provide clear guidance to the timing of 
negotiations on future membership of the partner countries.[...] A signal of 
this kind is politically and psychologically important to the associated 
countries.54 
In addition to economic and trade provisions, the European Agreement set the conditions for 
a political dialogue and cultural cooperation, which are not within EC competence, they need 
5 0 J. Redmond The external mictions of the Europecn Community, the international response to 
1992. 1992. p. 103. 
5 1 The European Parliament calling to be associated in the negotiating process and to be 
represented an observer status in the commission delegation, as it is the case for GATT and EFTA 
negotiations. In European Parliament session document PE 146.342/fin, 13 March 1991 p. 15. 
5 2 K-D. Borchardt The ABC of Community Law 3rd Edition, Bruxelles 1991. p.33. 
5 3 M. Maresceau "Les Accords Europeens: Analyse generale', in Revue du Marche Commun et 
de VUnion Eurvpeenne, n° 363, June 1993, pp 508-526. 
5 4 European Parliament, Session Documents PE 146.342/fin 13 March 1991. Report of the 
Committee on External Economic relations. Rapporteur: Mrs C. Randzio Plath. p. 11. 
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therefore to be approved by national parliaments (i.e.. mixed agreements) and would not enter 
into effect before their complete ratification. The ratification process was completed in 
November 1993 and Europe Agreements with Hungary and Poland, adopted by the Council 
on 13 December 1993, entered into force on 1 February 1994. 5 5 However, because the 
process of economic reconversion could not be delayed, the economic part of the Europe 
Agreements had been put into effect without ratification since March 1992 under the form 
of 'Interim Agreements' 
Second generation Association agreements, now called Europe Agreements after their 
ratification in November 1993, aim at consolidating all previous multilateral trade 
concessions and are to set free movement of services, capital and people and a free trade area 
before March 2002. The structure of the Europe Agreements is the same for every 
agreement. 
The four freedoms of the single market have been used as landmarks to establish the 
Europe Agreements, however, the notion of free trade does not have the same meaning when 
applied to the EC or Central European countries. As far as the free movement of goods is 
concerned more will be said in the next section. Concerning the free movement for services 
and capital and the freedom of establishment, the aim of Europe Agreements is to establish 
a 10 year transitional period at the end of which, when an enterprise establishes itself in the 
territory of the other party it shall receive treatment not less favourable than national 
enterprises. Protective measures are possible in cases where Central European companies are 
forced to accept a 'dramatic' loss of their domestic market shares. Free movement of persons 
is not dealt with in the Association agreements. 
The general structure of the European agreements is as follow: 
- Ptinciples 
- Political dialogue 
- Free movement of goods 
i) free trade for industrial goods with some exceptions 
ii) Sensitive sectors 
iii) Accompanying measures 
- Free movement of persons, services, capital 
Progressive liberalisation of supply of services across the border to nationals and companies of 
the other party. Specific provisions for transport services. 
OJ: L 114 30/04/1992. 
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- Approximation of legal provisions 
i) National treatment of establishment 
ii) Public contracts. Polish and Hungarian companies have access to contract award 
procedures in the Community under the same conditions as Community companies. 
iii) Liberalisation of payments and financial transfers 
iv) Competition rules 
v) Intellectual, industrial, commercial property. Legislation has to be introduced which gives 
the same protection as in the Community, Associated countries have to adhere to 
international conventions 
- Economic cooperation 
- Cultural cooperation 
- Financial cooperation 
The EC accepted asymmetrical reductions of tariffs in favour of Central Europe. In 
doing so they recognised their much weaker economic position and let the Central European 
countries the time to restructure their economies before facing the western concurrence. The 
EC has liberalised about 70% of its imports from Central Europe on 1 March 1992.56 The 
remaining 30%, mainly agricultural products, iron, steel, chemicals, textiles and apparel as 
listed in Annex la, lb and H, will be fully liberalised over 5 or 6 years. In March 1992, 
Central European countries had to liberalise 20 to 25% of its import from the European 
Community, the rest being liberalised over a 9-year period.57 The immediate consequences 
of such a liberalisation was a huge increase of trade activities between the EC and Central 
Europe. As we can see from the following tables, Central and Eastern European exports 
to the EC increased by 83% between 1989 and 1992, whereas imports increased by 120%. 
This asymmetry is even bigger for individual Central European states. When Hungary and 
former Czechoslovakia had almost the same volume of export in 1989, respectively 2586 and 
2557 mln Ecu, former Czechoslovakia doubled her exports whereas Hungary increased them 
by only 54%. The most worrying aspect of this evolution is that the EC has doubled its 
exports towards Central Europe (+162.7 % to ex-Czechoslovakia) leaving a growing deficit. 
Deficit with Poland has increased five times and the overall deficit for the Central European 
region six times. 
5 6 'EC concludes Europe Agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary', East-West, 
16/12/91. n° 516. p.2. 
5 7 'EC concludes Europe Agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary1, East-West, 
16/12/91. n° 516. p.2. 
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Table 1L EvolsOion of trade with CEECs58 with the EC, EFTA, United States, 
Japan and Canada between 1989 and 1992 (Percentage calcidaied from US$) 
InUS$ Exports Imports 
EC + 83% + 120% 
EFTA + 39% + 87% 
United States -9% + 84% 
Japan - 18% + 23% 
Canada - 37% + 73% 
Source: Eurostat Comext 
Table 12. Evolution of trade with Central Europe with the EC between 1989 
and 1992 (mln Ecu) 
Exports to the EC Imports from the EC balance 
1989 1992 % 1989 1992 % 1989 1992 
Poland 3857 7078 + 83.5% 3944 8153 +106.7% -87 -1075 
ex -Czkia 2557 5534 + 116.4% 2384 6263 +162.7 +173 -729 
Hungary 2586 3985 +54.0% 2987 4060 +135.9% -401 -75 
Total CE 9000 16597 +$4.4 9315 18476 +98.3 -315 -1879 
Sources: Eurostat 
The strong growth of trade existing since 1989 has, however, increased the asymmetry 
existing between the EC and Central Europe and has therefore significantly aggravated the 
deficit of the Central European countries' trade balance. Although Central European 
economies have dramatically increased their exports between 1990 and 1992, this could not 
match the augmentation of Central European imports of EC products. The EC trade surplus 
with its eastern partners was 1.7 billion Ecu for the 11 first months of 1992.59 This trade 
deficit has provoked a number of criticisms and was seen as proof of the EC protectionism. 
Two points should be raised here. First of all, a certain trade deficit is typical of developing 
economies and is usually due to a deficient structure of the national financial market which 
cannot respond to demands of investment. Secondly, the study of the trade structure of 
5 8 Poland, Hungary, former Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania 
5 9 Communication by the Commission to the Council, in view to the meeting of the European 
council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993. pp.8-9 quoted by G. de Vries "Hungary and the European 
Community - a West European view" in the World Today n° 139, July 1993. 
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Central Europe shows that the European market is the most open to Central European 
products. As we can see from table 12, the deficit, in 1992, in absolute value, is much 
higher in the trade with the EC, than with Japan or United States. However, American and 
Japanese surplus are relatively more important than the European Community's. On top of 
that, the evolution of trade between Central Europe and other parts of the world between 
1989 and 1992, shows that exportations to the EC and to EFTA have increased by 83% and 
39% respectively, whereas exportations to the United States and Japan have decreased by 9 
and 18% for the same period, (see table 11 p. 72) 
Table 13. Evolution of trade between CEEQf0 and EC, EFTA, USA, Japan and 
Canada (in mln US$) 
Export to Import from balance 
EC 24,606 28,230 - 3,624 
EFTA 4,528 6,407 - 1,879 
USA 1,211 1,714 -503 
Japan 545 715 - 170 
Canada 168 167 + 1 
Total 31,058 37,233 
Source: Eurostat (Jornext 
As far as protectionist barriers are concerned, Europe Agreements have not significantly 
improved the Central European situation since they had one of the lowest protectionist tariffs 
in the world and they had to reintroduce some tariffs barriers in certain sectors in order to 
protect their national industries against highly subsidised European exports.61 Mr Rasko, state 
Secretary at the Agriculture Ministry of Hungary, the largest food exporter of Eastern Europe, 
said "we cannot compete at dumping prices'.62 According to the OECD, subsidies account 
for 45% per cent of EC agricultural production, while they represented only 30 % of the 
Hungarian production in the 1980s, down to 8% in 1992 and a forecast 6% in 1993. During 
6 0 Poland, Hungary, former Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania. 
6 1 i.e.'EC expenditure on exports refunds for cereals grew from Ecu 1175 million in 1980 to Ecu 
2773 million in 1989' Agra Europe, 2 March 1990 in Senior Nello, The New Europe, changing 
economic relations between East and West. 1991. p.143. 
6 2 N. Denton "EC dumping of farm produce upsets Hungary in Financial Times 22/06/1993. p. 
6. 
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the first half of 1993, Hungarian exports have diminished by 28% in comparison with the 
first half of 1992. Many critics have seen this drop as the consequence of the commercial 
restrictions imposed by the EC. 
Furthermore, as far as the Central European exports to the EC are concerned, their 
prices doubled because of the European barriers such as duties and tariff, while the price of 
their exports to the United States increased only by 20 per cent, five times less than Europe. 
The following table shows that EC protectionism doubles the price of most agricultural 
exports from the Central Europe, whereas American tariffs represent only 20 to 25% increase 
of Central European prices. 
Table 14. Agriculture Implicit tariff rate 1985-90 









Exports to EC Exports to US 
Sources: FT 13/04/92 p.4. 'EC protectionism threatens east European growth' based on P. rvfesserlin. (1992) 
In its structuring of customs tariffs, Czechoslovakia, with the approval of the 
GATT, has raised 1000 tariff items, covering 20% of all its imports. Similarly and in order 
to protect the domestic food and agricultural market, Czechoslovakia has introduced 
compensatory amounts when import price is lower than domestic productioa 6 3 As a 
consequence of the trade liberalisation and of the whole revolutionary process, the expansion 
of EC exports was mostly directed towards Poland (Exports increased by 73%) and 
"New Czech customs tariffs in East West no. 518, p. 13. 
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Czechoslovakia (exports increased by 42%).6 4 Central European exports to the EC are more 
modest. 
Although the interim agreements aimed at the complete liberalisation of trade 
between the EC and Central Europe over a long transitional period of 10 years, numerous 
special provisions for agricultural products (Protocol 1), steel, coal (protocol 2) and textiles 
(protocol 3) are still present and are impeding Central European economies from gaining full 
benefits from the EC market. The establishment of these protocols came at the end of a 
particularly acrimonious debate between the EC and Central European countries, when the 
Commission had to defend national interests, (i.e.' Spanish clothes makers, Irish beef farmers 
and Scottish raspberry1 as the Economist put i t 6 5 ) . Polish negotiators were particularly upset 
and threatened to withdraw from the negotiations in July 1991. The liberalisation of sensitive 
products trade has been strongly opposed by national interests, which has limited the extent 
of Community generosity. Central European countries are responding differently to the 
economic challenge of transition and i f upgrading their products for export will need time, 
it is therefore vital that Central European countries could export sensitive products to the 
West.66 Sensitive products account for an important part of the Central European exports to 
the EC as they represent 33 per cent of Czech and Slovak exports to the EC, 42 per cent of 
Polish exports and 51 per cent of Hungarian exports.67 They are less than 1 per cent of total 
EC Gross Production This shows a huge disproportion in the 'relative importance of these 
products to EC and Central European countries. So, even i f they were to increase of400 per 
cent, EC production would not fall more than 4.6 per cent in textiles, or 1.3 per cent in food 
products.68 Moreover, it is unlikely that Central Europe could maintain this pace for ever, 
as internal consumption will certainly absorb most of the national production 6 9 Another 
argument is that losses for producers will be compensated by consumer gains.70 
Concerning Textiles, Europe Agreements imply the progressive elimination of import 
duties over six years and the disappearance of quantitative restrictions in less than 5 years. 
However, the requirement for their complete removal will be the object of bilateral 
6 4 'EC trade with East Europe' in East West, 29/05/92. no.527. p.2. 
6 5 'Open up' in the Economist, 3/08/1991, p. 15. 
6 6 DG for Economic and financial affairs, "The European Community as a world trade partner, in 
European Economy, no. 52, 1993, p. 33. 
6 7 'Fortress Europe keeps eastern neighbours our" in Financial Times 19/10/92. p.6. 
6 8 E.Balls 'Fortress Europe keeps eastern neighbours out', in Financial Times 19/10/92.p.6. 
6 9 i.e. 'Four tigers' example quoted by Al Agraa, The Economics of the EC. p. 41. 
7 0 J. Rollo 'Maybe not even Jam for Eastern Europe' in Financial Times 18/06/93. p. 15. 
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negotiations and will, to a large extent, depend on MFA negotiations.71 The MFA had been 
prolonged until 31 December 1993 because of the Uruguay round deadlock and its 
reintegration into the GATT exclusive competence has not yet been discussed. The removal 
of tariffs planned by Europe Agreements have little effect on the export capacity of Central 
European countries, because they still have to face important quotas.72 The Community has 
increased certain quotas ceilings,73 but has introduced new ones on other areas. Moreover, 
such increase of quotas ceilings does not necessarily imply a growth of Central European 
exports to the Community, because most of the time these exports failed to comply with the 
requirement of the rules of origin and therefore cannot enter the EC. 7 4 Statistics do not 
reflect the real capacity of these industries which are struggling to find new markets and 
which cannot force the Community to grant more liberalisation, because it will argue that 
they do not take full advantage of their current allowance. Another fact is that these quotas 
and the different limits to exports are not an incentive for Western Companies to take 
advantage of the cheap Central European labour, or to invest there, as their production will 
not be allowed in. This lack of capital and foreign investment impedes these countries from 
developing new structures of production in sectors that are less protected and less sensitive 
and in which they could develop a comparative advantage. As a consequence, they cannot 
diversify or re-orientate their production and this renders their economic survival even more 
dependent on sensitive sectors. 7 5 
As far as coal and steel products are concerned, customs duties will slowly but 
progressively be suppressed by 20% every year (nil after 6 years) and the quantitative 
restrictions and VRAs were abolished by March 1992. Central European countries have to 
do the same but in a longer period, from 6 to 9 years. State subsidies may be maintained 
i f they are linked to a policy of global reduction in production capacities, i f they help to 
71 European Economy, no 52, 1993, "The European Community as a World Trade partner', 
published by the DG for economic and financial affairs, p.35. 
7 2 P. Messerlin "The Association Agreements between the EC and Central Europe: Trade 
liberalisation vs Constitutional failure', in Flemming and Rollo, Trade, Payments and adjustment in 
Centred end Eastern Europe, RDA, BERD, March 1992. p. 121. 
7 3 'EC concludes Europe Agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary East West, n° 
516. 16/12/1991. p.3. 
7 4 See page 80. 
7 5 P. Messerlin in Flemming and Rollo, Trade, Payments and adjustment in Centred and Eastern 
Europe. 1992. p. 122. 
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ensure normal market conditions by the end of the transition period.7 6 P.Messerlin, in his 
analysis of the mterim Agreements reveals three interesting conclusions: 
i) The association agreements delivered for a second time many zero-tariffs 
previously granted under the GSP scheme. This means that the European 
Community did not improve the conditions of Central Europe since 1988. Only 20 
per cent of the 7,500 industrial goods are concerned by a total liberalisation 
ii) The tariff cuts which are been granted according to a timetable concerned the 
highest tariffs in the sector. This means that most of the most sensitive products, 
about 10% of industrial goods, will be taxed before coming into Europe. 
iii) Tariffs reductions and tariffs concessions (GSP) are clashing, as certain tariffs, 
during the first year of the Interim Agreement will be higher than previously because 
tariff cut have been made of a MFN basis.77 
As a consequence, free trade in industrial goods planned by the Europe Agreements will 
take some time before being implemented. The agreements in a number of cases (80%) have 
accorded what has been already accorded in the previous agreements such as MFN and GSP. 
In some cases duties were actually increased and most importantly, the number of sensitive 
products are being liberalised at a very slow pace. Moreover, on the particular insistence of 
Spain and Greece,78 a safeguard clause has been included in the protocol for these products 
and anti-dumping actions have also been launched In response to Eurofer complaints about 
Czech and Polish Mumping1 practices, the Commission has imposed additional tariffs on 
imports of steel. The Commission's proposal to restructure the European Steel industry in 
the Community, made on 17 February 1993 and launched by the Council on 25 February, 
to reduce the European over-capacity will have some influence on Central European countries 
who will have to limit their steel exports and give a guarantee of fair prices. On top of that 
the Community has started new negotiations on a 3-year quota plan which will enable 
Central European countries to increase their exports by only 35%, in comparison with the 
1991 level. 7 9 This plan will put in place a new device: the' Tariffs quotas'. This instrument 
is more flexible and allows exporting countries to export to a certain limit at normal price. 
Once they reach that limit and go beyond it, the exports are levied at 20 to 30 % above the 
normal tariffs. The threat of anti-dumping procedure will be a strong incentive for Central 
7 6 'EC concludes Europe Agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary East West, n° 
516. 16/12/1991. p. 3. 
7 7 P. Messerlin in Flemming and Rollo, Trade, Payments and adjustment in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 1992. p. 118. 
7 8 Contact Groups on Steel, in East West, 29/05/92, n° 527 p.4. 
7 9 'Bad news for East European steel exports' in East-West no 542, 15/02/1993. p.5 
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European countries to sign these accords. As an example, the Czech Republic is likely to 
accept the following regime. 
The Agricultural sector is an important one, as it represents 30% of active population in 
Poland and 20% in Hungary and was particularly hit by the recession. Agskiitare was the 
most problematic sector where concessions have been the most difficult to reach. In 1991, 
50% of all agricultural exports from Central European countries entered the EC market free 
of any imports duty or quantitative restrictions (57% for Poland, 47% for Hungary and 46% 
for CSFR) w , however the level of protection faced by Central European countries could 
exceed 100 per cent for certain products.81 The interim agreements are based on reciprocal 
concessions, but provide only for the suspension of quantitative restrictions and not their 
complete removal. Moreover, interim agreements do not have any major effect on the import 
of competitive products from Central Europe, as the concessions are granted within the 
existing system of quotas or tariffs ceilings. The liberalisation of agricultural products 
depends, in fact not only on their political sensitivity, but also and more importantly on the 
results of the GATT negotiations and on the reform process of the Common Agricultural 
Policy . J.Redmond argues even that VERs contained in previous sectoral arrangements 
would continue to be applicable.82 Moreover, there are two specific safeguard measures 
related especially to agricultural products (i.e. meat in Annex X, processed agricultural 
products in protocol 3)° 
After the discovering of 'foot-and-mouth' disease in Italian imports, the European 
Community imposed, on 8 April 1993, a one-month regional embargo on twenty countries, 
including the Visegrad group. This embargo banned exports of meat and dairy products, 
although no traces of this disease had been found in Central European exports and without 
real certainty that the contaminated imports came from this region On the basis of art. 29 
of the Europe Agreements, 'prohibitions, or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in 
transit [can be taken when] justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public 
security, the protection of health and life of humans, ariimals or plants.' This article clearly 
specifies that 'such prohibitions, shall not however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
80 European Economy no. 52. p.35. 
8 1 P. Messerlin in Flemming and Rollo, Trade, Payments and adjustment in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 1992. p. 116. 
8 2 J.Redmond, The external relations of the European Community, the international response to 
1992. 1992.p. 107. 
8 3 P. Messerlin in Flemming and Rollo, Trade, Payments and adjustment in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 1992. p. 126. 
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discrirnination or a disguised restriction of trade between the Parties. Central European 
countries have accused the European Community of such practices, as this trade represents 
about $10 million a month for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, representing one-
fifth of total EC imports. 8 4 The Prague Post reported that "The Visegrad countries 
denounced the embargo as protectionist and said it threatened to mushroom into a protracted 
regional trade war.' 8 5 Indeed Central European countries reacted by banning EC exports, 
Poland going further by banning imports from Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia. This 
"meat-war1 has put some stress on the Visegrad countries who reacted in a disorderly fashion 
and showing how imperfect the Visegrad forum was to coordinate policies. As the Prague 
Post put it, 
"The differences in response were astounding. The Hungarians tried to be quick, 
firm but reasonable. The Poles were just as quick and firm, but rather 
unreasonable -how else to describe the fact that along with banning Western food 
products they also put off-limits the same of goods from their 'guiltless' 
neighbours to the South.86 
This trade war cooled off after the lifting of the embargo by the European Community 
at the begirining of May, after the Central European countries accepted stricter control. 
Cattle destined for slaughter have to undergo 15 days of quarantine and pigs a blood test.87 
In conclusion we would say that even i f trade liberalisation is on its way, the European 
policy does not respond completely to Central European needs. The slow removal of trade 
barriers is often understood as protectionism and it does nourish the suspicion that member-
states, through heavy lobbying, are protecting their declining industries88 and destroying the 
short term competitive advantage that Central European industries have now. 
8 4 P. Messerlin in Flemming and Rollo, Trade, Payments and adjustment in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 1992. p. 116. 
85 The Prague Post, Vol. 3, no 16, 21/04/1993. p.l. 
8 6 D. Kumermann 'Neither side can win 'meat wars' in The Prague Post, vol 3, no. 16,21/04/1993. 
p.15 
8 7 Meat import ban, in East-West no. 547-548, p.4. 5/05/1993. 
8 8 E.Balls 'Fortress Europe keeps eastern neighbours ouf, Fincncid Times 19/10/92.p.6. 
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Table IS. Trade structure of Hungcay to the EC 
EC Exports to Hungary E C imports from Hungary 
01-06/93 % 01-06/93 01-06/93 % 01-06/93 
MEcu 01-06/92 MEcu 01-06/92 
Equipment, Machines 606 + 20% 368 + 23% 
Textiles 293 + 10% 329 + 9% 
Agriculture 163 + 52% 288 -28% 
Industrial products 159 + 48% 172 - 19% 
Chemical products 285 + 23% 107 -13% 
All sectors 2343 + 23% 1821 -5% 
As Central European countries were complaining that the EC did not open its gate wide 
enough to enable them to trade, the Cbrnmission re-assessed and tried to improve the 
European policy towards Central Europe during European Summits. Thus, at the Edinburgh 
Summit in December 1992, the British Presidency took a certain number of measures 
promoting the integration of Central European reforming economies. The Commission 
proposed, during this Summit, although without the support of all Member States, to shorten 
the transition period for the Community1 s dismantling of customs duties and quantitative 
restriction, to improve Community market access for agricultural products and for textiles. 
The PHARE programme was to be extended and finally the Commission proposed the 
creation of a free trade area between EFTA and Visegrad 4 and between the Visegrad 
members themselves.89 
Another Summit which had its importance in the formulation of the Community policy 
towards Central Europe is the Copenhagen Summit held in June 1993. In top of political 
decisions that will be discussed in the next chapter, the Commission has proposed more 
asymmetry in the liberalisation of trade in favour of Central Europe. However , after 
opposition from France and Portugal, the Commission withdrew its proposal to change the 
rigid "quota-based' system for a more flexible "ceilings'.90 Thus even i f some quotas on the 
8 9 "Edinburgh Summit to suggest limited initiatives for Central and Eastern Europe' in East-West, 
3/12/92, n° 538, pp. 2-4. 
9 0 L.Barber "EC agrees package to boost market access for Eastern Europe' in Finmcial Times 
10/06/1993. 
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sensitive products listed in annex lib, (Mineral, chemical fertilisers, footwear, semi-finished 
products of iron, motor cars...) are abolished one year before, Central European countries will 
still have to pay extra-duties i f they breach import restrictions. Secondly, the Commission 
has re-proposed the relaxing of rules of origin for all products from all associated countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. The Foreign Affairs Council weakened these concessions, 
on 9 June 1993 by putting aside rules of origin changes for later consideration. The trade 
concessions offered by the Copenhagen Council to the Associated Countries include: 
the abolishment of import duties on certain sensitive industrial products at the end 
of the second (instead of hte fourth) year after the entry into force of the agreement 
the abolishment of import duties on former GSP products (annex UT) at the end of 
the third year (instead of the fifth) and increase at higher rates of the amounts of 
the tariff quotas and ceilings concerning these products. 
reduction of the import levies/duties on agricultural quota six months earlier than 
was foreseen; increase in the quotas six months earlier than was foreseen, 
abolishment of the import duties on textile products after five instead of six years 
abolishment of hte import duties on steel products after four instead of five years 
The Financial Times comments that 
'the weaknesses of the trade concessions, however, undermine both immediate 
export and growth prospect in Central and Eastern Europe, in the longer term, 
the very objective of EC membership.'91 
The European Agreements contain 8 safeguard clauses (two general (Art 24, EA 30) and 
six specific) which resuscitate the EEC Art. 115 redundant after the implementation of the 
Single Market programme in 1993,92 and which states that 
"Where any product is being imported in such increased quantities and under 
such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause: 
i) serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive 
products in the territory of one of the parties or 
ii) serious disturbances in any sector of the economy or difficulties which 
could bring about serious deterioration in the economic situation of a region, 
9 1 J.Rollo 'Maybe not even jam for East Europe' in Financial Times 18/06/93. p.15. 
9 2 J.Redmond, The External relations of the European Community, the International response to 
1992. NY. 1992. p.6. 
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The Cbmmunity or the Associate members, whichever is concerned, may 
take appropriate measures under the conditions and in accordance with the 
procedures laid by the agreement'.93 
As P.Messerlin explains it, the elimination of and/or by the restricting and was the only 
improvement in comparison with former safeguard measures, but it was immediately 
balanced by the introduction of serious disturbance as an incentive to entail safeguard 
procedures. 9 4 However, it has to be said that Member States have less and less power to 
apply national safeguard measures on their own initiative.95 As a matter of fact, surveillance 
measures have dropped from 1.300 in 1987 to 185 in 1991.96 
Amongst NTBs, are rules of origin, norms and standards. Definition of rules of origins 
is complex and restricting, they take into account the ownership of manufactures and 
products have to undergo 'sufficient working or processing197 Thus for most industrial goods, 
inputs from non-EC sources should not represent (in Added value) more than 40 or 50 per 
cent of the value of the production, which means that assembly plants which are not based 
on bilateral trade between the EC and the Central European countries were de facto excluded. 
, 9 8 The cumul of origins is now possible between associated countries. Anti-dumping 
procedures have been renegotiated by the GATT. Changes are embodied by the 'Dunkel text' 
signed on 20 December 1991, which redefines the determination of dumping, the 
determination of injury and the procedure of implementation 9 9 This text represents an 
improvement in comparison with the 1979 text, as less discretion and leeway are given to 
the importing authorities to conduct or interpret anti-dumping actions or laws. In top of that, 
the Commission approved, on 17 June 1992, the proposal of'Harmonisation and streamlining 
of decision-making procedures for Cxirnmunity instruments of commercial defence and 
modification of the relevant council regulations' which gives the Commission the right to 
impose or not, duties after consultation of the Member States. However, the Member States 
9 3 Commission of the EC, COM(91) 524 final, Brussels, 13 December 1991. p.19. 
9 4 P. Messerlin in Flemming and Rollo, Trade, Payments and adjustment in Centred and Eastern 
Europe. 1992. p. 127. 
9 5 E . Vermuslt and F. Graafsma 'Commercial defence actions and other international trade 
developments in the European communities: 1 July 1992 - 31 December 1992. in European Journal 
of International Law, vol.4 no. 2. 1993. pp.283 - 304. 
96 European Economy, no. 52 p. 189. 
9 7 P. Messerlin in Flemming and Rollo, Trade, Payments and adjustment in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 1992. p. 129 
9 8 P. Messerlin in Flemming and Rollo, Trade, Payments and adjustment in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 1992. p. 129. 
9 9 E.Vermulst and F. Graafsma Commercial defence actions and other international trade 
developments in the European communities: 1 July 1991- 30 June 1992. in European Journal of 
International Law, vol.3 no. 2. 1992. pp.371 - 427 
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may overturn the Commission decision in the following twenty days by a majority vote. 
Thus, in September 1992, the Commission resisted the pressure of the Member States to 
implement a general safeguard clause against all ECSC products imported from 
Czechoslovakia 1 0 0 The application of this proposal limits the Council's power to impose 
anti-dumping procedures and therefore completes the harmonisation of the Common Policy. 
If this is a good thing for the Community which could harmonise the implementation of the 
tariff at a Single Market level, it also means that decisions and negotiations with Central 
European countries are therefore confined to the Association Committee, which, as we will 
see below, is not a model of transparency. This was however an incomplete measure as the 
individual states could still implement national protection after having appealed to the 
Commission on the basis of EEC art. 113 to issue a recommendation against illicit trade 
practices. On 14 August 1992, the Commission authorised Germany, France and Italy to 
control imports from Czechoslovakia at their own frontiers. 1 0 1 Moreover, similar draft 
regulations have been issued for other commercial policy regulations, such as safeguard 
regulations, common rules for imports, common rules for imports from states-trading 
economies, 
What P.Messerlin sees as a 'constitutional failure of the European Agreement' 1 0 2 is 
simply the continuation of a long struggle that we have exposed in chapter 2 and on which 
was modelled the whole attitude of the European Community towards Central European 
countries. The first major lack of the Europe Agreements is that Central European countries 
have not been granted the full rights due to the status of market economies. This can be very 
damaging as far as anti-dumping measures are concerned (see infra) and gives an unrestricted 
leeway for the Community to settle disputes at its convenience. Moreover, the new way of 
settling disputes 'administratively1 1 0 3 is affirmed to be a non-transparent procedure by 
Messerlin. 1 0 4 
We have already seen that managed trade was heavily present in the system of 
quantitative restrictions, but also in the safeguard and rules of origin provisions set up by the 
1 0 0 'Safeguard clause applied on certain Czechoslovak steel imports' in East West, no.532. 
1/09/1992 p.ll. 
101'Safeguard clause applied on certain Czechoslovak steel imports' in East West, no.532. 
1/09/1992 p.ll. 
1 0 2 P. Messerlin in Flemming and Rollo, Trade, Payments and adjustment in Centred and Eastern 
Europe. 1992. p. 125. 
1 0 3 Art. 27 in COM (91) 524 final, Brussels 13 December 1991. p.19. 
1 0 4 P. Messerlin in Flemming and Rollo, Trade, Payments and adjustment in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 1992. p. 127 
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treaties. The main difference however, is that the settlement of disputes with Central Europe 
will from now onwards be settled within the framework of the Association Council which 
is designed to 
- make it easier for the associated countries to settle into the family of democratic 
nations, 
- increase the tempo at which the contracting partners of Central and Eastern Europe 
move in the direction of the European Community, 
- widen and consolidate the consensus on international issues.105 
Any dumping cases or safeguard procedures have to be immediately referred to the 
Association Council which has thirty days to settle the dispute. After this period, the 
contracting party is able to take unilateral actions. As Art.27, 3.c. refers the Joint 
Committee may take any decision needed to put an end to the difficulties', however, if 
exceptional circumstances demand immediate actions, the Community or the Central 
European countries concerned, can short-circuit the procedure mentioned above. The 
settlement of dispute remains however on a bilateral basis that may bring an arrangement 
infringing GATT procedures and which could enable the Community to put pressure on the 
exporting parties. These loose rules are a major drawback to the 'liberalisation' process 
described earlier, as it is uncertain to what extent contracting parties will be forced to comply 
with the application of the Europe agreements. The Parliamentary Association Committee 
is a forum for cooperation between members of the European Parliament and 
parliamentarians of the Associated Countries. Its main purpose is to facilitate an exchange 
of information and ideas. 
The process of harmonisation in trade related matters, started in the 1970s with the CCP, 
confirmed in 1985 with the Single European Act and put into effect with the implementation 
of the Single Market in 1993, is part of the institutional process which gives the Commission 
more exclusive power to implement a genuine Common Commercial Policy and to put into 
practice more trade liberalisation. This trend has been very slow, because of the opposition 
of Member States who delayed their economic retructuration. The 1989 revolution disturbs 
completely the lengthy European integration Fomer protectionist state-economies have been 
transformed into evolving market economies which are putting the EC under economic and 
commercial pressure. The Commission which spends so much time in creating a common 
rninimal protectionist barrier towards third countries has now to undo its work and organise 
1 0 5 ESC Economic and Social Consultative Assembly EC relations with the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, Brussels 1991. p. 19. 
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a common approach to more trade liberalisation, while Germany and Great Britain are 
running ahead and France dragging its feet. Moreover, as we have seen earlier, the 
increasing importance taken by cooperation in the decision making process of the 
Community, which entails more compromises and more 'middle-of-the-road' solutions is 
likely to deter efficient policies. Furthermore, the political consequence of such liberalisation 
on European integration, with Central European states knocking at European doors, favours 
a vision of Europe that has to accept long-term diplomatic responsibilities. These new 
European agreements also have a very important political dimension which needs to be 
further developed as the EP stated it: 
"The new generation of agreements with these countries, whose economic 
dimension is already almost outweighed by the political dimensions, require 
a political response form the Community which overcomes the earlier 
sharing of influence among Western Countries which are now Community 
Member States."06 
If the step taken by the Member States in signing the Maastricht Treaty is understandable and 
can be seen as a major achievement towards more European integration, it has to be said that 
once again, it came very late and that the European integration process will be made at the 
expense of Central and Eastern Europe which needs more liberalisation and more 
commitment that the Community can possibly give them at the present moment. The 
consequences of a long inward-looking Community and the subsequent manifest lack of 
vision of its role in the international scene have now to be faced and accepted in their 
entirety. 
1 0 6 Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on shaping the European 
Community's common Foreign policy. Rapporteur Mr. Josep Verde I Aldea. EP session documents. 
PE 201.471 \fin. Or. ITAFR . 23 October 1992. p. 12. 
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When the EC was created back in the 1950s there was little room and little concern 
for its political dimension because the two superpowers were domiriating the European 
continent. As a consequence, the EC was undeveloped politically but with economic success 
in the hand a progressive political awareness appeared in the 1970s and 1980s. Now, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union changed the whole cold war political and security set up, 
leaving more opportunities for the EC to affirm itself on the international scene as its 
political and security responsibilities grew. The EC was not able to carry out such 
responsibilities as it did not have an adequate security dc>drine or sufficient political means 
to intervene. The only certainty was that union might bring the force necessary to face the 
new world challenges. The European Community has no alternative but to experiment, and 
retry old remedies to face its responsibilities. As J.Delors the President of the Commission 
put it: 
' [La Communaute Europeenne] est une sorte de laboratoire de la gestion des 
interdependances; malgre ses rides et ses manques'.... 'Contrairement a 
l'apres seconde guerre mondiale, qui avait ete 'prepare' pendant vingt ans 
du point de vue theorique, l'apres communisme a du en effet etre totalement 
improvise, d'ou le recours a des concepts existants, car il n'etait pas possible 
de rattraper en quelques mois ce qui n'avait pas ete pense pendant des 
annees.'1 
This chapter outlines the new concept of security and the new Central European perceptions 
of threat and their political and security expectations. Following this analysis, we shall see 
how the EC has developed its international role since the 1970s and how Central European 
revolution has entailed the EC to further develop its foreign policy along two tracks: first 
a progressive political integration with the countries which signed a Europe Agreement and 
which aim at joining the EC/EU; second a security policy which aims at providing peace on 
the European continent and which tries to reconcile cold war institutions with post-cold war 
1 J.Delors ' favour invisible' in Le Monde, 7-8 Novembre 1993. p. 7. 
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needs. It is, however, arguable that these policy advancements constitute only a basis for a 
common foreign European policy and that decisive improvements, such as a transfer of 
sovereignty, will not come before a dramatic change of the European Union structure and 
nature. The question is therefore: Will the pressure due to the enlargement of the EU to 
Central European candidates on both its policy and institutional set up be strong enough to 
overcome Member States resistances to further integration? 
I Centrd Emvpe: dowwstk mud Menwttomd politics. 
With the notion and the role of state and politics having been completely undermined by 
the Soviet experience and with interdependence making the role of the state more difficult 
to appreciate and to justify, the traditional societal reconstruction according to Western 
principles is rendered very difficult and uncertain in Central Europe. This is not without 
influence on International Relations as they are now considered as the external expression 
of internal developments. As R.W. Cox argues, 
" International Relations cannot be understood as simply a system where 
states aggregate power. Distinction between the state and civil society, 
which allows the separation of foreign from domestic policies cannot be 
maintained.'2 
It is therefore important to take into account these internal developments in order to realise 
that the international assistance that the EC could provide is not only financial and economic 
but also political. 
In 1990, Central European countries have adopted democratic regimes and new 
constitutions, but since 1918 these countries have had little experience of what is democracy. 
Former Czechoslovakia with a record in Central and Eastern Europe can claim 23 years of 
democratic regime between 1918 and 1989, followed by Poland with 8 years and Hungary 
with only 2 . 3 New democratic regimes are weakened by several aspects, such as low 
elections turnout, extreme partition of the political spectrum and possible authoritarian or 
ultra-national drifts. In the democratic political life, parties have an important role to play 
because they represent the connections between Society and government, they express 
interests and values of the different social groups and they finally organise people's need into 
2 R.W. Cox 'Social forces, states and world order: Beyond international relations theory1 in 
Millennium 10:2 126-155. 1981 
3 "Democracy in Eastern Europe' The Economist 1/02/1992. 
85 
Chapter 4. Political reintegration of Central Europe and EU foreign policy. 
coherent policies. Central European parties usually issue from former 'umbrella' 
organisations such as the Polish Solidarnosc, the Slovak Public against Violence, the Czech 
Civic Forum and the Hungarian 'Alliance of Young Democrats'. Some were divided into two 
or three big components as was the case in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, while the Polish 
organisation suffered an extreme partition Because of this partition, the largest parties 
cannot rule on their own, they need to create a coalition which unites from three (Hungary: 
3, Czech Republic: 4 and Slovakia) up to 7 different parties for Poland. Given the 
fragmentation and confusion of interest, aspirations and traditions, it is very difficult to 
sustain a voluntary consensus to carry out painful economic policies. Most parties are, 
however, committed to dismantling State Socialism, even if they do not agree on the method 
to achieve it. Another common point to all these parties, is their commitment to the return 
to Europe and the accession to the European Union. Democracy is fragile and its institutions 
receive small support from the population 
As parliamentary regimes seem not to fulfil population hopes, a certain attraction for 
authoritarian rule has emerged amongst Central European countries. In an opinion polls 
published in January 1993, about a third of Polish electors would support an authoritarian 
regime and about 33% in May 1992 would give Lech Walesa the power to rule by decree. 
4Lech Walesa is a controversial figure who is often compared to the former Polish 
President\dictator Pilsudski. He met bitter criticisms in late 1990 from one of his former 
advisors: Adam Michnik. In an article in the New York Review of Books, he affirms that 
'Walesa wants to be an 'axe wielding* president who rules by decree and who 
likens democracy to a drivers control over a car.... Walesa is irresponsible,... 
incompetent... also incapable of reform'. 5 
Thus in Poland, in early 1992, the struggle between the Prime Minister and Lech Walesa 
finished to the benefit of the latter who inherited substantial powers and imposed his choice 
for new premiership with Hanna Suchocka. The Polish case also illustrates the difficulty of 
management of the former Communist elites for two reasons. First because they still have 
a lot of economic power in the country and secondly because they could be the victim of a 
witch hunt. Thus politicians would be tempted to stigmatise the Communists and to offer 
their heads to the public opinion's anger and frustratioa 
In the same article Adam Michnik warns new democracies of 
4 Eastern Europe Newsletter Vol. 7 no 3. 2 February 1993. 
5 Adam Michnik 'My vote against Walesa' in the New York Review of books, vol. XXXVTI, no. 
20. December 20, 1990. 
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"phantoms from the past awaken: movements that combine populism, 
xenophobia, personality cults and a vision of the world ruled by a conspiracy 
of Freemasons and Jews.16 
In Hungary, in 1992, Istvan Csurka the deputy leader of Hungary's ruling party, the MDF, 
affirmed that the rebirth of the Hungarian nation was fighting a Communist-Jewish-Liberal 
conspiracy and was demanding vital space within Europe to live, as Hitler justified his 
policy. Slovaks also show worrying signs of political insanity. They commemorated the day 
in 1939 when the Fascist puppet state was founded (14 March) and they were honouring the 
War Criminal J. Tiso in October 1990 on the very day the Israeli president was making a 
state visit to Prague. 
With the Warsaw pact and the cold-war security structure collapsing, every Central 
European state got rid of the anti-western Soviet perception of threat. The dual antagonistic 
structure disappeared and let other conflicts of different varieties and intensities take over. 
Amongst those, Poland is especially concerned with Russian hegemonic diplomatic attitude 
and the Ukrainian unstable political and economic situation which could both lead to civil 
wars, flows of refugees or even military incursion The new Polish military doctrine 
stipulates that the army must safeguard all borders against any potential threat, whether from 
the east (Russia or Ukraine) or the west (Germany). As a consequence, Poland abandoned 
its offensive stance against Western Europe and redeployed its army along the eastern border. 
Another major concern for the Polish government is the illegal border crossings and influx 
of well-armed Russian and Ukrainian narcotics gangs into Poland. Some measures were 
taken to modernise patrol equipment and to redeploy many extra-units of rapid reaction 
border guards. Some 12 to 15 new watch towers were built up. Hanna Suchocka, the 
former Polish Prime Minister affirmed that 
"Poland is perhaps the only post-Communist country that is not threatened 
with disintegration, that is not making territorial claims on its neighbours and 
whose borders are not questioned by neighbours' 
Poland is not completely free of ethnic problems. Of course Poland gave up the myth of 
ethnic homogeneity cultivated by Cbmmunists and recognised its minorities. 7 Amongst 
6 A. Michnik 'My vote against Walesa' in the New York Review of books, 20 December 1990. 
7 Working document of the European Parliament on "La situation des minorites en Europe'. Serie 
Politique W-4. Avril 1993. 
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them, are large minorities of German and Belorussians on Polish soil and a certain number 
of Poles in Byelorussia, Lithuania and Ukraine, whose rights are not fully respected 
Hungarian position is more delicate because minority problems are a key issue of concern 
in domestic politics and in detmriining its relations with its neighbouring countries. Hungary 
has 3.3 million Magyars outside her borders, Romania (2 m), Slovakia (0.6 m) and the 
Vojvodina (0.4 m). Former Prime Minister Antall claimed to be Prime Minister 'in spirit' to 
ethnic Hungarians and Hungary has adopted a 'model' law on the collective and individual 
rights of the minorities within its own borders, hoping that this would favourably influence 
the behaviour of neighbouring countries towards Hungarian minorities. Current Hungarian 
policy is based on the promotion of local autonomy in areas where Hungarians form a 
majority of the population in neighbouring states and it support local councils which seek to 
protect and improve the existing provision guaranteeing information, culture and education 
of these minorities. 
Because of its 621-km border with the former Yugoslavia, Hungary is very concerned 
with the situation in Bosnia A number of unchallenged incursions into Hungarian air space 
were made by Yugoslav air force fighters during the 1991 Serbo-Croat war. Serbia has 
inherited from the federal army long range surface-to-surface missile systems that have 
Budapest within their range. Hungary's relations with Serbia have deteriorated since 
Budapest supplied infantry armaments to both Croatia and Slovenia in 1990-91. They are 
further strained by the tense situation in Vojvodina where 20% of the population is ethnic 
Hungarian and is threatened to by be displacement or expulsion by Serbian refugees coming 
from the South. UN economic sanctions are pushing Serbia to take greater advantage of 
the economically more developed Vojvodina 
Hungary concluded a cooperation agreement with its neighbours and has developed a 
defence policy which condemns the use of force to solve a minority problem This policy 
of good neighbourhood was adopted at the unanimity less one vote by the Hungarian 
parliament in March 1993. The Hungarian government signed a cooperation treaty with 
Ukraine which states that Hungary has accepted the inviolability of its borders with Ukraine. 
In exchange, Ukraine has pledged that its 200,000 Hungarian population will enjoy full 
minority rights. 
In Romania, the vast majority of ethnic Hungarian are located in the Transylvania region 
which covers the north-western third of the country. There were still numerous clashes 
between Hungarian minorities and Romanian government which were used for political ends 
by both sides. In Hungary, it has upset and reinforced the nationalist opposition such as the 
extremist Istvan Csurka who, before being expelled by the ruling party -MDF-, declared that 
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Hungary should consider changing its border.8 Hungary resents the way that the Romanian 
'unitary national state'9 treats the Hungarian minorities whereas Romanian President Iliescu 
affirmed that Hungary was using its diaspora as 'fifth column' in very much the same way 
that Hitler used ethnic Germans to destabilise bordering states during the run-up to World 
War II . Hungary's new state treaty does not include guarantees of territorial inviolability 
whereas Hungarian minorities' rights are constitutionally provided for. In February 1993, a 
sub-Carpathian 'Euroregion' was established with the aim of cultivating cultural and 
economic ties between its member states which include Hungary, Slovakia and Ukraine. 
Despite the fact that the bulk of the Carpathian mountain range lies across Romanian 
territory, Hungary refused to let Romania in On 4 October 1993, Romania's admittance to 
the Council of Europe was endorsed by all the member states except Hungary. Despite a 
meeting at ministerial level in November 1993 there is no prospect of a genuine improvement 
in their relations. More seriously, Serbia is informally allied with Romania against Hungary. 
Minorities in Central Europe. 
'000 Gypsies Hungarians Poles Slovaks Others 
Bielorussia - - . 600 - -
Czech Rep. 114 - - 308 -
Hungary 500 - - 120 -
Lithuania - 600 258 - -
Slovakia 80 - - - -
Ukraine - - - 25 -
Vojvodina - - - - -
Poland 4 - - 25 500 • 
Romania - 2 m - - -
* 500 of which 300 are German and 200 Bielonrssians. 
Source. National Statistical Offices. E1U. in The Economist 13 March 1993. p.18. 
Table 16. Minorities in Centred Europe 
After the split of Czechoslovakia, numerous minorities appeared in both parts, however they 
do not seem to create a real problem as their rights are recognised in the 'Agreements on the 
Common Policy towards Nationals of third countries' and they are so far respected . 
Hungary's relations with Slovakia are also volatile because of a long standing dispute over 
8 Survey Eastern Europe. 'Little Local Wars? in the Economist. 13 march 1993. p. 18-19. 
9 Term used in the Romanian constitution. 
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the Gabcikovo hydroelectric dam on the Danube river.10 It fears for the large number of 
Hungarian minority there because the Slovak government put a lot of emphasis on ethnicity 
to justify its independence. As a matter of fact, it has obliged ethnic Hungarian local 
authorities to remove bilingual road signs and there is a project of redrawing local district 
boundaries in such a way as to dilute the proportion of Hungarians in any given commune. 
This was a very symbolic and sensitive issue. Here again, Hungary abstained from voting 
for Slovakia's admission to the Council of Europe at the end of June 1993. Budapest also 
expressed concern about the treaty of cooperation signed in 1993 between Romania and 
Slovakia because that treaty provides for coordinated policy towards ethnic minorities. This 
has awakened the old Hungarian fear of conspiracy against itself. All its neighbours army 
gathered together are eight times more powerful than the Hungarian army. As a 
consequence, Hungary has adopted a doctrine of "all-round defence', adopted in March 1993, 
that called for troops to be redeployed more or less evenly throughout the country. 
Political instability in Russia has also created concerns for the Czech Republic, but non-
military concerns are more prominent on the government's agenda such as economic 
insecurity, rising crime, nuclear insecurity and migration (economic refugees and asylum 
seekers). Immigration is an important problem especially since Germany has tightened its 
immigration on 1 July 1993 and would-be migrants are staying in Czech Republic (about 
100.000 people). Military threat has not disappeared because Russia retains a huge military 
force and that most of the nuclear and conventional capability has become much less 
predictable and more dependent on the vagaries of power politics in Moscow. 
The 1989 revolution and the collapse of the Soviet Union were very good news for those 
who wanted to develop the international political identity of the European Community. They 
have also brought an area of instability that the EC is enabled to deal with. This is not only 
due to historical reasons but also to the nature of the EC and of its institutions dealing with 
external political affairs. 
II) The European Community and its foreign policy 
The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was established in the 1970s through the first 
Davignon Report of 27 October 1971" and was mentioned in many different ministerial 
1 0 "Danube dam threatens to open floodgates of hostility1 in FT, 29 October 1992. p. 2. 
" The first Davignon report is also known as the Luxembourg report. 
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reports which brought incremental changes.12 As a support to organise and discuss the EPC 
business, Heads of Governments decided, in 1974 at the Paris Summit, to meet three times 
each year (and then only twice a year) as the "European Council' of Heads of State and 
Foreign Ministers. The European Council was supposed to palliate the insufficiencies of both 
the Commission and of the Council of Ministers, which for various reasons, were lacking 
leadership. The communique produced at the end of the Paris Summit announced that: 
'Recognising the need for an overall approach to the internal problems 
involved in achieving European unity and the external problems facing 
Europe, the Heads of government consider it essential to ensure progress and 
overall consistency in the activities of the Communities and in the work on 
political cooperatioa'13 
The European Council was not formally and legally integrated into Community, because 
of the political sensitivity of the problems discussed in EPC meetings and because the 
decisions issued by them did not really need the backing of Community. 1 4 This gave the 
EPC and the European Council the freedom to evolve practically, according to the needs and 
preferences of its members. The European Council was to be organised on the same 
structure as the Council of Ministers (e.g. national delegations, working groups, and a 
committee: the Political Committee; to prepare ministerial meetings). Decisions within the 
EPC are taken by the unanimous vote and therefore impose a consensual approach on 
policies even for the most controversial issues, which is not without consequence on the 
efficiency and the range of the decisions taken by the Council. Thus, i f the European 
economic legislation is 75% proactive and 25% reactive, the ration is inverted for the 
European Foreign policy.15 Decisions taken through EPC are outside of the Community law 
system and are not legally binding. They could be reversed in theory. The Single European 
Act signed in 1987 institutionalised this phenomenon by giving the EPC an autonomous 
juridical status which conforms more to international law than to Community law. EPC is 
made a European institution for foreign policy coordination, but it was not integrated into 
1 2 Davignon Reports in 1970 and 1973. Report on the European Political Cooperation (London 
13 October 1981), Stuttgart declaration of June 1983, and article 30 of the Title HI of the Single 
European Act in 1987 which institutionalised the existing system. 
1 3 Neil Nugent The Government and Politics of the Europecm Community. 2nd Edition, 
MacMillan, London 1991. p.194. 
1 4 Terry G. Birtles 'A Single Western Europe? Implications of the Changing Division of External 
Relations Powers between the European Community and Member States, in Political Geography 
Quarterly, Vol. 9. no. 2. April 1990, pp. 131- 145. 
1 5 European Community survey in The Economist 1 July 1990. p. 33. 
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the Treaties. SEA art.31 denies the European Court of Justice the right to intervene or to 
control if EPC decisions are implemented or not. 1 6 
The Single European Act (title IH) improved the EPC and the cohesion existing between 
its Member States. EPC members were obliged to consult each other on foreign policy 
issues in order to ensure that (their) combined influence was exercised as effectively as 
possible through coordination, the convergence of their positions and the implementation of 
joint actions. The SEA also urged the European Community to make coherent and consistent 
both their economic and political decisions and assigns to the Presidency and the 
Commission the special responsibiUty, each within its own sphere of competence, to ensure 
and maintain that consistency. With Article 30.5, the Commission was to exercise its power 
and jurisdiction in both economic and political spheres, under the conditions and for the 
purpose of each sphere. The European Council was institutionalised and became a European 
institution as such. The EPC's spokesman is either the Presidency, the Troika (the previous, 
current and future presidency) or the 12 who must remain mute and let. the Presidency do the 
talking. 1 7 Therefore, if the EPC wished to recourse to Community instruments to conduct 
a specific policy (e.g.. economic concessions or sanctions for bargaining purposes), it had to 
pass through normal Community procedures. This did not guarantee however, that this 
particular policy would be adopted. Any dialogue involving politics and economics (EC and 
EPC business) has to be done according to the EPC procedures. In his study on the EPC, 
Jean de Ruyt affirmed that the efficiency of the Community on an international level was 
'hampered by the schizophrenic divisions of competencies between the 
integrated EC institutions and the intergovernmental EPC process'. 1 8 
The European Council proved to be very important not only in the definition of medium 
and long-term Community goals, but also in initiating and dispensing policy guidelines and 
finally in taking decisions in constitutional and institutional affairs. Thus, in 1990, four 
European Summits took place to deal with the consequences of the 1989 revolution in 
1 6 T.G. Birtles 'A Single Western Europe? Implications of the Changing Division of External 
Relations Powers between the European Community and Member States, in Political Geography 
Quarterly, April 1990. p. 137. 
1 7 Simon Nuttall 'The institutional network and the instruments of action.' in R. Rummel Toward 
Political Union. Oxford, Westview Press 1992. p. 69. 
1 8 Jean de Ruyt European Political Cooperation: Toward a Unified European Foreign Policy. 
Washington DC: The Atlantic Council, October 1989. 
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Central European countries and theirs effects on the internal structure of the European 
Community (i.e. Dublin 1 & 2, Rome 1 & 2). It has therefore undermined the Commission 
by its inter-governmentalism and the Council of Ministers which is now managing the 
policies detailed and set up by the bi-yearly European Council. 
The 1989 revolution and especially the pressure put on the Community by Central 
European countries, have led the European Community to reinforce its internal structures and 
to revise the collaboration of the EC and EPC which proved to be inadequate. 1 9 To face 
the German reunification and the collapse of the Soviet Union, F. Mitterrand and H. Kohl 
proposed reactivating the European Political Union in April 1990, a proposition which met 
British reluctance, as the UK did not see the need for big structural changes, especially i f it 
were to give more power to European institutions. This project was further developed during 
the 28 April 1990 Dublin European Council when it was declared that: 
In accordance with the conclusions reached by the European Council at 
Dublin, the Community will act as a Political entity on the international 
scene.'20 
This will to intervene politically in the international scene was embodied in the creation 
of the European Union and of its second pillar: the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP in title V of the Treaty on European Union TEU)21 The treaty, which was officially 
adopted at Maastricht on 11 December 1991 and signed on 7 February 1992, gives the 
European Union the objective 
'to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the 
implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the 
eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to 
a common defence.'22 
The Maastricht Treaty gives the European Union a potential CFSP but its achievement will 
be very much determined by the nature of the European Union itself. The EU is built on a 
3 pillar structure which comes under a single institutional framework The first pillar is 
rooted in the Rome Treaty as modified by the Single European Act and the others two -
Common and Foreign Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs -are based on 
1 9 PE 201.471. Fin. p.7. 
20 Agence Europe. 30/04/1990. 
2 1 CFSP principal references are: Treaty on European Union: Title V and common provisions 
Title I and VII, the role of the Community (art 228, 228a et 223) and Title VI. Five declarations 
annexed to the Final Act of the Conference on political Union. Conclusions of the European Council 
(Maastricht, Edinburgh, Copenhagen and Brussels). 
2 2 Title I Article B of the TEU. 
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mtergovernmental cooperation. This pillar structure was favoured by France, UK, {Denmark 
and Portugal who wanted to protect their national sovereignty in the foreign policy realm. 
On the one hand, the Maastricht Treaty represents real progress in the sense that the 
institutional framework ensures the coherence and consistency of the actions taken by the FX! 
and that the EU becomes more ambitious. The single institutional framework of the Union 
is indeed an important step, eliminating the separation between political cooperation and 
Community action On the other hand, the single institutional framework is not really unique 
because common institutions have completely different responsibilities, rationale and powers 
according to which pillar they are working in As a matter of fact, the European Court of 
Justice is still absent from pillars JJ and HI, the role of the Commission and of the European 
Parliament have been less important in pillars II and m than in pillar I . In those pillars, the 
Commission is not the "conscience' of the European integration process, but it is "fully 
associated' 2 3 and it may submit proposals to the Council. The European Parliament is 
consulted on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP.24 As a consequence only 
one institution has strengthened: the European Council. It has acquired a much more 
important role as it shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development 
and shall define the general political guidelines thereof.'25 This pillar structure represents 
not only a serious risk of decommunitarisation but, more importantly, does not give the 
Union the means to carry out its basic objectives in the International scene.26 Member States 
have not given the EU the juridical personality hence it cannot fulfil the basic requirements 
and duties of an international actor. Thus, the EU cannot conclude international conventions, 
cannot assume the responsibility of its acts, cannot be represented and cannot defend its 
interests before a court. Without juridical personality, the Union does not have the capacity 
to define and exercise its competencies and powers that its objectives are implying. The 
political power to act in International Relations lies within the Member States acting within 
the framework of the intergovernmental CFSP. Of course an evolution is still possible 
towards deeper integration but the communitarisation of the CFSP is unlikely to happen. 
Several reasons can be put forward. First, all the instruments that the Community had used 
to complete the Common Commercial Policy are absent from the political field namely a 
2 3 Articles J.5 -J.9 of the TEU. 
2 4 Art. J.7 of the TEU. 
2 5 Art. D ~ 1 of the TEU. 
2 6 The ELTs objectives are: 
- to promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable... 
- to assert its identity on the international scene... 
- to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States.. 
TEU Title I art. B. 
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general pro-European atmosphere, juridical control of the ECJ, dynamic supranational bodies 
and above all an initial transfer of sovereignty which gave the Communities juridical 
personality. Secondly, it is difficult to foresee a transfer of sovereignty in the international 
political field because it would mean the emergence of a federation, which is completely 
unacceptable to UK and Denmark27 and the subsequent replacing of the nation state-based 
legitimacy by a popular legitimacy. Although, many political analysts conclude with 
RRummel that 
"As long as the Community is not determined to transform itself into a federal 
entity, implementing the two essential components of defence and 
macroeconomic policy, there will not be a full fledged Community foreign 
policy.'28 
there is no chance that an intergovernmental conference or body could take such a 
revolutionary measure in a time of global political re-nationalisation. 
The Common Foreign Security Policy, despite its innovations, is therefore quite limited 
by the nature and the structure of the EU. 2 9 Its main aspects are to implement an active 
foreign policy (rather than 'reactive') and to put unity and consistency in the external action 
of the Union The CFSP covers all areas falling within that policy and has five fundamental 
30 
aims. J U 
- to safeguard the common values, interests and independence of the Union, 
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Members in every way, 
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with 
international law, 
- to promote international cooperation 
- to develop and consolidate democracy and human rights 
There are two modes of implementation. The first one concerns coordination of national 
policies in the conduct of policy in all areas covered by the CFSP that are of general interest, 
and adoption of a common position whenever the Council deems it necessary. This is not 
2 7 "The transfer of competencies that compose the notion of foreign sovereignty to the Union is 
the necessary and sufficient condition to qualify it as a federal state.' A. Pliakos in v La nature 
juridique de l'Union Europeenne' Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europeen n°2, avril-juin 1993. pp. 
187-224. 
2 8 R. Rummel, Toward Political Union, Planning a CFSP in the European Community. Oxford 
Westview Press 1992. p. 36. 
2 9 The set up of the CFSP has entailed institutional changes: closer cooperation between the 
Political Committee and the COREPER, the fusion of the political cooperation secretariat with the 
general secretariat of the Council, collaboration between the General Secretariat of the Council and 
the Commission. 
3 0 TEUartJ.l . 
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however a single Union foreign policy, it does not cover the whole of the foreign policy of 
the Member States. The second mode of implementation is to set up Joint Action in areas 
in which the Member States have important interests in common. The adoption and 
implementation of joint action are subject to aprecise and heavy juridical procedure. On the 
basis of general guidelines laid down at the highest political level by the European Council, 
the Council decides that a matter should be the subject of joint action and specifies its main 
components. The Council is also responsible for ensuring that action by the Union is 
uniform, coherent and effective. Its decisions are unanimous and the discipline between the 
Member States is strengthened. National policies must conform to the common positions and 
Member States are bound both in the positions they adopt and in their action in the case of 
joint actioa These general guidelines established from respective national interests would not 
however replace a systematic assessment capability at Union level based on the definition of 
the common interests and the long term implications of foreign policy decisions. This lack 
of European capacity for foreign policy and analysis and planning has confined CFSP to 
limited joint actions and could result in Member States taking individual action without any 
regard to the constraint of the Union's interests or capacity. The European Council has given 
certain general guidelines on areas in which joint actions could be particularly beneficial for 
the attainment of the objectives of the Unioa Its geographical priorities are Central and 
Eastern countries, Russia and the former Soviet Union, ex-Yugoslavia, the Maghreb and the 
Middle East. Four joint actions have been developed so far: 
- Peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
- Peace process in the Middle East, 
- Stability pact in Central and Eastern Europe, 
- Monitoring the transition towards democracy in South Africa. 
The CFSP is essentially a mechanism which needs a strong political will but it will oblige 
Member States to define the geopolitical interests of the Union in a particular external 
situation as a basis for a common position and possible common action and encourage them 
to build a consensus on how to protect such interests. It should also make it easier for 
Community instruments to be mobilised in the pursuit of political objectives or for political 
action to be taken in support of Community actioa Another major advantage of the CFSP 
is that it is comprehensive and includes the eventual framing of a common defence policy 
which might in time lead to a common defence. The European Council has also identified 
domains within the security dimension which could be subjects of joint actions: 
- the CSCE process 
- disarmament and arms control, including confidence building measures 
- nuclear proliferation 
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- economic aspects of security (i.e. transfer of military technology and arms exports 
to third countries. 
However, CFSP has so far neither improved visibility nor continuity of the Union's 
global external action. 3 1 The six-month presidency and the separation of international 
representation of the Commission itself between three Commissioners is damaging to the EU. 
Sir Leon Brittan represents Foreign Trade, Manuel Marin development policies and Hans Van 
Broek Political affairs. Several clashes appeared between Sir Leon and Hans Van Den Broek 
over the representation of the Commission at European Council and international summits. 
As E. Mortimer foresaw and put crudely 'A Coherent Foreign policy is not likely to emerge 
from this mish mash of disparate procedures and rival bureaucracies.' 3 2 I f the CFSP 
embodies real progress in the affirmation of the EU as an international partner, the conditions 
of its exercise are not fulfilled to meet the ambitions it was set in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Europe agreements implied the setting up of a political dialogue in the structures that 
they established: The Association Council, the Association Committee and the Parliamentary 
Association Committee (see infra). This dialogue was, however, limited to economic aspects 
and to the resolution of trade disputes. Because the European Council of Copenhagen 
pledged to integrate the Associate Countries, the EU established a more comprehensive 
structure in order to prepare those countries for accession The EU at the Copenhagen 
Summit decided to set up a structured relationship between the Associated countries and the 
institutions of the European Union within the framework of a reinforced and extended 
multilateral dialogue operating in parallel to bilateral dialogue provided for in the Europe 
Agreements. 3 3 The framework involves the holding of meetings at different levels on 
matters of common interests, decided in advance, arising in the EUs areas of competencies 
such as energy, environment, transport, science and technology... The European Council's 
proposal was to be modified by the Hurd/Andreatta letter of 17 December 1993 which 
proposed detailed initiatives to implement Copenhagen resolutions.34 As a consequence, the 
3 1 i.e. six monthly rotating presidencies, Community budget or Member States' budget to finance 
CFSP expenditure? Difference between Community action and joint action... 
3 2 E. Mortimer "The dangers of disorder* in Fmancid Times 9 Sept 1992. 
3 3 Conclusions of the Copenhagen Summit. "The Community proposes that the associated 
countries enter into a structured relationship with the institutions of the Union within the framework 
of a reinforced and extended multilateral dialogue and coordination on matters of common interest.' 
3 4 The main points of the Hurd Andreatta initiative proposed the 12+6 format instead of the 
Troika + six format for ministerial meeting to cover CFSP issues, the extension of the number of 
working groups to cover security, Terrorism, Planners and Human Rights, appointment of a European 
correspondent in the associated countries, encourage CEEC to adopt a single representation on a 
rotating basis at EU meetings, the association of CEECs with some joint actions, the adoption by the 
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final structure of the structured relations with Central and Eastern European countries was 
presented as such to the Press:35 
- a meeting once a year between the presidents of the European Council and 
Commission he arranged with the Heads of State and Government of the associated 
countries; 
- briefing of CEECs by Presidency of EU after each European Council; 
- SemestiM 12 + 6 meetings Foreign Ministers36 (in the form of a special Council) 
once per presidency to look at problems involving the CFSP with a view to arrive 
as much as possible at common operational conclusions and to accommodate specific 
concerns of the associated countries; 
- a meeting once a presidency between Political directors in the form of a special 
session of the Political Committee (12 + 6); 
- Expert working group meetings extended to security, terrorism, planners and Human 
Rights; 
- as appropriate, CEECs will be invited to publicly align themselves with EU 
declarations; 
- attendance of representative of CEEC at selected Troika demarches; 
- CEECs invited to associate with implementation of EU joint actions, as appropriate; 
- intensified cooperation in international organisations; 
- CEECs to be invited to appoint Shadow European correspondents and identify CFSP 
contact points in Brussels missions;37 
- Regular contacts between EU missions in third countries and at headquarters of 
international organisations and missions of Associate countries; 
- EU notes that in some cases the modalities of cooperation require the Associated 
countries to nominate a single representative. In particular, Associate countries are 
invited to establish a system providing for a single representative on rotation for 
coordination purposes. 
Because the uncertainties of the internal development of the EC have delayed the political 
cooperation with Central Europe, the Community has decided to exploit as far as possible 
the political dialogue set up in the European agreements. As the spokesman for the Danish 
Presidency said 
"This is not a perfect package, but it is really an expression of our 
commitment to work for the gradual enlargement of he Community to the 
east in the years to come.'38 
CEEC of EU declarations. 
35 Agence Eumpe n° 6186. 9 March 1994. p.4. 
3 5 First Troika meeting at ministerial level held on 21 September 1993. 
3 7 That was already put into place by Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary at the time of the 
proposal. 
3 8 'East gets a lukewarm welcome' in the Guardian, 22 June 1993. p. 8. 
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Hie European Community underlines the importance of Political cooperation before 
economic integration, which a major reversal of traditional European process. J. Delors 
recognised it in a speech given in Hanover in April 1994 saying that 
Turning the Community process on its head, political cooperation would 
outstrip economic integration. In this way pernicious ultra nationalism could 
be combated, human rights consolidated and acceptable solutions found to 
protect the interests of minorities.'39 
The first meeting under multilateral political dialogue between the Union and the 
associated countries (Hungary Poland, Czech and Slovak republics, Bulgaria, Romania) took 
place on 8 March 1994. CEECs welcomed the reinforcement of the political dialogue as 
presented by the Political Committee, but objected to the last point suggesting closer 
cooperation among the six associated because Visegrad countries do not speak with a single 
voice on political issues (i.e. Czech reluctance) and there is no political will to institutionalise 
foreign policy coordination The first ministerial meeting between the EC troika, the three 
Central European countries and representation of the EC Commission has been held on 5 
May 1992, during which the Community has reminded its attachment to a close regional 
political cooperatioa At this occasion the Visegrad 3 made part of their will to a fuller 
participation in the dialogue on the future shape of the Community, (1996) knowing that they 
will have to compel to what will be decided then This aspiration did not receive a warm 
welcome from the EC delegation 
The setting up of a structured political dialogue with the EU institutions represents an 
important step in the political reintegration of Central Europe into Europe. However, it is 
part of the accession process and does not directly answer present Central European security 
needs. Surely, with Maastricht and the CFSP, the EU has acquired a security and defence 
dimension but the extent of security guarantees that the EU can give to Central European 
countries is dramatically limited by the cold war heritage (i.e. inadequate institutions, 
outdated military theories...) and has to cope with the present European security landscape. 
KB.) The European Security System 
The collapse of the Soviet Empire changed the whole European security structure and 
the concept of security itself. In the cold war period, security referred to the relationship 
between states and was concerned with sovereignty, alliance, strategic deterrence, 
conventional and nuclear battlefields. Now, economic problems, enovironment, the lack of 
stable and democratic regimes, ethnic problems, the rise of nationalism and religious 
Agence Europe. 21/04/1993. 
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fundamentalism are majors threats to the European security. That makes military means less 
important in the dealing with such problems. These developments have important 
consequences on the European security policy. First, there is a need to establish a more 
coherent link between the military and non-military aspects of security policy. Second, the 
end of the Cold war is leading towards less American involvement in Europe leaving more 
political and financial responsibilities to European states who may lack cohesion and 
leadership. Third, Central and Eastern Europe have to be closely involved in the new 
European security architecture (see Table 17 page 100 on the European Security Framework) 
if the new European security policy is to be effective. These new tasks and objectives cannot 
be easily fulfilled by the institutions created during the cold war period Not only were they 
left in a state of complete unpreparation as far as military doctrine was concerned, but they 
were also totally unable to carry out new tasks such as preventive diplomacy, peace-making, 
peace-enforcement and crisis management which correspond better to the needs of the new 
European political and security landscape. They all need major institutional reforms and a 
complete re-assessment of their role on the European continent. Though it came as a general 
conviction in Central Europe that integration into NATO and the European Union may be 
the best option to counteract threats to stability and reduce risks of escalation, it seems that 
Havel's statement is correct, namely that 
"[their] countries are dangerously sliding into a certain political, economic 
and security vacuum: the old, imposed political, economic and security ties 
have collapsed, yet new ones are developing slowly and with difficulty, if 
at a l l ' 4 0 
The first institution dealing with security in Europe as a whole is the CSCE. Born in 
the seventies after the Helsinki Final Act, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) was created to maintain a modus vivendi on a divided continent by 
promoting cooperation and rapprochement. Until 1989,35 states took part in the CSCE but 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, this number was raised to 53 in February 1994. The 
role of the CSCE changed quite dramatically and the Paris Conference of 1990 gave it a new 
role: to provide Central European countries with political support and backing for the 
process of change in those countries. This has entailed a progressive institutionalisation of 
4 0 'President Havel's address to the NATO Council', NATO Review, vol. 39, n° 2 April 1991, 
p.33. Quoted in Pal Dunay 'Security Cooperation in Central Europe' in Pamdigms, Vol. 6.2, Winter 
1992, pp. 26-42. 
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the CSCE.41 However, the capabilities of the CSCE in conflict settlement and crisis 
management are inefficient mainly due to its complicated crisis management mechanism, its 
decision-making process which requires unanimity less one and a lack of financial and 
operational resources. The CSCE receives the full support of Russia who wants to see in this 
institution 'the supreme security structure in Europe'42 because it is the only pan-European 
security organisation in which Russia has a veto right. A growing competition is taking 
place between the EU and Russia for control of the institutional framework which will 
determine the eventual political alignment of most CEECs, an area that Russia still sees as 
its natural sphere of influence. 4 3 Consequently, the Russian attitude towards new EU 
initiatives does not prove to be very cooperative44 and the imposition of the CSCE as the 
only security structure in Europe would mean the disappearance of most of EU foreign affairs 
and security plans. 
To short circuit the inertia of the actual CSCE, French Prime Minister Edouard Bahadur 
proposed, at the Copenhagen Summit of June 1993, the creation of a small CSCE consisting 
of the 12 and the Central and Eastern European countries.45 The Paris Conference of 26-7 
May gave birth to the first concrete expression of EU pan-European 'joint Action' under the 
CFSP46 and the field of preventive diplomacy. The Stability pacts intention was to organise 
a series of bilateral conferences and regional round tables between neighbouring Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEEQ states with potential or actual disputes over borders 
and/or minorities.47 Each conference would be "moderated' by an EU official. In order to 
secure CEECs cooperation, the EU proposed the promise of eventual membership, financial 
and trade incentives. The resulting agreements, conducted on basis of existing principles 
(UN, CSCE, Council of Europe), would be part of a Global Pact which would be monitored 
and implemented by the CSCE but will not lead to the creation of a new institutioa48 The 
plan was met with scepticism and resentment. First, because some countries such as Poland, 
4 1 Creation of the Council of Foreign Ministers, a Conflict prevention Centre in Vienna and an 
office for free elections in Warsaw later transformed into an Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights with wider responsibilities within the human dimension. Nomination of a Secretary 
General and the nomination of a High Commissioner on National Minorities. 
4 2 Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev at a NATO meeting in Brussels on May 25 1994. 
4 3 Reference found in the official foreign policy document approved by President Boris Yelstin 
at the end of April 1993. 
4 4 "Le pacte de Stabilite accueilli froidement a l'Est' in Liberation, 26 May 1994. 
4 5 "Bahadur: un "pacte" pour la securite' in the Figaro, 21 Juin 1993. p. 5. 
4 6 The stability pact was adopted at the Brussels Council meeting in December 1993. 
4 7 Text of the Stability Pact is in Europe Documents in Agence Europe, n° 6240,30-1 May 1994. 
Nine countries were identified as primarily involved: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. 
48 Conclusions de la Presidence Beige. Bruxelles, 10-1 decembre 1993. 
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Czech Republic (see infra) Bulgaria and Lithuania were estimated to have no such problems. 
Secondly, CEEGs did not appreciate that Edouard Bahadur, in a communication to the 
Commission on 9 June 1993 about the pact, put their accession to the EU under new 
conditions, namely solving all their border and minority problems before joining. Thirdly, 
countries such as the Balkans and the Caucasus who most needed a political solution were 
excluded from the pact. 4 9 Fourthly, the pact does not alleviate other European security 
structure's weakness: lack of enforcement power. E. Gazzo regrets that 
'the world has still not understood, in spite of the experience of the past, 
that it is not by creating collective assemblies (which do not replace 
dialogue) that peace will be ensured. The growing number of such 
assemblies may create jobs and certainly confusion'50 
US and Russia have expressed general political support but there are some doubts about the 
need for a pact, considering existing CSCE mechanisms sufficient. The EU is however 
identified as the key player in this initiative and has a strong interest in proving that the 
CFSP is working and in facilitating political reintegration of CEECs. 
The CFSP introduced a major innovation by including defence-related questions in the 
European political integration process,51 however, the insertion of defence in the Maastricht 
Treaty which could lead to the eventual framing of a common defence policy and common 
defence, has only been possible at the price of complete absence of supranationalism in this 
field. As a matter of fact, the WEU, a purely intergovernmental institution, was asked by 
the EU to "elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence 
implications'. The emergence of a European defence policy has entailed major rethinking 
of the European security framework: One of the most important questions is being debated 
between Europeanist and Atlanticist. The latter seeing the American presence on European 
soil as crucial for its defence (UK, Denmark) and the former believing in the progressive 
emergence of an autonomous European defence mainly based on the Franco-German couple. 
Relations between the two major security structures in Europe; NATO and WEU; are 
therefore influenced by this debate. 
The WEUs defence policy is politically conditioned by the EU but it is dependent on 
NATO as far as operational means are concerned Both NATO and the West European 
Union (WEU), as reactivated at the 1989 Rome Summit, are assuming a different and 
Agence Europe n° 6239. 28 May 1994. p. 3. 
E. Gazzo in Agence Europe, n° 6140, 3/4 January 1994. p. 1. 
TEU, Art J.4. § 1. 
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complementary role and have developed integrated answers to the security challenge of 
Europe. Central European diplomatic and defence objectives are quite clear: they want to 
join NATO and WEU and see their integration in other European institutions such as CSCE 
and other programmes as the best way to accomplish this wish. As Peter Boross, 
Hungarian's Foreign Minister put it 
Tt is good for no one if a vacuum would be created again in the middle of 
Europe that might trigger different ambitions from different powers, the 
country's security rests on belonging somewhere and due to the western 
European orientation this can only be NATO I think it is very important 
that we do everything in order to get closer to NATO and finally to become 
a member'52 
Soon after the 1989 revolution and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact (officially on 
1 July 1991), Central European countries established a complex system of direct military 
contacts with NATO. From early 1990 onwards, they forged close bilateral military relations 
with individual NATO countries53 and they began providing facilities to NATO for military 
purposes. Both Hungary and Czechoslovakia gave Germany permission to fly combat 
aircraft over their territory during the Gulf war in early 1991 and US aircraft were able to 
refuel at Hungarian bases. They expressed the will to go further. Long before the collapse 
of the Soviet regime, the Polish leadership was lauding NATO as the 'central pillar of 
European security', President Havel asked for NATO membership during his visit to 
Brussels in March 1991 and officials in Budapest called for 'Hungary's integration into the 
existing Western security systems'. These requests received a mixed reception. Of course, 
NATO states welcomed Central European participation in the Alliance's activities but formal 
membership could create a major risk of isolating and antagonising Russia and NATO did 
not want to create a new division in Europe. Moreover, the enlargement of NATO to four 
new members could paralyse the decision making process which is based on unanimity. 
Surely NATO does not want to be a second CSCE. There will also be many constraints and 
a lot of work to do to harmonise so many different structures. After the failure of the 1991 
coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union four months later, many of 
NATO's earlier reservations ceased to be relevant but it was still reluctant to propose full 
alliance membership with complete security guarantees. Consequently, NATO began to 
develop a new policy taking greater account of local security concerns and created the North 
5 2 NATO press service, latest news. 23 December 1993. 
5 3 Since 1991 Poland has signed military treaties with all neighbouring states and with several 
NATO countries including the US, Germany, France, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands and UK. 
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Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) at the Alliance Summit of Rome on 7-8 November 
1991.54 NACC has now 38 members and provides a post-Cold war forum where Central 
and Eastern European countries have a direct link with NATO. The idea behind it is to 
develop it into a more independent body, able to coordinate peace-keeping activities and 
military cooperation.55 
Central European countries although welcoming this initiative were not very impressed 
with the level of commitment present in the NACC and thought that the NACC was more 
a substitute for NATO membership than a preparation for it. A new concept was then 
elaborated at the Brussels NATO Summit in January 1994: Barimrship for Feme. This 
concept is based on bilateral agreements and gives the opportunity for a state to discuss with 
NATO if it feels insecure on a 16 + 1 basis. NATO may then offer some security 
guarantees. If there is any problem between two partners, then NATO will bring them 
together around a table in order to find a solution. Central European countries were still not 
very satisfied but NATO argued that it was the only thing it could do. Polish President Lech 
Walesa expressed his concern to the Italian newspaper la Stampa saying: 
"Eastern European countries must be admitted into the European Union and 
NATO or Russia would seek to re-assert its influence in the region by 
taking the initiative and exercising economic pressures on us. We will have 
to give in to compromises and the former Soviet Bloc will organise itself 
again'56 
NATO is supposed to be the perfect remedy for Central European security headaches but 
NATO has three weaknesses. It lacks expertise in the management of small crises, it is 
unable to intervene out-of-area and it is reluctant to give security guarantees to CEECs. 
Moreover, as the Europeanisation of the Western security structure was considered essential, 
both NATO and the European Union saw the West European Union (WEU) as an "integral 
part of the development of the Union' 5 7 in the field of security and defence. As its 
Secretary General, Willem van Eekelen put it in his speech at the European Parliament: 
"WEU will take the lead when NATO cannot act'.58 
5 4 V. Soule "La Communaute bousculee par 1'Europe de l'Esf in F.Feron, Armelle Thoraval L'Etat 
de VEumpe. ed. La Decouverte, Paris 1992. pp.466- 468. 
5 5 NATO press service, latest news, 3 December 1993. 
5 6 NATO press service, latest news. 3 January 1994. 
5 7 TEU, Art. J.4. § 2. 
5 8 Speech of W van Eekelen at the Commission for Foreign Affairs and Security. European 
Parliament, Brussels, 30 March 1994. unpublished. 
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WEU is based on the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948 modified by the Paris 
agreements of 23 October 1954. Its aims were to create in Western Europe a firm basis for 
European economic recovery, to afford assistance to each other in resisting any policy of 
aggression promote unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe. 5 9 WEU 
played an important role in integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the Atlantic 
Alliance, in assuming responsibilities for arms control, and in settling the Saar problem but 
it lost some of its purpose during the seventies and eighties. It was re-activated in 1989 at 
the Rome Summit and was given two new objectives: the definition of a European security 
identity and the gradual harmonization of the defence policies of Member States. Following 
the Summit in Rome, the WEU Council was to hold two meetings a year at ministerial level. 
WEU is now seen as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance in the new European 
security architecture alongside NATO and CSCE, considering itself an integral part of the 
process of European unification and the future defence arm of a European Union. 
The Atlantic Alliance Summit in Rome (7-8 November 1991) recognized the European 
security identity and its role in defence and at the EC Summit in Maastricht (9-10 December 
1991), the WEU Member States adopted a declaration on the role of the WEU and its 
relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance.60 This text states that 
WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, WEU will 
- formulate a European defence policy and carry forward its concrete 
implementation through the further development of its own operational role 
- implement the decisions of the European Union which have defence 
implications 6 1 
- promote the introduction of joint positions of its members into the 
Alliance's consultation mechanisms. 
In the Petersberg Declaration adopted during their meeting in Bonn, 19 June 1992, the 
Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU countries decided to create a military force that 
could intervene at the request of the CSCE or of the Security Council of the United Nations. 
These forces could be used for humanitarian missions, peace keeping operations and for 
5 9 Western European Union. European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, 
Sub-committee on security and disarmament 7 June 1993. Document PE 205.114 
6 0 This declaration reflects the consensus obtained on the basis of two bilateral initiatives: the 
Italian-British Declaration of 4 October 1991 and the letter from Pt Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl 
of 14 October 1991 proposing the creation of the Euro-corps. 
6 1 Disposition that we can find in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) article J. 4. § 2. "The 
Union requests the WEU, which is an integral part of the development of the Union; to elaborate and 
implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, 
in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.' 
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conflict management actions, including operations to re-establish peace. WEU has 
established very close relations with NATO which developed, in January 1994, the idea of 
Combined Joint Task Forces by which NATO forces could be made available to WEU such 
as the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps,62 headquarters, communication and surveillance systems 
and different national assets such as intelligence services, satellite. As a result of 
WEU/NATO cooperation, NATO is able, since June 1992, to conduct peacekeeping 
operations and out-of-area activities under a mandate from the CSCE. To respond to CEECs 
needs, the WEU offered an enhanced status of association to CEECs. 6 3 The Associate 
Partner Status gives the CEECs the possibility to 
participate in meeting of the WEU Council unless otherwise decided; 
receive regular information on the activities of the Council working groups; 
arrange for a liaison with the Planning Cell; 
associate themselves with decisions taken by Member States and participate in 
their implementation 
First CEECs reactions were positive, as they were satisfied with the extent to which they 
would be involved and participate in the work of WEU. They see their present status with 
WEU as far more reaching than the status offered to the CEEC by NATO in its Partnership 
for Peace programme. 
Both the Europeanised NATO and the WEU are complementary and very important 
military structures, however, the relevance of non-military elements in the formulation of the 
European security policy makes the European Community the best forum to discuss and to 
back up financially and economically diplomatic initiatives. The Polish Ambassador in Paris 
Jerzy Lukaszewski notes,64 'the European Union represents the stability, an effective support 
to the institutionalisation of a democratic system in these countries, and finally because it 
represents a clear goal to the population who has to suffer from the economic restructuring.' 
Central European countries have clearly expressed their policy in the Visegrad 3 
memorandum of November 1991: 
'Our three countries are convinced that stable democracy respect for human 
rights and continued policy of economic reforms will make accession 
possible. We call upon the Communities and the member-states to respond 
6 2 The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps consists of four divisions from European NATO Member 
Sstates under the leadership of the United Kingdom. 
6 3 Decision taken during a meeting of the Consultation Forum at ambassadorial level on 19 April 
1994. See official document on a status of Association with WEU for Bulgaria, Czech Rep., Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Rep. 
Association status very similar to the one given to Iceland, Norway and Turkey in November 1992. 
6 4 X'Europe centrale et les Douze' in Le Figaro, 21 Jutn 1993. p. 2. 
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to our efforts by clearly stating the integration of our economies and societies, 
leading to membership of the Communities, is the aim of the Communities 
themselves. This simple but historic statement would provide the anchor 
which we need.165 
However, the consequences of this enlargement have made more urgent the discussion 
of institutional changes at the European level. The debate is therefore on how to enlarge to 
Central Europe without putting into jeopardy the already limited efficiency of the European 
institutions and the continuity of the European integration process. This debate left Central 
European in a disabused mood as the Hungarian minister Jeszenszky's comments illustrate: 
"We hope that Western Europe wants to be more than merely a neo-
Carolingian empire, and that it will not miss the opportunity to open up new 
horizons. Naturally, much will depend on the EC's further internal 
development and on the economy. The present slump does not encourage 
integratioa'66 
and condiUommty Jm The if em emem question o 
We said earlier on that the EU is unlikely to develop an integrated common foreign 
policy unless there is an initial transfer of sovereignty from Member States to the EU in this 
sphere. If that were the case, as a consequence, the European Union would be transformed 
into a federal system However, the time when European integration and delegation of 
sovereignty was anonymously done through application of very technical decisions is now 
over. Any transfer of sovereignty in the highly sensitive realm of international political 
affairs demands a political debate which gives citizens the opportunity to face their 
responsibilities and to question their governments in order to choose which standard of 
democracy, transparency and efficiency they want to put in the EU. The structure on which 
its international political capacity is based is intergovernmental and preserves national 
privileges, but it is probable that it will find its limits with the next enlargement. As their 
economic and political situation has put the EC/EU under pressure to adapt its policies and 
structure of intervention (i.e. CCP, Europe Agreements, CFSP, TEU, EMU), in the same way, 
6 5 Mchalski and Wallace. The European Community, the Challenge of Enlargement. RITA. Nov. 
1992. 2nd Edition. London, p. 114. 
6 6 Article of Hungarian Minister Jeszensky, "We are well Placed for EC' in the Dutch newspaper 
Groot BijgaanJen De Standaard 19-20 May 1993. p. 4. 
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Central European countries by the prospect of their accession, may force the EU to adapt its 
institutions and to define more precisely its nature. Will this be enough to secure a transfer 
of sovereignty? 
Enlargement is usually the best occasion for states and peoples to debate on the 
advantages and disadvantages of European integration and to find the right political solutions 
to preserve and improve the heritage of the Founding Fathers. The EU has, however, missed 
such a historical opportunity with the EFTAN enlargement because the debate on institutional 
reforms has been postponed to the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 and widening and 
deepening have been dangerously dissassociated. Without being excessively pessimistic, it 
is very unlikely that major and far reaching reforms will be undertaken in 1996 because there 
is simply no consensus and no pressure on the Member States to find one on either the scope 
of these reforms or on the agenda. This section details Member States attitudes towards 
enlargement to CEECs and reform prospects. The absence of consensus and the different 
interests illustrate the lack of vision that the EU suffers at the international level and 
consequently demonstrates that a CFSP as explained earlier on will be more and more 
difficult to put into place. The second section argues that the conditions of accession set up 
by the Copenhagen Summit reveal that the ultimate decision to enlarge the EU is political 
and that it is in the Member States' hands to decide which reforms to undertake. The last 
section introduces us to the limits of the EU present institutional framework in the light of 
the enlargement to Central European countries and illustrates the gap which exists between 
the ideal solution and the political reality. 
The enlargement to Central European countries is a difficult question for the European 
Union because it will command more drastic reforms, at both institutional and policy levels, 
than those which have been adopted so far by the Union to cope with the enlargement to 
Nordic countries, Austria. In the past the Community associated widening and deepening 
of the Community, however in the nineties, Member States' attitudes and interests led to an 
inward-looking stance which limited the EU international efforts quite dramatically, 
especially towards Central Europe. It is arguable that the economic and political external 
policy of the EU has been dominated to a certain extent by national political interests and 
concerns. 
Germany is particularly interested in integrating Central European countries into the 
European Union for a number of reasons. First, that would be a source of stability in the 
regions where the economic and political situation could create important emigration waves. 
Second, the German presence in these countries would be more acceptable i f Germany 
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behaved as an ally in the integration process. W. Brandt, in the late sixties, was already 
thinking of Federalism as a means of re-stnicturing relations between Germany and the East 
European countries which had common economic interests.67 Third, Germany is favourable 
to enlargement for economic reasons. Along with Britain, she thinks that economic 
restructuring could be faster and more efficient if those countries were inside the EC 
framework, furthermore the creation of a single market would undeniably benefit the massive 
German presence in that area. With reunification, Germany has become the giant of Europe. 
It represents 25% of the EC total population with 79 millions inhabitants, its has a GNP 
twice as much as that of Britain and its economic growth (4.6% in 1990, with 700,000 jobs 
created) has transformed her into the locomotive of the European integration. This growth 
of Germany has, in turn, pushed small countries to favour enlargement in order to dilute it. 
Thus Belgium, which was opposed to the Austrian enlargement, became a supporter after 
German reunification. The German share and role in the redevelopment of Central Europe 
is without doubt the most important. The Economist, in illustrating its comments on the 
recognition of the Baltic States, Slovenia and Croatia, alleged that Germany had taken the 
lead in foreign politics towards Central and Eastern Europe because France and Britain had 
no alternative strategy of their own 6 8 As Theo Sommer put it 
'We think it is absolutely indispensable to contain the emerging united 
Germany within the larger framework of a United Europe with Western 
Europe at its core but Eastern Europe not forever beyond the pole.'69 
Germany has forced her partners to redefine their policy towards the European 
Community. France whose prime concern was to contain German power was reluctant to 
enlarge the Community before tying Germany closer to European integratioa France was 
also worried that Germany could be less interested in the European integration process than 
before its reunification and that Central and Eastern European would see things the German 
way. Germany, understanding her neighbour's concern, accepted association in the EMU and 
EPU processes, even if some doubts were raised about their relevance in a difficult economic 
and international climate. This decision proved to be very expensive not only to Germany, 
who has to face a costly reunification process and her financial responsibilities in the Gulf 
war, but also to European states which have to bear the consequences of the 1992 ERM 
6 7 M. Burgess Federalism and European Union Political Ideas, Influence and Strategies in the 
European Community, 1972-1987. London 1989. chap. 4. "The origins and growth of European Union 
1969-1979'. 
6 8 'From the Atlantic to where1 in The Economist 31/8/91 p.44. 
6 9 Theo Sommer 'We can be trusted' in Newsweek, 9 July 1990. 
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crisis. As early as 22 November 1989, France and Germany, in a joint address, insisted that 
EC political integration and democracy in the East had to go together and that the best way 
to respond to events was to strengthen the EC bonds so that the EC could maintain its 
magnetic attraction to the East.' 7 0 Their common attitude toward European security is 
commanded by a German reaffirmation of allegiance to the West and a worry to quell French 
fears.71 This Franco-German couple, supposedly at the heart of the European integration 
process, was put under serious strain by the Yugoslav crisis and the German monetary policy, 
which reflect a more powerful German role in the conduct of international affairs of the EC. 
To calm down Central European impatience, President F. Mitterrand proposed the creation 
of a European confederation and suggested a first meeting in Prague in June 1991. This 
proposition did not really satisfy Central Europe and received a cool welcome after 
Mitterrand's declarations that the enlargement of the European Community would take "des 
dizaines et des dizaines d'annees'.72 
Italy, and to a certain extent Belgium and Spain, was strongly committed to the idea of 
a federal European Union and to any policy that would give more powers not only to the 
Commission but also to the European Parliament. 7 3 However, this commitment to more 
European integration is in competition with specific Italian interests in the Central European 
zone and lessened by nationalist pressures. Italian market shares represented almost 15% in 
1991, - just behind Germany - and Italy is quite active in the development and organisation 
of a regional cooperation called Pentagonal created in 1989 and enlarged to Poland in 1991 
to form the hexagonal. If this association was to serve as a vehicle for Italian influence, The 
Economist affirms that it was also to act as a barrier to German expansion into Central 
Europe. 7 4 Great Britain is eager to enlarge the EC, not for their economic or political 
benefit, but rather to dilute the integration process into a more intergovernmental structure. 
The Thatcher government was ready to accept Central European countries whose economies 
would have seriously impeded the completion of EMU and EPU. The lack of consensus 
amongst Member States and their national interests did not produce the outcome that CEECs 
were expecting from the EC. As Ryszard Piasecki expresses it : 
7 0 R Rummel. op. cit. p. 125. 
7 1 Guy de Carmoy Tranco-German relations in the new Europe' in R J. Jackson Europe in 
transition, the management of security after the cold wcr. Praeger, London 1992. p. 143. 
7 2 V. Soule 'La Communaute bousculee par l'Europe de I'Est' in F.Feron, Armelle Thoraval LEtat 
de VEurope. ed. La Decouverte, Paris 1992. pp.466- 468. 
7 3 J. Pinder '1992 and beyond: European Community and Eastern Europe' in the International 
Spectator, vol. XXV, no. 3. July September 1990. pp. 172-183. 
7 4 'Hello Neighbours' in the Economist 13/07/91 p. 35. 
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"The Community is not yet ready to satisfy our desires and our vital needs. 
It does not seem yet disposed to really and plainly cooperate with the 
Visegrad countries.'75 
Central European commitment to join the EU and its progress towards more democracy and 
more market economy, which has not been matched elsewhere in Eastern Europe, compelled, 
however, the EU to react and to offer to CEECs more than individual Member States were 
ready to give. The EC decided at the June 1992 Lisbon to promise enlargement to capable 
candidates and the EU repeated its pledge at the Copenhagen European Council: 
"the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall 
become members of the European Union Accession will take place as soon 
as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by 
satisfying the economic and political conditions required.'76 
The Treaty of Rome uses the concepts of European and democracy as eligibility criteria. 
They are based on European identity, the respect of Human rights, democracy, respect and 
protection of ethnic minorities. On top of these general principles, the candidate must have 
a "functioning and competing market economy, an adequate legal and administrative 
framework in the public and private sectors... and the capacity to implement the Community's 
system'. 7 7 The European Council declared at the Edinburgh Summit that it accepted the 
eventual membership of Central European states when they are able to satisfy the conditions, 
which are as follows: 
i) The capacity of the applicant countries to assume the obligations of membership 
(Acquis communautcdre) 
ii) democratic society 
iii) a functioning market economy 
iv) the capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
v) market sources within the EU 
vi) provision which is the Community's capacity to absorb new members while 
deepening. 
Applicant countries must meet certain economic criteria in their economic capacity which 
are defined by the Maastricht criteria of convergence. For example, the Maastricht criteria 
requires the government's budget deficit to be 3% of GDP or less. The Czech republic's 
7 5 Ryszard Piasecki 'La Pologne dans la nouvelle architecture europeenne' in L'Eiovpe en 
formation n° 287, Hiver 1992-1993. p.24.27. My translation. 
76 Conclusions of the Presidency. Copenhagen, June 21-22 1993. 
7 7 Point 5 of the Challenge of the Enlargement. 
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deficit is less, while Hungary's and Poland's are both lower than Italy's. On inflation, all do 
as well as or better than Europe's southern economies. Overall, Poland, the Czech republic 
and Hungary seem readier than some current Member States.78 At the Lisbon meeting, the 
Commission reaffirmed also the importance for the applicant countries to accept fully the 
acquis Communautdre and the political objectives of the European Unioa 7 9 The definition 
of the Community's acquis is defined as follow by the Lisbon Council: 
i) the contents, principles and political objectives of the Treaties, including the 
Maastricht Treaty, 
ii) the legislation adopted in implementation of the Treaties and the jurisprudence 
of the Court; 
iii) the declarations and resolutions adopted in the Community framework; 
iv) the international agreements and the agreements between Member States 
connected with the Community's activities. 
This acquis communautdre that the new entrants cannot refuse in the long term, put the 
price of entry at a very high level. This threshold has furthermore been upgraded by the 
Maastricht Treaty. Several EU Member States political leaders have insisted that opt out 
clauses, protocols and declarations attached to the Treaty would be applicable only to the 
existing member that is explicitly mentioned 8 0 I f this is the price to homogeneity in the 
future, that is fine, but the development ofa.de facto Europe a la carte, with the Schengen 
group, the decision of 11 members to go ahead with a European social policy and the fact 
that economic and monetary qualifications will probably divide further the European 
integration make it extremely difficult to define what would be the basis of the negotiations. 
The elaboration of the political union will certainly give the answer to this problem, but here 
again it is necessary to define more exactly what are the ambitions and the philosophy of the 
European Unioa Whereas the Central European states would have some problems to 
integrate economically speaking, they leave no doubt about their commitment to the pohtical 
goal of the Unioa But a s M K Hodges noted: 'the Maastricht Treaty missed several vital 
elements, [and does not give] a clear statement of the purpose and nature of the 
Community1.81 Even i f Member States do not know exactiy what is the /indite politique of 
78 The Economist March 13th 1993. p.21. 
7 9 J. Delors Tnaugural address to CEPS Sixth Annual Conference' Centre for European Policy 
studies 6th Annual Conference. Bruxelles, 1989. pp. 9-15 
8 0 A. Michalski, H. Wallace. The European Community, the Challenge of Enlargement. London 
1992. p. 47. 
8 1 Hodges M. R. "The European Union: implications of the Maastricht Treaty for relations with 
non-members'. Ditchley Conference Report no. D.92/1. Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire, 31/01/92 
2/02/1992. p.5. 
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the Union, it did not impede Janos Martonyi, the Hungarian Foreign Minister of 1992, from 
reaffirming' [their] unlimited commitment to the yinalite politique.'82 Does he know exactly 
what kind of commitment he is making here? This set of conditions that the CEECs have 
to fulfi l is only a part of the process of enlargement as it is still conditional on the Union's 
capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration. 
In fact, this appreciation of the readiness of the EU to accept Central European countries 
depends very much on a consensus on institutional reforms that has still to be found. 
The Eftan enlargement has not so far modified the institutional setup of the European 
Union and also showed that Member States were reluctant to change the present institutional 
setup. However, as far as the Visegrad enlargement is concerned, the number of Member 
States involved in the European integration process will make the reform of the European 
institutions indispensable. J. Delors affirmed that 
'An enlarged Community will not be able to operate effectively without 
major institutional change. This will, in particular, affect the Ctornrnission, 
Council and European Parliament. The only realistic path for the 
Community is towards a federal Europe'.83 "We must have a Community 
which is political, efficient in its decision making and which can constantly 
deepen its own sense of unity. 8 4 
Although we cannot agree more with J. Delors' conclusion and objectives, it is 
unrealistic to expect similar analysis from Member States and nothing suggests that a 
federation will emerge in the foreseable future. It is possible to imagine many scenarios for 
Europe which could end either in its absolution, its federal accomplishment or in-between 
solutions. Many propositions have been made these past few years to deal with Europe's 
institutional changes. However, i f the European Union clearly wants a genuine Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and a Common Defence Policy, meaning the exercice of their 
sovereignty at a supranational level, it will come with the birth of a federal system 
Delegation of sovereignty at foreign policy level cannot be separated from the birth of a 
federal system As a consequence, any institutional reform which has not a clearly 
federalistic purpose could be seen as an obstacle to the international affirmation of the 
European Union 
8 2 Survey The European Community in the Economist, 11 July 1992. p.27. 
8 3 Survey "The European Community in the Economist, 11 July 1992. p. 18. 
8 4 "Resurgent Delors seeks to rekindle Euro-enthusiasm' in the Financial Times. 27 May 1993. 
p.2. 
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Bringing in the Eftans and the Visegrad 4 would create a 17 official language EU, 
requiring more than 55 interpreters at every meeting of the European Council and Council 
of Ministers undermining the efficiency of the Union The acceptance of possibly 10 new 
Member States (Nordic countries, Austria, Cyprus, Malta and Visegrad 4) will also put under 
strain the representation system of the Union The origins of the voting structures of the EC 
lies in the will of the EC 6 to ensure that Germany should not outweigh France and that each 
Member State should be represented whatever their size. This principle creates blatant 
inequalities. Germany has ten votes in the Council making one vote representing 7,8 m 
people Luxembourg has 2 votes, making 1 vote for 188,000 people. The Lisbon European 
Council asks, in point 23, that the relation between the number of seats and the population 
of Member States be rationalised. Indeed the current organisation cannot possibly be 
maintained with the perspective of further enlargements. With the present system, the 
Visegrad 4, with 25.7 million people, would have more votes than Germany.85 A balance 
has also to be found between the big and the small countries as the inequality and the 
number of representatives would politically damage the efficiency of the European voting 
system 
Another problem concerns the inconsistency of the rotating Presidency in international 
affairs. There is no exact correlation between small states and the record of achievements, 
but the EU policy could be greatly influenced by the Member States which hold the 
Presidency and which could focus on problems which do not directly concern EU interests. 
The Portuguese Presidency was blamed for pressing its own interests in East Timor while 
neglecting the Yugoslav crisis, not breaking the budget deadlock or having any impact on 
the GATT talks.8 6 Another disadvantage is the incoherence in style and political priorities 
of each Presidency and the degree of acceptance at the international level is limited in some 
cases. The Gulf war and the Yugoslav crisis have illustrated that the outside world tends to 
address first the larger Member States with a standing at the international level. 
Furthermore, with a increasing number of states, the chance for a big Member State to 
preside over the European Union would become extremely rare. The French, in their 1990 
proposal, would like to get rid of the present system whereby the Presidency of the Council 
rotates every six months and propose a large country to hold the Presidency for several years, 
with small countries holding a six-month vice-presidency. 8 7 Klaus Hansen, a German 
socialist member of the EP's Committee on institutional affairs proposed in his report that 
T. Garel Jones 'Leading the pack into the heart of Europe, in the Times, 21 June 1993. p. 8. 
'Survival of the fattest: in the Economist 11/4/92 p. 60. 
Survey on the European Community, in the Economist, 7 July 1990. p. 30. 
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the presidency of the Community stayed in the hand of the big five and so for one year and 
that all decisions should be taken by a majority voting. 8 8 It goes without saying that small 
states were not very happy with these proposals. Another proposal in the air in early 1992 
was to give the Presidency to the big 4 and to organise the vice-presidency on a regional 
basis. Thus the Benelux countries would have been associated with the vice-presidency and 
rotate with Spain and Portugal associated in an Iberian Presidency. In case of enlargement 
other regional associations would naturally be integrated as the Northern European 
presidency, the Slav presidency (Poland and Czechoslovakia), an Austro-Hungarian and 
finally a Balkan presidency.89 
As the number of Member States grows the management of the Commission's work will 
be more and more difficult. J. Delors insists on the restriction of any "opting out' policies 
for the new members, but does not ignore that European affairs will be more and more 
complex. Hie Community edifice is based on a number of different policies with different 
decision-making processes and different stages at which present Member States are evolving 
and new entrants are benefitting from transition periods. It can be very disruptive for the EU 
on the international stage as the level of commitment is different from one country to 
another. As a consequence, the Commission will need a substantial increase of its powers 
to manage a de facto multi-speed Europe and to reorganise more rationally the sharing of 
powers and tasks between the Community, national and regional governments. This increase 
of power commands more democratic control and political accountability but also a 
rationalisation of the interactions of national and supranational administrative structures. The 
principle that has been chosen is the principle of subsidiarity, already used in the Single act -
art 130 R- about the environment and which is defined in art. G of the Maastricht Treaty. 
It means that what could be realised efficiently at the lowest level should not be attributed 
to a bigger structure. It is now working in the German federation and would fight against 
the "bureaucratic Moloch' which is invading the European Community as H Kohl denounced 
it. 9 0 According to the Lisbon Council, it implies: 
i) a less comprehensive and detailed legislative programme for the Council 
and the Parliament; 
88 Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the structure and strategy for the European 
Union with regard to its enlargement and the creation of a Europe-wide order1 rapporteur Klaus 
Hansen. 21 May 1992. PE 152.242/fm. 
8 9 'Big is beautiful' in the Economist 11/1/92. p. 50. 
9 0 Pierre Servent 'La subsidiarite contre le Moloch bureaucratique' in Le Monde 30 Juin 1992. 
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ii) a more balanced attribution of tasks to the appropriate bodies at the 
appropriate levels (regional, national, or Community levels); 
iii) a clearer distinction between responsibility for decision and 
responsibility for implementation, which can often be decentralised 
Several legal experts have pointed out that subsidiarity is a political concept which has 
little legislative value and which would eventually be decided by the European Council. R. 
Hoffman argues that this would be the source of more trouble and political fights and would 
increase the byzantine character of European decision making.91 Hoffman therefore sees the 
whole concept as irrelevant. I f the concept of subsidiarity means decentralisation and more 
effective democratic control at the supranational and national level, it also means a 
decentralisation of power from national governments to the regions which certain Member 
States such as France are politically not ready to accomplish As Mchalski and Wallace 
argue 'neither the principle, nor the practice of subsidiarity is sufficiently defined to provide 
political and legal guidance on how a larger and more diverse Community would operate'.92 
To deal with the lack of democratic control over the Commission and the Council work, 
the TEU gave more power to the European Parliament. But this delegation of power has 
been limited by the Member States and national parliaments which are quite opposed to 
lessening their power and democratic control. The Maastricht Treaty gave the EP a say in 
the nomination of the Commission on the Council's proposal and associates the EP in the co-
operation procedure and in the conclusion of constitutional and foreign treaties. Considering 
the debate on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the economic recession, the re-
nationalisation of European politics and the criticisms about the achievement of the Union, 
the next enlargement presents many dangers for the Union and the whole integration process. 
It is indeed difficult to imagine any progress in international relations i f citizens do not 
believe that European structures can answer people's domestic needs. The reappearance of 
people's electoral sanction in European affairs renders very difficult any change in the 
institutional balance i f the EU cannot produce results and proves that it can achieve what 
cannot be achieved by Member States. Many ad hoc solutions could be imagined but the 
Maastricht Treaty showed that an institutional syncretism which aims at reconciling 
intergovernmentalism, pragmatic solutions and federalist rhetoric rendered the EU more 
9 1 S. Hoffman 'Reflections of the Nation-State in Western Europe Today' in Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 21, 1983. p. 21-37. 
9 2 A. Michalski, H. Wallace. The European Community, the Challenge of Enlargement. RII A. 
London 1992. p. 47. 
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complex and opaque to public understanding than before and still does not answer their 
expectations. Moreover, the increasing number of problems emerging from ad hoc solutions 
or arithmetic improvements, such as the growing lack of transparency, democracy and 
efficiency, demonstrates that the rationale which was behing the 1994 enlargement cannot 
be maintained in the Central European case. As J.Delors said "the only realistic path is 
towards a federal Europe' but such a political project commands drastic reforms which 
requires a political maturity which is absent from the European political scene. For example, 
the federal model as proposed in a study of the European Parliament93 would transform the 
Commission into a government representing the Union in all policy fields to its citizens and 
to the outside world. This government would be responsible to the two assemblies: one 
being supported by the direct legitimacy of the people (the European Parliament) and the 
other indirectly legitimized through the States. The EP will therefore be promoted by 
receiving co-decisional powers in all fields of activity and the Council would in turn be 
transformed into a "Senate' with all Member States represented in the same way, with 
majority voting as the general rule. It will limit quite dramatically the "executive powers' 
of the Council and would cut it down to a simple role of representation with the same 
legislative powers as those of the EP. As the Commission would take the attributions of the 
Presidency in International Affairs, the Presidency's new role would be limited to the chairing 
of the meetings of the Council and to formal representation It does not take too much effort 
to see that this federal solution is beyond reach against the present trend of renationalisation 
and that it is not yet evident that Central European pressure on both the European Union and 
its policies will put Europe back on the federal path. 
9 3 European Parliament. DGIV working papers on Enlarged Community: Institutional 
Adaptations. Political Series n°17. June 1992. 
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The 1989 revolution and the re-emergence of Central Europe on the European diplomatic 
scene has had important consequences, not only historical but also economic and political. 
Central Europe resurrected from the Soviet grave and appeared under the name of Visegrad 
4. This regional structure took shape in 1991 and gathered four countries: Poland, Hungary, 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. These countries share the same diplomatic and economic aims 
which are to create a free trade area among themselves and eventually to join the EC. Their 
cooperation is, however, uneasy because they are facing the historical consequences of 200 
years of European civil wars. Many problems which were neutralised during the Soviet 
occupation re-appeared such as border disputes, minority problems, political instability of 
newly democratic regimes and a certain renewal of the East/West antagonism. On top of this 
historical legacy, 1989 has thrown the whole political and security landscape of Europe into 
confusion, leaving all major pan-European institutions without a role or without a structure 
to intervene efficiently. 1989 and Central Europe pose a series of new economic political 
and security problems, but it also gave the EC the opportunity to affirm itself as a major 
international partner. 
As far as economic and financial assistance was concerned, the EC was the institution 
most able to intervene on the continent. Chapter 2 explained that with the CCP, the EC has 
at its disposal a Community instrument which enables it to intervene and to preserve its 
common interest and the interest of Central Europe against individual discriminatory actions. 
Although the EC was already quite developed as far as its international economic capacity 
was concerned, it to set up a new instrument of intervention - the PHARE programme- and 
improved already existing tool by transforming Association Agreements into Europe 
Agreements. These two iristrurnents were developed very quickly without clearly defined 
political strategy. As a matter of fact, European agreements had to be updated several times 
in four years with two different generations and more trade concessions granted at the 
Copenhagen Summit. PHARE, which assists financially Central European economies in 
transition, has progressively expanded its scope of activities to finance democratic and 
structural programmes. As a consequence it has become the largest grant assistance 
programme. Even i f the EC/EU policy has met criticisms from Central European countries 
complaining about the slowness of trade liberalisation, its selfish attitude and incoherent 
policy, it has, nevertheless, shown a certain capacity of reaction and adaptability to answer 
its neighbours' economic needs. 
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This capacity to respond to international pressure was possible thanks to the completion 
of the Common Cbmmercial Policy which gives the Community exclusive powers in external 
economic affairs. The EC is, therefore, competent and able to respond to Central European 
economic needs but there exist some questions which still need to be solved before we can 
witness the level of efficiency that we are expecting from the EC. As the process towards 
domesticization of international relations went on, many more economic decisions are 
politically motivated. This was very clear from the structure of the Europe Agreement which 
gives a more important role the political dialogue. This could also be found in the creeping 
re-nationalisation and politicization of the Common Commercial Policy and the decision 
making process of the whole European Community. This trend is inevitable because the 
present international environment demands such identification of politics and economics in 
any coherent foreign policy. 
Several attempts have been made, first in 1987 with the Single European Act and second 
in 1992 with Maastricht, to reconcile economics and politics within the European integration 
process, but this major challenge is, however, difficult to undertake. As we saw earlier, 
political cooperation has developed far away from the Community procedure. European 
Political Cooperation and Common Foreign Security Policy respond to a completely different 
logic and mtergovernrnental model which is lacking the most essential ingredients which 
made the Common Commercial Policy a success. First, there is no initial transfer of 
sovereignty which grants the EU juridical personality. The role of the Court of Justice which 
was vital in helping the Community to interpret the basic articles founding the CCP, to 
impose and guarantee the consequences of such delegation of power is completely absent 
from the CFSP. Second, international environment and pragmatism have enabled the 
Community to impose in practice the entirety of the commercial dispositions of the Rome 
Treaty but in the case of the CFSP it just shows how impotent the EU is so far. Third, the 
exercise of its competences has called for international recognition of the Community as the 
only competent body, but in the case of external political affairs no major international actor 
has addressed the EU as such because it has no juridical personality whatsoever and therefore 
the EU cannot conclude international conventions, cannot define and exercise its competences 
and powers that the objectives that are implied in the Maastricht Treaty. The decision 
making process of the Common Foreign Security Policy responds to intergovernmental 
criteria and renders the adoption of common foreign policy difficult. The EUs attempts to 
provide solutions, not only to Central European countries' minority problems and border 
disputes, but also to Eastern European countries through the Stability Pact, show the limit 
of EUs international capacity. Some would say it is because it just does not dispose of the 
necessary means to intervene or to prevent conflict. The evidences that we have produced 
120 
show that these policies are in fact limited by the very nature of the European Union and that 
the European Common Foreing Policy cannot be achieved without transfer of sovereignty and 
emergence of a federal system Thus, even i f the EU were developing progressively its 
military arms through the WEU, it is unlikely that EUs foreign policy would be more 
efficient in its present setup. As often in the European integration history, external 
environment played an important role. Central European pressures on the European Union's 
policies show that they were strechted to their maximum as were the institutional framework 
in which they were evolving. As a consequence, it is unlikely that the EU acquires an 
efficient common foreign policy in the near future unless Member States and European 
citizens realise that it is impossible to have one without a federal Europe. 
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